But some questioned whether the U.S. effort would ever reach the desired end state described by Chaplain Davis. "It seems to be getting better, but you really can"t tell," said Cpl. Toby Gilbreath, as he stood outside Patrol Base San Juan, an imposing bunker west of Baghdad.

"I would like to think that there are still possibilities here," Army Reserve Lt. Col. Joe Rice said in the coffee shop of the al Rasheed Hotel downtown in the Green Zone. "We are finally getting around to doing the right things." Rice was working on an Army lessons learned project but was expressing his personal opinion. "I think we"re getting better, I do." But, he continued, "is it too little, too late?"

AFTERWORD: BETTING AGAINST HISTORY.

MID-2006.

H.

istory will determine if President Bush was correct in a.s.serting that the invasion of Iraq "made our country more secure." But the indications at this point, during the war"s fourth year, aren"t good. Globally, fear and distrust of the U.S. government increased. Regionally, the war in Iraq distracted the U.S. military and intelligence establishments from maintaining a single-minded focus on the pursuit of bin Laden and al Qaeda. So while there is a small chance that the Bush administration"s inflexible optimism will be rewarded, that the political process will undercut the insurgency, and that democracy will take hold in Iraq, there is a far greater chance of other, more troublesome outcomes: that Iraq will fall into civil war, or spark regional war, or eventually become home to an anti-American regime, or break up altogether. In any of these forms it would offer a new haven for terrorists.

In January 2005, the CIA"s internal think tank, the National Intelligence Council, concluded that Iraq had replaced Afghanistan as the training ground for a new generation of jihadist terrorists. The country had become "a magnet for international terrorist activity," said the council"s chairman, Robert Hutchings. There was no question that there were more terrorists in Iraq in 2005 than there were early in 2003, when President Bush had accused the country of harboring terrorists.

Juan Cole, an Iraq expert at the University of Michigan and an outspoken opponent of the war, said that under the care of the Bush administration, Iraq had become a failed state of the sort that produces terrorists. "Iraq was not a failed state in 2002," he noted.

The invasion of Iraq has proven unexpectedly costly, with the loss of several thousand American soldiers and of an untold number of Iraqis. During 2004 and 2005, the cost to the American taxpayer was running at about $5 billion a month, meaning that by mid-2006, the total cost of the adventure had surpa.s.sed $200 billion. It is staggering to think of how that amount of money could have been spent differently to achieve the Bush administration"s stated goals of countering terrorism and curtailing the proliferation of weapons of ma.s.s destruction. Just $1 billion in aid, for example, might have changed the face of education in Pakistan and helped draw out the poison of anti-Western teachings there.

The policy costs to the United States The costs go well beyond that initial bill of blood and treasure; Iraq is likely to dominate American foreign policy for years. As the "National Strategy for Victory in Iraq," the doc.u.ment released by the White House in November 2005, put it, "What happens in Iraq will influence the fate of the Middle East for generations to come, with a profound impact on our own national security."

In Iraq, the U.S. position also suffers from the strategic problem of the fruit of the poisoned tree-that is, when a nation goes to war for faulty reasons, it undercuts all the actions that follow, especially when it won"t concede those errors. The administration stubbornly won"t deal with being wrong on WMD, and its refusal to make amends appears to have intensified the reluctance of many other nations to partic.i.p.ate in the pacification and rebuilding of Iraq. Likewise, the administration won"t admit to propounding tenuous links between Iraq and anti-U.S. terrorism. This is an arguably greater error, because it may have contributed to the problem of some U.S. troops" conflating the war in Iraq with the 9/11 attacks, and so led some to treat Iraqis as despised terrorists rather than as the prize in the war.

Another policy cost, yet to be paid, is the damage done to the credibility of its policy of preemption. Admittedly, waging preventive war will always be controversial in the United States. But the threat of it may be precisely what is needed to deal with a belligerent, nuclear-armed North Korea when that regime is on the verge of collapse, or for dealing with the Pakistani nuclear a.r.s.enal after an Islamic extremist coup. "How many people are going to believe us when we say, "It"s a slam dunk"-to use George Tenet"s phrase-"Iran has nuclear weapons"?" David Kay asked on CNN. "The answer is going to be, "You said that before.""

