See Clarendon, iii. 610.

It is probable that some foreign catholics were in the parliament"s service. But Dodd says, with great appearance of truth, that no one English gentleman of that persuasion was in arms on their side.

_Church History of Engl._ iii. 28. He reports as a matter of hearsay, that, out of about five hundred gentlemen who lost their lives for Charles in the civil war, one hundred and ninety-four were catholics.

They were, doubtless, a very powerful faction in the court and army.

Lord Spencer (afterwards Earl of Sunderland), in some remarkable letters to his wife from the king"s quarters at Shrewsbury, in September 1642, speaks of the insolency of the papists with great dissatisfaction. _Sidney Papers_, ii. 667.

[284] It cannot be doubted, and is admitted in a remarkable conversation of Hollis and Whitelock with the king at Oxford in November 1644, that the exorbitant terms demanded at Uxbridge were carried by the violent party, who disliked all pacification.

Whitelock, 113.

[285] Baillie, ii. 91. He adds, "That which has been the great snare to the king is the unhappy success of Montrose in Scotland." There seems indeed great reason to think that Charles, always sanguine, and incapable of calculating probabilities, was unreasonably elated by victories from which no permanent advantage ought to have been expected. Burnet confirms this on good authority. Introduction to _Hist. of his Times_, 51.

[286] Whitelock, 109, 137, 142; Rushw. Abr. v. 163. The first _rat_ (except indeed the Earls of Holland and Bedford, who were rats with two tails) was Sir Edward Dering, who came into the parliament"s quarters, Feb. 1644. He was a weak man of some learning, who had already played a very changeable part before the war.

[287] A flagrant instance of this was the plunder of Bristol by Rupert, in breach of the capitulation. I suspect that it was the policy of one party to exaggerate the cruelties of the other; but the short narratives dispersed at the time give a wretched picture of slaughter and devastation.

[288] Clarendon and Whitelock _pa.s.sim_; Baxter"s _Life_, pp. 44, 55.

This license of Maurice"s and Goring"s armies in the west first led to the defensive insurrection, if so it should be called, of the club-men; that is, of yeomen and country people, armed only with clubs, who hoped, by numbers and concert, to resist effectually the military marauders of both parties, declaring themselves neither for king nor parliament, but for their own liberty and property. They were of course regarded with dislike on both sides; by the king"s party when they first appeared in 1644, because they crippled the royal army"s operations, and still more openly by the parliament next year, when they opposed Fairfax"s endeavour to carry on the war in the counties bordering on the Severn. They appeared at times in great strength; but the want of arms and discipline made it not very difficult to suppress them. Clarendon, v. 197; Whitelock, 137; _Parl.

Hist._ 379, 390.

The king himself, whose disposition was very harsh and severe, except towards the few he took into his bosom, can hardly be exonerated from a responsibility for some acts of inhumanity (see Whitelock, 67, and _Somers Tracts_, iv. 502, v. 369; Maseres"s _Tracts_, i. 144, for the ill-treatment of prisoners); and he might probably have checked the outrages which took place at the storming of Leicester, where he was himself present. Certainly no imputation of this nature can be laid at the door of the parliamentary commanders; though some of them were guilty of the atrocity of putting their Irish prisoners to death, in obedience, however, to an ordinance of parliament. _Parl. Hist._ iii.

295; Rushworth"s Abridgement, v. 402. It pa.s.sed October 24, 1644, and all remissness in executing it was to be reckoned a favouring of the Irish rebellion. When we read, as we do perpetually, these violent and barbarous proceedings of the parliament, is it consistent with honesty or humanity to hold up that a.s.sembly to admiration, while the faults on the king"s side are studiously aggravated? The partiality of Oldmixon, Harris, Macauley, and now of Mr. Brodie and Mr. G.o.dwin, is full as glaring, to say the very least, as that of Hume.

[289] Clarendon and Baxter.

[290] The excise was first imposed by an ordinance of both houses in July 1643 (Husband"s _Collection of Ordinances_, p. 267), and afterwards by the king"s convention at Oxford. See a view of the financial expedients adopted by both parties in Lingard, x. 243. The plate brought in to the parliament"s commissioners at Guildhall, in 1642, for which they allowed the value of the silver, and one shilling per ounce more, is stated by Neal at 1,267,326, an extraordinary proof of the wealth of London; yet I do not know his authority, though it is probably good. The university of Oxford gave all they had to the king; but could not of course vie with the citizens.

