Napoleon welcomed the renewal of war. He understood that until he had completely broken the power of Great Britain all his Continental designs were imperiled and his colonial and commercial projects hopeless. The humiliation of the great rival across the Channel would be the surest guarantee of the prosperity of the French bourgeoisie, and it was in last a.n.a.lysis from that cla.s.s that his own political support was chiefly derived. The year 1803-1804 was spent by the emperor in elaborate preparations for an armed invasion of England.

Along the Channel coast were gradually collected at enormous cost a host of transports and frigates, a considerable army, and an abundance of supplies. To the amazing French armament, Spain was induced to contribute her resources.

[Sidenote: The Third Coalition Against France]

Great Britain replied to these preparations by covering the Channel with a superior fleet, by preying upon French commerce, and by seizing Spanish treasure-ships from America. And William Pitt, the very embodiment of the Englishman"s prejudice against things French, returned to the ministry of his country. Pitt was unwilling to risk British armies against the veterans of Napoleon, preferring to spend liberal sums of money in order to instigate the Continental Powers to combat the French emperor. Pitt was the real bone and sinews of the Third Coalition, which was formed in 1805 by Great Britain, Austria, Russia, and Sweden to overthrow Napoleon.

Austria naturally smarted under the provisions of the treaty of Luneville quite as much as under those of Campo Formio. Francis II was aroused by French predominance in Italy and now that he himself had added the t.i.tle of "hereditary emperor of Austria" to his shadowy dignity as "Holy Roman Emperor" he was irritated by the upstart Napoleon"s a.s.sumption of an imperial t.i.tle.

In Russia the a.s.sa.s.sination of the Tsar Paul, the crazy admirer of Bonaparte, had called to the throne in 1801 the active though easily influenced Alexander I. In early life Alexander had acquired a p.r.o.nounced taste for revolutionary philosophy and its liberal ideas, and likewise a more or less theoretical love of humanity. Now, Pitt persuaded him, with the a.s.sistance of English gold, that Napoleon was the enemy both of true liberty and of humanity. So the tsar joined his army with that of Austria, and in the autumn of 1805 the allies advanced through southern Germany toward the Rhine.

Pitt had done his best to bring Prussia into the coalition, but the Prussian king, Frederick William III (1797-1840), was timid and irresolute, and, despite the protests of his people, was cajoled by Napoleon"s offer of Hanover into a declaration of neutrality. Bavaria and Wurttemberg, from fear of Austria, became open allies of the French emperor.

[Sidenote: Napoleon vs. Austria]

Before the troops of the Third Coalition could threaten the eastern frontier of France, Napoleon abandoned his military projects against Great Britain, broke up his huge armaments along the Atlantic coast, and, with his usual rapidity of march, hurled his finely trained army upon the Austrians near the town of Ulm in Wurttemberg. There, on 20 October, 1805, the Austrian commander, with some 50,000 men, surrendered, and the road to Vienna was open to the French.

[Sidenote: Trafalgar (1805) and the Continued Sea Power of Great Britain]

This startling military success was followed on the very next day by a naval defeat quite as sensational and even more decisive. On 21 October, the allied French and Spanish fleets, issuing from the harbor of Cadiz, encountered the British fleet under Lord Nelson, and in a terrific battle off Cape Trafalgar were completely worsted. Lord Nelson lost his life in the conflict, but from that day to the close of the Napoleonic Era British supremacy on the high seas was not seriously challenged.

[Sidenote: Austerlitz, 1805]

Wasting no tears or time on the decisive loss of sea-power, Napoleon hastened to follow up his land advantages. Occupying Vienna, he turned northward into Moravia where 1805 Francis II and Alexander I had gathered a large army of Austrians and Russians. On 2 December, 1805, the anniversary of his coronation as emperor,--his "lucky" day, as he termed it,--Napoleon overwhelmed the allies at Austerlitz in one of the greatest battles in history.

[Sidenote: Defeat of Austria: Treaty of Pressburg, 1805]

The immediate result of the campaign of Ulm and Austerlitz was the enforced withdrawal of Austria from the Third Coalition. Late in December, 1805, the emperors Francis II and Napoleon signed the treaty of Pressburg, whereby the former ceded Venetia to the kingdom of Italy and recognized Napoleon as its king, and resigned the Tyrol to Bavaria, and outlying provinces in western Germany to Wurttemberg. Both Bavaria and Wurttemberg were converted into kingdoms. By the humiliating treaty of Pressburg, Austria thus lost 3,000,000 subjects and large revenues; was cut off from Italy, Switzerland, and the Rhine; and was reduced to the rank of a second-rate power.

