As yet he knew comparatively nothing of what preparations the Americans were making to receive him, and but little about the country he was in.

But he did know that the patriot army had at last faced about, and that was enough to rouse the spirit of his soldiers to the highest pitch.

[Ill.u.s.tration: BURGOYNE"S ORDER OF BATTLE.

19th September.

[_Pen and ink sketch by a British officer._]

A, The Line Formed. B, The Columns in March.]

[Sidenote: Sept. 15.]

On the fifteenth the British Army began its march southward in three divisions. The only road had to be given up to the baggage and artillery. To protect it, the left, or German division, marched along the meadows, next the river. The centre, or British division, kept the heights above; while Frazer"s corps moved at some distance, on the right of it, with Breyman"s following just behind in support. Two divisions were therefore marching on the heights, and one underneath them.

[Sidenote: Sept. 17.]

What with the delays caused by broken bridges on the road, bridging the ravines on the heights, or forcing a way through thick woods, which it was necessary always to reconnoitre with care,--the royal army could get over but six miles in two days. Being then near the enemy, a halt was made to prepare for battle.

[Sidenote: Sept. 19.]

On this day, Burgoyne continued his march in the same order as before, with skirmishers thrown out well in advance of each column. The centre, which he directed in person, would, in following the direction it was taking, very shortly find itself at Freeman"s Farm.

On his part, Gates had sent out Morgan"s rifle corps to feel the enemy, in order to learn what they were doing or intending to do. Morgan had advanced as far as our outpost at Freeman"s house, when the British skirmishers came out of the woods into the clearing. They were instantly fired upon and returned the fire. It was therefore here that the action of September 19 began.

Morgan"s hot fire soon drove the enemy back to cover again, with loss.

Our riflemen dashed into the woods after them, got into disorder, and, before they were aware, fell upon the supporting battalions, by whom they were defeated and scattered, in their turn. This division then advanced into the clearing, from which by this time the Americans had decamped. Burgoyne thus gained the ground about Freeman"s house, whence his pickets were first attacked and driven in.

At this place, Burgoyne formed his line, facing towards the woods into which Morgan"s men had retreated. He rightly judged the enemy to be there, though threats failed to extort any information from the prisoners he had taken. When Frazer told one of Morgan"s captains he would hang him up to the nearest tree, unless he would point out the place where his comrades were posted, the man undauntedly replied, "You may, if you please."

Knowing that Gates could not be attacked on his right, Burgoyne meant to make the trial on the left. If that wing could be turned, Gates would have to retreat from his works, or be driven into the river. This was all the simple plan of attack, but as yet, Burgoyne did not know where the American left was posted. The woods effectually masked the American position, and all was now quiet.

Burgoyne now prepared to go forward again. From what had just taken place, he supposed the troops now with him would strike the American line first. It was therefore arranged that when he became fully engaged, Frazer was to charge the American flank, and crush it, making the centre division his pivot. With his right, Burgoyne meant to turn the American left.

Burgoyne had with him four battalions of the line, and four guns. He would have brought more guns if more could have been used with effect in the woods, as he greatly relied upon this arm. Frazer had twenty companies of grenadiers and light infantry, the 24th British regiment, Breyman"s Germans, and all the Canadians, loyalists, and Indians now left with the army; he also had four pieces of artillery. About four thousand men were thus in readiness to engage. The left wing was now in motion along the river road, under the heights, but was too far off to be of much use in reenforcing the right. It was, however, of service in preventing Gates from sending troops away from his right, to fight Burgoyne on the left.

Though Burgoyne did not know the American position, which thick woods everywhere masked from his view, he had disclosed his own very clearly to Morgan, who sent an urgent request for reenforcements.

Gates wished to receive the attack in his works, not make one himself.

He therefore ordered only one or two battalions from his left to go to Morgan"s a.s.sistance, and withstood the entreaties of his officers to be allowed to meet the enemy in the open field.

At between two and three o"clock, as Burgoyne had just finished his dispositions for attacking, a heavy fire broke from the woods in Frazer"s front. This came from Morgan and the troops sent to his support. Making no impression on Frazer, whose cannon held them in check, the a.s.sailants suddenly shifted their attack over to the left, where Burgoyne commanded in person. And thus it was that, instead of attacking, Burgoyne found himself a.s.saulted; instead of turning Gates"s left, his own was being a.s.sailed, with the purpose of separating the two wings of his army.

On finding a battle actually in progress, Gates reenforced the troops who were fighting against odds, with driblets of a regiment at a time.

Instead of going on the field himself, or letting Arnold go,[46] he pretended to believe that his own right was the real object of attack, and kept in his quarters. This day"s battle was therefore fought wholly by his subordinates, against the British general-in-chief, seconded by his ablest lieutenants.

Having found the enemy"s left, the Americans chiefly turned their attention to that flank, as has just been said. The 62d British regiment was posted here with two guns. This flank was crushed, and its artillery silenced by a superior fire. Its defeat caused the whole British line to give way, leaving part of their artillery in our hands.