The sums raised within the parliament"s quarters from the beginning of the war to 1647 are reckoned in a pamphlet of that year, quoted in Sinclair"s _Hist. of the Revenue_, i. 283, at 17,512,400. But, on reference to the tract itself, I find this written at random. The contributions, however, were really very great; and, if we add those to the king, and the loss by waste and plunder, we may form some judgment of the effects of the civil war.

[291] The independents raised loud clamours against the Scots army; and the northern counties naturally complained of the burthen of supporting them as well as of their excesses. Many pa.s.sages in Whitelock"s journal during 1645 and 1646 relate to this. Hollis endeavours to deny or extenuate the charges; but he is too prejudiced a writer, and Baillie himself acknowledges a great deal. Vol. ii. pp.

138, 142, 146.

[292] The chief imputation against Manchester was for not following up his victory in the second battle of Newbury, with which Cromwell openly taxed him; see Ludlow, i. 133. There certainly appears to have been a want of military energy on this occasion; but it is said by Baillie (ii. 76) that all the general officers, Cromwell not excepted, concurred in Manchester"s determination. Ess.e.x had been suspected from the time of the affair at Brentford, or rather from the battle of Edgehill (Baillie and Ludlow); and his whole conduct, except in the celebrated march to relieve Gloucester, confirmed a reasonable distrust either of his military talents, or of his zeal in the cause.

"He loved monarchy and n.o.bility," says Whitelock, p. 108, "and dreaded those who had a design to destroy both." Yet Ess.e.x was too much a man of honour to enter on any private intrigues with the king. The other peers employed under the parliament, Stamford, Denbigh, Willoughby, were not successful enough to redeem the suspicions that fell upon their zeal.

All our republican writers, such as Ludlow and Mrs. Hutchinson in that age, Mrs. Macauley and Mr. Brodie more of late, speak acrimoniously of Ess.e.x. "Most will be of opinion," says Mr. B. (_History of British Empire_, iii. 565), "that as ten thousand pounds a year out of the sequestered lands were settled upon him for his services, he was rewarded infinitely beyond his merits." The reward was doubtless magnificent; but the merit of Ess.e.x was this, that he made himself the most prominent object of vengeance in case of failure, by taking the command of an army to oppose the king in person at Edgehill: a command of which no other man in his rank was capable, and which could not, at that time, have been intrusted to any man of inferior rank without dissolving the whole confederacy of the parliament.

It is to be observed, moreover, that the two battles of Newbury, like that of Edgehill, were by no means decisive victories on the side of the parliament; and that it is not clear whether either Ess.e.x or Manchester could have pushed the king much more than they did. Even after Naseby, his party made a pretty long resistance, and he was as much blamed as they for not pressing his advantages with vigour.

[293] It had been voted by the Lords a year before, Dec. 12, 1643, "That the opinion and resolution of this house is from henceforth not to admit the members of either house of parliament into any place or office, excepting such places of great trust as are to be executed by persons of eminency and known integrity, and are necessary for the government and safety of the kingdom." But a motion to make this resolution into an ordinance was carried in the negative. Lords"

Journals; _Parl. Hist._ 187. The first motion had been for a resolution without this exception, that no place of profit should be executed by the members of either house.

[294] Whitelock, pp. 118, 120. It was opposed by him, but supported by Pierrepont, who carried it up to the Lords. The Lords were chiefly of the presbyterian party; though Say, Wharton, and a few more, were connected with the independents. They added a proviso to the ordinance raising forces to be commanded by Fairfax, that no officer refusing the covenant should be capable of serving, which was thrown out in the lower house. But another proviso was carried in the Commons by 82 to 63, that the officers, though appointed by the general, should be approved by both houses of parliament. Cromwell was one of the tellers for the minority. Commons" Journals, Feb. 7 and 13, 1645.

In the original ordinance the members of both houses were excluded during the war; but in the second, which was carried, the measure was not made prospective. This, which most historians have overlooked, is well pointed out by Mr. G.o.dwin. By virtue of this alteration, many officers were elected in the course of 1645 and 1646; and the effect, whatever might be designed, was very advantageous to the republican and independent factions.

[295] Whitelock, p. 145.

[296] Whether there are sufficient grounds for concluding that Henrietta"s connection with Jermyn was criminal, I will not pretend to decide; though Warburton has settled the matter in a very summary style. See one of his notes on Clarendon, vol. vii. p. 636. But I doubt whether the bishop had authority for what he there says, though it is likely enough to be true. See also a note of Lord Dartmouth on Burnet, i. 63.