[Sidenote: Napoleon vs. Prussia]

[Sidenote: Jena (1806) and the Humiliation of Prussia]

For a time it seemed as if the withdrawal of Austria from the Third Coalition would be fully compensated for by the adhesion of Prussia.

Stung by the refusal of Napoleon to withdraw his troops from southern Germany and by the bootless haggling over the transference of Hanover, and goaded on by his patriotic and high-spirited wife, the beautiful Queen Louise, timid Frederick William III at length ventured in 1806 to declare war against France. Then, with a ridiculously misplaced confidence in the old-time reputation of Frederick the Great, without waiting for a.s.sistance from the Russians who were coming up, the Prussian army--some 110,000 strong, under the old-fashioned duke of Brunswick--advanced against the 150,000 veterans of Napoleon. The resulting battle of Jena, on 14 October, 1806, proved the absolute superiority of Napoleon"s strategy and of the enthusiastic French soldiers over the older tactics and military organization of the Prussians. Jena was not merely a defeat for the Prussians; it was at once a rout and a total collapse of that Prussian military prestige which in the course of the eighteenth century had been gained by the utmost sacrifice. Napoleon entered Berlin in triumph and took possession of the greater part of the kingdom of Prussia.

[Sidenote: Napoleon vs. Russia, Friedland]

[Sidenote: Treaty of Tilsit (1807): Dissolution of the Third Coalition]

The Russians still remained to be dealt with. Winter was a bad season for campaigning in East Prussia, and it was not until June, 1807, at Friedland, that Napoleon was able to administer the same kind of a defeat to the Russians that he had administered to the Austrians at Austerlitz and to the Prussians at Jena. The Tsar Alexander at once sued for peace. At Tilsit, on a raft moored in the middle of the River Niemen, Napoleon and Alexander met and arranged the terms of peace for France, Russia, and Prussia. The impressionable tsar was dazzled by the striking personality and the unexpected magnanimity of the emperor of the French. Hardly an inch of Russian soil was exacted, only a promise to cooperate in excluding British trade from the Continent. Alexander was accorded full permission to deal as he would with Finland and Turkey. "What is Europe?" exclaimed the emotional tsar: "Where is it, if it is not you and I?" But Prussia had to pay the price of the alliance between French and Russian emperors. From Prussia was torn the portion of Poland which was erected into the grand-duchy of Warsaw, under Napoleon"s obsequious ally, the elector of Saxony. Despoiled altogether of half of her territories, compelled to reduce her army to 42,000 men, and forced to maintain French troops on her remaining lands until a large war indemnity was paid, Prussia was reduced to the rank of a third-rate power. Tilsit destroyed the Third Coalition and made Napoleon master of the Continent. Only Great Britain and Sweden remained under arms, and against the latter country Napoleon was now able to employ both Denmark and Russia.

[Sidenote: Humiliation of Sweden]

Early in 1808 a Russian army crossed the Finnish border without any previous declaration of war, and simultaneously a Danish force prepared to invade Sweden from the Norwegian frontier. The ill-starred Swedish king, Gustavus IV (1792-1809), found it was all he could do, even with British a.s.sistance, to fight off the Danes. The little Finnish army, left altogether unsupported, succ.u.mbed after an heroic struggle against overwhelming odds, and in 1809 the whole of Finland and the land Islands were formally ceded to Russia. Finland, however, did not enter Russia as a conquered province, but, thanks to the bravery of her people and not less to the wisdom and generosity of the Tsar Alexander, she long maintained her free const.i.tution and was recognized as a semi- independent grand-duchy with the Russian tsar as grand-duke. Thus Sweden lost her ancient duchy of Finland, and she was permitted to retain a small part of Pomerania only at the humiliating price of making peace with Napoleon and excluding British goods from all her ports, In the same year, Gustavus IV was compelled to abdicate in favor of his uncle, Charles XIII (1809-1818), an infirm and childless old man, who was prevailed upon to designate as his successor one of Napoleon"s own marshals, General Bernadotte. Surely, Napoleon might hope henceforth to dominate Sweden as he then dominated every other Continental state. Of course, Great Britain, triumphant on the seas, remained unconquered, but the British army, the laughingstock of Europe, could expect to achieve little where Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Sweden had failed.