[Ill.u.s.tration: FIRST BATTLE OF BEMIS" HEIGHTS.

[_Pen and ink sketch by a British officer._]

A, Americans Attacking. B, British Positions.]

So far the battle had gone in our favor. Any demonstration from our right, upon the enemy"s left, would, unquestionably, have rendered the victory complete. As nothing of the kind was attempted, the British were able to bring up reenforcements from that wing, without opposition, and the golden opportunity was lost.

From the river road, Riedesel, by making a roundabout march, brought two of his regiments into action. Phillips hurried with four guns taken from the reserve artillery to the front. Frazer turned part of his force upon the American flank, thus relieving Burgoyne from the pressure laid upon him, and enabling him to form a second line. When this was done, the whole British force advanced again as far as their first position, while the Americans, for want of fresh troops to meet them, were compelled to fall back under cover of the woods again. The combat had now lasted four hours. Darkness put an end to it, nearly on the spot where it had begun.

The British were indeed masters of the field; but instead of attacking, they had always been attacked, and instead of advancing, they had been everywhere stopped; their artillery alone had saved them from defeat.

Our army lost three hundred and nineteen killed and wounded; the British, more than five hundred,--the difference being due to superior marksmanship. Our losses could easily be made good; the British could not. All the real advantages, therefore, were clearly on the side of the Americans.

FOOTNOTES:

[45] BATTLE OF BEMIS" HEIGHTS. Bemis" Heights formed part of the American position, but not of the battle-ground. Freeman"s Farm would have been a more accurate designation. Stillwater locates it anywhere within a township of many miles in extent.

[46] ARNOLD"S PART in this battle has been long a matter of dispute.

Gates was jealous of him because he was the idol of his soldiers. Arnold had no high opinion of Gates. After Arnold turned traitor, every one seems to have thought it a duty to give him a kick. This feeling is unfortunately conspicuous in the only detailed account from the American side we have of this battle, which was written by Wilkinson, Gates"s adjutant-general, and given to the world nearly forty years (1816) afterwards. Wilkinson seems to have fully shared his commander"s likes and dislikes, and has treated Arnold shabbily. The battle was almost wholly fought by Arnold"s division, and it is equally incompatible with his duty and temper to suppose he would have remained in camp when his troops were engaged, though he was probably held back until a late hour in the day.

XIII.

LINCOLN"S RAID IN BURGOYNE"S REAR.

Much to Burgoyne"s chagrin, he had been obliged to garrison Ticonderoga with troops taken from his own army, instead of being allowed to draw upon those left in Canada, under command of General Carleton. About a thousand men were thus deducted from the force now operating on the Hudson.

Ever since the battle of Bennington, Lincoln had been most industriously gathering in, and organizing the militia, at Manchester. All New England was now up, and her sons were flocking in such numbers to his camp, that Lincoln soon found himself at the head of about two thousand excellent militia.

Guided by the spirit of Washington"s instructions, he now determined on making an effort to break up Burgoyne"s communications, capture his magazines, hara.s.s his outposts, and, perhaps, even throw himself on the British line of retreat. There is a refreshing boldness and vigor about the conception, something akin to real generalship and enterprise. It was a good plan, undertaken without Gates"s knowledge or consent.

[Sidenote: Sept. 13.]

On the same day that Burgoyne was crossing the Hudson, Lincoln sent five hundred men to the head of Lake George, with orders to destroy the stores there; five hundred more to attack Ticonderoga; and another five hundred to Skenesborough, to support them in case of need. Unknown to Lincoln, Burgoyne had now wholly dropped his communications with the lakes, but these movements were no less productive of good results on that account.

The first detachment, under command of Colonel Brown,[47] reached Lake George landing undiscovered. The blockhouse and mills there were instantly taken. Mount Defiance and the French lines at Ticonderoga[48]

were next carried without difficulty. In these operations, Brown took three hundred prisoners, released over one hundred Americans from captivity, and destroyed a great quant.i.ty of stores.

The second detachment having, meantime, come up before Mount Independence, Ticonderoga was cannonaded, for some time, without effect.

Unlike St. Clair, the British commander would neither surrender nor retreat, even when the guns of Mount Defiance were turned against him.

Failing here, the Americans next went up Lake George, to attack Burgoyne"s artillery depot, at Diamond Island. They were not more successful in this attempt, as the enemy was strongly fortified and made a vigorous defence. After burning the enemy"s boats on the lake, Brown returned to Skenesborough.

General Lincoln was about to march from Skenesborough to Fort Edward, with seven hundred men, when he received a pressing request from Gates, dated on the morning of the battle, to join him at once.

Abandoning, therefore, his own plans, Lincoln retraced his steps with so much speed, that he arrived in Gates"s camp[49] on the twenty-second.

Gates immediately gave him command of the right wing[50] of the army.

The road between Skenesborough and Fort Edward was now constantly patrolled by parties of American militia; so that it was truly said of Burgoyne, that the gates of retreat were fast closing behind him.