[297] Clarendon speaks often in his _History_, and still more frequently in his private letters, with great resentment of the conduct of France, and sometimes of Holland, during our civil wars. I must confess that I see nothing to warrant this. The States-General, against whom Charles had so shamefully been plotting, interfered as much for the purpose of mediation as they could with the slightest prospect of success, and so as to give offence to the parliament (Rushworth Abridged, v. 567; Baillie, ii. 78; Whitelock, 141, 148; Harris"s _Life of Cromwell_, 246); and as to France, though Richelieu had instigated the Scots malcontents, and possibly those of England, yet after his death, in 1642, no sort of suspicion ought to lie on the French government; the whole conduct of Anne of Austria having been friendly, and both the mission of Harcourt in 1643, and the present negotiations of Montreuil and Bellievre, perfectly well intended. That Mazarin made promises of a.s.sistance which he had no design, nor perhaps any power, to fulfil, is true; but this is the common trick of such statesmen, and argues no malevolent purpose. But Hyde, out of his just dislike of the queen, hated all French connections; and his pa.s.sionate loyalty made him think it a crime, or at least a piece of base pusillanimity, in foreign states, to keep on any terms with the rebellious parliament. The case was altered, after the retirement of the regent Anne from power: Mazarin"s latter conduct was, as is well known, exceedingly adverse to the royal cause.

The account given by Mr. D"Israeli of Tabran"s negotiations in the fifth volume of his _Commentaries on the Reign of Charles I._, though it does not contain anything very important, tends to show Mazarin"s inclination towards the royal cause in 1644 and 1645.

[298] Colepepper writes to Ashburnham, in February 1646, to advance the Scots" treaty with all his power. "It is the only way left to save the Crown and the kingdom; all other tricks will deceive you.... It is no time to dally on distinctions and criticisms. All the world will laugh at them when a crown is in question." _Clar. Papers_, ii. 207.

The king had positively declared his resolution not to consent to the establishment of presbytery. This had so much disgusted both the Scots and English presbyterians (for the latter had been concerned in the negotiation), that Montreuil wrote to say he thought they would rather make it up with the independents than treat again. "De sorte qu"il ne faut plus marchander, et que V. M. se doit hater d"envoyer aux deux parlemens son consentiment aux trois propositions d"Uxbridge; ce qu"etant fait, elle sera en surete dans l"armee d"Ecosse" (15th Jan.

1646) P. 211.

[299] "I a.s.sure you," he writes to Capel, Hopton, etc., Feb. 2, 1646, "whatever paraphrases or prophecies may be made upon my last message (pressing the two houses to consent to a personal treaty), I shall never part with the church, the essentials of my crown, or my friends."--P. 206. Baillie could not believe the report that the king intended to take refuge in the Scots army, as "there would be no shelter there for him, unless he would take the covenant, and follow the advice of his parliament. Hard pills to be swallowed by a wilful and an unadvised prince." Vol. ii. p. 203.

[300] Not long after the king had taken shelter with the Scots, he wrote a letter to Ormond, which was intercepted, wherein he a.s.sured him of his expectation that their army would join with his, and act in conjunction with Montrose, to procure a happy peace and the restoration of his rights. Whitelock, page 208. Charles had bad luck with his letters, which fell, too frequently for his fame and interests, into the hands of his enemies. But who, save this most ill-judging of princes, would have entertained an idea that the Scots presbyterian army would co-operate with Montrose, whom they abhorred, and very justly, for his treachery and cruelty, above all men living?

[301] _Parl. Hist._ 499; Whitelock, 215, 218. It was voted, 17th June, that after these twenty years, the king was to exercise no power over the militia without the previous consent of parliament, who were to pa.s.s a bill at any time respecting it, if they should judge the kingdom"s safety to be concerned, which should be valid without the king"s a.s.sent. Commons" Journals.

[302] P. 248. "Show me any precedent," he says in another place, "wherever presbyterian government and regal was together without perpetual rebellions, which was the cause that necessitated the king my father to change that government in Scotland. And even in France, where they are but on tolerance, which in likelihood shall cause moderation, did they ever sit still so long as they had power to rebel? And it cannot be otherwise; for the ground of their doctrine is anti-monarchical."--P. 260. See also p. 273.