[Sidenote: Height of Napoleon"s Power, 1808]

The year that followed Tilsit may be taken as marking the height of Napoleon"s career. The Corsican adventurer was emperor of a France that extended from the Po to the North Sea, from the Pyrenees and the Papal States to the Rhine, a France united, patriotic, and in enjoyment of many of the fruits of the Revolution. He was king of an Italy that embraced the fertile valley of the Po and the ancient possessions of Venice, and that was administered by a viceroy, his stepson and heir- apparent, Eugene Beauharnais. The pope was his friend and ally. His brother Joseph governed the kingdom of Naples. His brother Louis and his stepdaughter Hortense were king and queen of Holland. His sister Elise was princess of the diminutive state of Lucca. The kings of Spain and Denmark were his admirers and the tsar of Russia now called him friend and brother. A restored Poland was a recruiting station for his army. Prussia and Austria had become second- or third-rate powers, and French influence once more predominated in the Germanies.

[Sidenote: Profound Changes in the Germanies]

It was in the Germanies, in fact, that Napoleon"s achievements were particularly striking. Before his magic touch many of the antique political and social inst.i.tutions of that country crumbled away. As early as 1801 the diminution of the number of German states had begun.

The treaty of Luneville had made imperative some action on the part of the Diet of the Holy Roman Empire in order to indemnify the rulers whose lands on the left bank of the Rhine had been incorporated into France, and to grant "compensations" to the south German states. After laborious negotiations, lasting from 1801 to 1803, the Diet authorized [Footnote: By a decree, called the _Reichsdeputationshauptschluss_.] the wholesale confiscation throughout southern Germany of ecclesiastical lands and of free cities, with the result that 112 formerly independent states lying east of the Rhine were wiped out of existence and nearly one hundred others on the west bank were added to France. Thus the number of the Germanies was suddenly reduced from more than three hundred to less than one hundred, and the German states which mainly benefited, along with Prussia, were the southern states of Bavaria, Wurttemberg, and Baden, which Napoleon desired to use as an equipoise against both Austria and Prussia. In this ambition he was not disappointed, for in the War of the Third Coalition (1805) he received important a.s.sistance from these three states, all of which were in turn liberally rewarded for their services, the rulers of Bavaria and Wurttemberg being proclaimed kings.

[Sidenote: Extinction of the Holy Roman Empire (1806), and its Replacement by the Empire of Austria and the Confederation of the Rhine]

The year 1806 was epochal in German history. On 19 July, the Confederation of the Rhine was formally established with Napoleon as Protector. The kings of Bavaria and Wurttemberg, the grand-dukes of Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt, and Berg, the archbishop of Mainz, and nine minor princes virtually seceded from the Holy Roman Empire and accepted the protection of Napoleon, whom they pledged themselves to support with an army of 63,000 men. On 1 August, Napoleon declared that he no longer recognized the Holy Roman Empire, and on 6 August the Habsburg emperor, Francis II, resigned the crown which his ancestors for centuries had worn. The work of a long line of French kings and statesmen,--Francis I, Henry IV, Richelieu, Mazarin, Louis XIV,--was thus consummated by Napoleon Bonaparte. The Holy Roman Empire had at last come to the inglorious end which it had long deserved. And its last emperor had to content himself with his newly appropriated t.i.tle of Francis I, Hereditary Emperor of Austria. The dignity and might of the proud Habsburgs had declined before a mere upstart of the people as never before a royal Bourbon. And this same year, 1806, witnessed, as we have seen, not only the humiliation of Austria but the deepest degradation of Prussia.

By 1808 all the Germanies were at the mercy of Napoleon. Prussia was shorn of half her possessions and forced to obey the behests of her conqueror. The Confederation of the Rhine was enlarged and solidified.

A kingdom of Westphalia was carved out of northern and western Germany at the expense of Prussia, Hanover, Brunswick, and Hesse, and bestowed upon Jerome, brother of Napoleon. The grand-duchy of Berg was governed by the Protector"s plebeian brother-in-law, Joachim Murat. And, greatest fact of all, wherever the French emperor"s rule extended, there followed the abolition of feudalism and serfdom, the recognition of equality of all citizens before the law, the principles and precepts of the Code Napoleon.

[Sidenote: Napoleon "the Son of the Revolution"]

This was the true apogee of Napoleon"s power. From the November day in 1799 when the successful general had overthrown the corrupt and despicable Directory down to 1808, his story is a magnificent succession of the triumphs of peace and of war. Whatever be the judgment of his contemporaries or of posterity upon his motives, there can be little question that throughout these nine years he appeared to France and to Europe what he proclaimed himself--"the son of the Revolution." He it was who in the lull between the combats of the Second Coalition and those of the Third had consolidated the work of the democratic patriots from Mirabeau to Carnot and had a.s.sured to France the permanent fruits of the Revolution in the domains of property, law, religion, education, administration, and finance. He it was who, if narrowing the concept of liberty, had broadened the significance of equality by the very lesson of his own rise to power and had deepened the meaning of fraternity by lavishing affection and devotion upon that machine of democracy--the national army--the "nation in arms." And he it was who, true to the revolutionary tradition of striking terror into the hearts of the divine-right monarchs of Europe, had with a mighty noise shaken the whole Continent and brought down the political and social inst.i.tutions of the "old regime" tumbling in ruins throughout central and southern Europe. He had made revolutionary reform too solid and too widespread to admit of its total extinction by the allied despots of Europe. The dream which a Leopold and a Frederick William had cherished in 1791 of turning back the hands on the clock of human progress and of restoring conditions in France as they had been prior to 1789, was happily dispelled. But in the meantime the despots were to have their innings.