[303] "The design is to unite you with the Scots nation and the presbyterians of England against the anti-monarchical party, the independents.... If by conscience it is intended to a.s.sert that episcopacy is _jure divino_ exclusive, whereby no protestant, or rather Christian church, can be acknowledged for such without a bishop, we must therein crave leave wholly to differ. And if we be in an error, we are in good company, there not being, as we have cause to believe, six persons of the protestant religion of the other opinion.... Come, the question in short is, whether you will choose to be a king of presbytery, or no king, and yet presbytery or perfect independency to be?"--P. 263. They were, however, as much against his giving up the militia, or his party, as in favour of his abolishing episcopacy.

Charles was much to be pitied throughout all this period; none of his correspondents understood the state of affairs so well as himself; he was with the Scots, and saw what they were made of, while the others fancied absurdities through their own private self-interested views.

It is very certain that by sacrificing episcopacy he would not have gained a step with the parliament; and as to reigning in Scotland alone, suspected, insulted, degraded, this would perhaps just have been possible for himself; but neither Henrietta nor her friends would have found an asylum there.

[304] Juxon had been well treated by the parliament, in consequence of his prudent abstinence from politics, and residence in their quarters.

He dates his answer to the king from his palace at Fulham. He was, however, dispossessed of it not long after by virtue of the ordinance directing the sale of bishops" lands. Nov. 16, 1646. _Parl. Hist._ 528. A committee was appointed (Nov. 2, 1646) to consider of a fitting maintenance to be allowed the bishops, both those who had remained under the parliament, and those who had deserted it. Journals. I was led to this pa.s.sage by Mr. G.o.dwin, _Hist. of Commonwealth_, ii. 250.

Whether anything farther was done, I have not observed. But there is an order in the Journals, 1st May 1647, that whereas divers of the late tenants of Dr. Juxon, late Bishop of London, have refused to pay the rents or other sums of money due to him as Bishop of London at or before the 1st of November last, the trustees of bishops" lands are directed to receive the same, and pay them over to Dr. Juxon. Though this was only justice, it shows that justice was done at least in this instance, to a bishop. Juxon must have been a very prudent and judicious man, though not learned; which probably was all the better.

[305] Jan. 29, 1646. _Parl. Hist._ 436. Whitelock says, "Many sober men and lovers of peace were earnest to have complied with what the king proposed; but the major part of the house was contrary, and the new-elected members joined those who were averse to compliance."--P.

207.

[306] _Clar. Papers_, p. 275.

[307] _Id._ 294, 297, 300. She had said as much before (_King"s Cabinet Opened_, p. 28); so that this was not a burst of pa.s.sion.

"Conservez vous la militia," she says in one place (p. 271), "et n"abandonnez jamais; et _par cela tout reviendra_." Charles, however, disclaimed all idea of violating his faith in case of a treaty (p.

273); but observes as to the militia, with some truth, that "the retaining of it is not of so much consequence--I am far from saying, none--as is thought, without the concurrence of other things; because the militia here is not, as in France and other countries, a formed powerful strength; but it serves more to hold off ill than to do much good. And certainly, if the pulpits teach not obedience (which will never be, if presbyterian government be absolutely settled), the Crown will have little comfort of the militia."--P. 296.

[308] P. 301.

[309] P. 313.

[310] Pp. 245, 247, 278, 314. In one place he says, that he will go to France _to clear his reputation to the queen_. P. 265. He wrote in great distress of mind to Jermyn and Colepepper, on her threatening to retire from all business into a monastery, in consequence of his refusal to comply with her wishes. P. 270. See also Montreuil"s memoir in Thurloe"s _State Papers_, i. 85, whence it appears that the king had thoughts of making his escape in Jan. 1647.

[311] "For the proposition to Bellievre (a French agent at Newcastle after Montreuil"s recall), I hate it. If any such thing should be made public, you are undone; your enemies will make a malicious use of it.

Be sure you never own it again in any discourse, otherwise than as intended as a foil, or an hyperbole, or any other ways except in sober earnest," etc. P. 304. The queen and her counsellors, however, seem afterwards to have retracted in some measure what they had said about his escape; and advised that if he could not be suffered to go into Scotland, he would try Ireland or Jersey. P. 312.

Her dislike to the king"s escape showed itself, according to Clarendon, vi. 192, even at a time when it appeared the only means to secure his life, during his confinement in the Isle of Wight. Some may suspect that Henrietta had consoled herself too well with Lord Jermyn to wish for her husband"s return.

[312] P. 344.

[313] P. 279.