DESTRUCTION OF THE FRENCH EMPIRE

[Sidenote: Weaknesses in the French Empire of Napoleon]

[Sidenote: 1. Napoleon Himself]

From 1808 to 1814--six dreadful years--Napoleon"s power was constantly on the wane. Nor are the reasons for his ultimate failure difficult to perceive. Some of the very elements which had contributed most to the upbuilding of his great empire with its dependent kingdoms and duchies were in the long run elements of weakness and instability--vital causes of its eventual downfall. In the first place, there was the factor of individual genius. Altogether too much depended upon the physical and mental strength of one man. Napoleon was undoubtedly a genius, but still he was human. He was growing older, more corpulent, less able to withstand exertion and fatigue, fonder of affluence and ease. On the other hand, every fresh success had confirmed his belief in his own ability and had further whetted his appet.i.te for power until his ambition was growing into madness and his egotism was becoming mania.

His aversion from taking the advice of others increased so that even the subtle intriguers, Talleyrand and Fouche, were less and less admitted to his confidence. The emperor would brook the appearance of no actor on the French stage other than himself, although on that stage during those crowded years there was too much for a single emperor, albeit a master emperor, to do.

[Sidenote: 2. Defects of Militarism]

The second serious defect in the Napoleonic system was the fact that its very foundation was military. What had enabled the National Convention in the days of the Revolution"s darkest peril to roll back the tide of foreign invasion was the heroism and devotion of an enthusiastic citizen soldiery, actuated by a solemn consciousness that in a very literal sense they were fighting for their fields and firesides, for the rights of men and of Frenchmen. They const.i.tuted compact and h.o.m.ogeneous armies, inspired by the principles and words of Rouget de Lisle"s rousing battle hymn, and they smote the hired troopers of the banded despots hip and thigh. It was this kind of an army which Napoleon Bonaparte took over and which had earned for him his first spectacular successes. He certainly tried to preserve its Revolutionary enthusiasm throughout his career. He talked much of its "mission" and its "destiny," of liberty, equality, and fraternity, and he kept alive its traditions of heroism and duty. He even improved its discipline, its material well-being, and its honor. But gradually, almost imperceptibly, the altruistic ideals of the Revolution gave way in the French army to the more selfish and more Napoleonic ideal of glamour and glory. And as years pa.s.sed by and the deadly campaigns repeated themselves and the number of patriotic volunteers lessened, Napoleon resorted more and more to conscription--forcibly taking away thousands of young Frenchmen from peaceful and productive pursuits at home and strewing their bones throughout the length and breadth of the Continent.

[Sidenote: 3. Reaction of Nationalism]

Nor did Napoleon"s army remain h.o.m.ogeneous. To the last its kernel was French, but, as the empire expanded and other peoples were brought into a dependent or allied position, it came to include regiments or companies of Poles, Germans, Italians, Dutch, Spaniards, and Danes. In its newer heterogeneous condition it tended the more to lose its original character and to a.s.sume that of an enormous machine-like conglomeration of mercenaries who followed the fortunes of a despot more tyrannical and more dangerous than any of the despots against whom it had at first been pitted. It is true that many of the Frenchmen who composed the kernel of the Grand Army still entertained the notion that they were fighting for liberty, equality, and fraternity, and that their contact with their fellow-soldiers and likewise with their enemies was a most effective means of communicating the revolutionary doctrines to Europe, but it is also true that Napoleon"s policy of quartering his troops upon the lands of his enemies or of his allies, and thereby conserving the resources of his own country, operated to develop the utmost hatred for the French, for the Revolution, and for Napoleon. This hatred produced, particularly in Germany and in Spain, a real patriotic feeling among the ma.s.ses of the exploited nations, so that those very peoples to whom the notions of liberty and equality had first come as a blessed promise of deliverance from the oppression of their own divine-right rulers now used the same notions to justify them in rising as nations against the despotism of a foreign military oppressor. Liberty, equality, and fraternity--the gospel of the Revolution--was the boomerang which Napoleon by means of his army hurled against the European tyrants and which returned with redoubled force against him.

[Sidenote: 4. "The Continental System"]

It was thus the character of the emperor himself and his military exigencies that, taken in conjunction with the so-called "Continental System" and the national revolts, made Napoleon"s empire but an episode in the story of modern times. It is now time to explain the Continental System and then to see how it reacted throughout Europe upon the feeling of national patriotism to bring about the downfall of the Corsican adventurer.

[Sidenote: The Economic War between Great Britain and France]

"Continental System" is the term commonly applied to the curious character which the warfare between Napoleon and Great Britain gradually a.s.sumed. By 1806 the interesting situation had developed that Great Britain was indisputable mistress of the seas while Napoleon was no less indisputable master of the Continent. The battles of the Nile, of Copenhagen, and of Trafalgar had been to the British what those of Marengo, Austerlitz, and Jena had been to the French. On one hand the destruction of the French fleet, together with the Danish, Dutch, and Spanish squadrons, had effectually prevented Napoleon from carrying into practice his long-cherished dream of invading England. On the other hand, the British army was not strong enough to cope successfully with Napoleon on land, and the European Powers which all along had been subsidized by English gold had been cowed into submission by the French emperor. Apparently neither France nor Great Britain could strike each other by ordinary military means, and yet neither would sue for peace.

William Pitt died in January, 1806, heart-broken by the news of Austerlitz, the ruin of all his hopes. Charles James Fox, the gifted Whig, who thereupon became British foreign secretary, was foiled in a sincere attempt to negotiate peace with Napoleon, and died in September of the same year, despairing of any amicable settlement.

The brilliant French victory at Jena in October, 1806, seemed to fill the British as well as the Prussian cup to overflowing. The very next month Napoleon followed up his successes by inaugurating a thoroughgoing campaign against his arch-enemy, Great Britain herself; but the campaign was to be conducted in the field of economics rather than in the purview of military science. England, it must be remembered, had become, thanks to the long series of dynastic and colonial wars that filled the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the chief commercial nation of the world: she had a larger number of citizens who made their living as ship-owners, sailors, and traders than any other country in the world. Then, too, as we shall see in a subsequent chapter, it was in the England of the eighteenth century that the Industrial Revolution began,--a marvelous improvement in manufacturing, which fostered the growth of a powerful industrial cla.s.s and enabled the English to make goods more cheaply and in greater profusion and to sell them more readily, at lower prices, both at home and abroad, than any other people in the world. Industry was fast becoming the basis of Great Britain"s wealth, and the commercial cla.s.ses were acquiring new strength and influence. It was, therefore, against "a nation of shopkeepers," as Napoleon contemptuously dubbed the English, that he must direct his new campaign.

To Napoleon"s clear and logical mind, the nature of the problem was plain. Deprived of a navy and unable to utilize his splendid army, he must attack Great Britain in what appeared to be her one vulnerable spot--in her commerce and industry. If he could prevent the importation of British goods into the Continent, he would deprive his rivals of the chief markets for their products, ruin British manufacturers, throw thousands of British workingmen out of employment, create such hard times in the British Islands that the ma.s.s of the people would rise against their government and compel it to make peace with him on his own terms: in a word, he would ruin British commerce and industry and then secure an advantageous peace. It was a gigantic gamble, for Napoleon must have perceived that the Continental peoples might themselves oppose the closure of their ports to the cheaper and better manufactured articles of Great Britain and might respond to a common economic impulse and rise in force to compel him to make peace on British terms, but the stakes were high and the emperor of the French was a good gambler. From 1806 to 1812 the struggle between Napoleon and Great Britain was an economic endurance-test. On the one hand, the question was whether the British government could retain the support of the British people. On the other hand, the question was whether Napoleon could rely upon the cooperation of the whole Continent.

[Sidenote: The Berlin and Milan Decrees]

The Continental System had been foreshadowed under the Directory and in the early years of the Consulate, but it was not until the Berlin Decree (November, 1806) that the first great attempt was made to define and enforce it. In this decree, Napoleon proclaimed a state of blockade against the British Isles and closed French and allied ports to ships coming from Great Britain or her colonies. The Berlin Decree was subsequently strengthened and extended by decrees at Warsaw (January, 1807), Milan (December, 1807), and Fontainebleau (October, 1810). The Milan Decree provided that even neutral vessels sailing from any British port or from countries occupied by British troops might be seized by French warships or privateers. The Fontainebleau Decree went so far as to order the confiscation and public burning of all British manufactured goods found in the Napoleonic States.

[Sidenote: The Orders in Council]