A third strategic error has been less noticed-the cost of being backed by a phony coalition. By pretending to have the West behind it, the Bush administration committed the prestige prestige of the West to a military adventure in the Mideast without having the of the West to a military adventure in the Mideast without having the resources resources of the West behind it. This became increasingly evident as the U.S. presence was challenged and the coalition continued to dwindle. There is a possibility that the incompetence of the U.S. occupation and the unwillingness of other Western nations to become involved will lead Islamic extremists to underestimate the genuine strength of the West, which is extraordinary, and barely tapped yet. Of such miscalculations, wars are made. of the West behind it. This became increasingly evident as the U.S. presence was challenged and the coalition continued to dwindle. There is a possibility that the incompetence of the U.S. occupation and the unwillingness of other Western nations to become involved will lead Islamic extremists to underestimate the genuine strength of the West, which is extraordinary, and barely tapped yet. Of such miscalculations, wars are made.

There are two additional costs that grow out of the way the Bush administration handled the coalition it brought to Iraq. One general at the Pentagon worried-given what he called the shabby treatment of those nations that did partic.i.p.ate, such as Poland and Spain, which were invited to a peacekeeping mission and then asked to partic.i.p.ate in combat-about what will happen the next time the U.S. government seeks international partic.i.p.ation in a military operation. And allies have a new distrust of the U.S. government"s decision-making processes, which proved defective during the run-up to the war, and then again during the occupation. "The fact that our judgment was flawed has created an enormous legitimacy problem for us, one that will hurt our interests for a long time to come," commented Francis f.u.kuyama, a political theorist who first came to Washington as an intern for Paul Wolfowitz.

Then there are opportunity costs that may become painfully evident as events unfold. What if we wake up one morning and there has been an Islamic extremist coup in Saudi Arabia or Pakistan? The U.S. military is already stretched thin, so if a military response is deemed necessary-and it likely would be, given that one country dominates the world oil market and the other possesses nuclear weapons-we may be sending in tired troops or units that lack training.

One way to prevent war is by early engagement. In particular, the use of small numbers of highly skilled troops who can train local militaries in humane but effective methods of operation is a proven way of quenching possible insurgencies, and also of deterring terrorist organizations from finding new sanctuaries. (Individuals can hide but groups generally need safe locations in which to meet and plan, and to cache supplies.) In the U.S. military, the troops expert in that sort of foreign internal defense mission are Special Forces. Yet, said one Special Forces veteran, by mid-2005, the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan were consuming more than 80 percent of the Special Operations forces, meaning that smaller problems elsewhere may be growing through neglect.

Another cost of continuing heavy engagement in Iraq is that it could embolden adversaries to act. For example, former Defense Secretary William Perry warned in a January 2005 talk in Hong Kong that some senior Chinese generals were advising the Beijing government that it was the right time to deal militarily with Taiwan, while the "U.S. is pinned down in Iraq and will not be able to come to the defense of Taiwan." Likewise, the U.S. investment in Iraq may have given Iran a window of opportunity in which to develop nuclear weapons.

Yet inside all these problems there lay a major victory for President Bush and his plan to transform the Middle East. Like it or not, the U.S. government through his actions has been tethered to Iraq and to the region around it as never before. Under him, the U.S. military has carried out its first ever occupation of an Arab nation, and the United States has spent hundreds of billions of dollars in an attempt to change the nature of politics there. Whether or not his vision of transforming the Middle East occurs, it appears that the United States won"t be detaching from the region anytime soon. "If the government falls, we"ll have to go back in," in a third war, commented John Lehman, a Reagan-era Navy secretary. The stakes are simply too high to let Iraq become a sanctuary for anti-U.S. terrorists.

The best case scenario: The Philippines, 1899-1946 For the U.S. government, success really means staying in Iraq for years. The alternatives are failure in some form-either a unilateral withdrawal and abandonment of Iraq, or ejection by an anti-American government. "The average counterinsurgency in the twentieth century has lasted nine years," Gen. Casey said late in 2005. "Fighting insurgencies is a long-term proposition, and there"s no reason that we should believe that the insurgency in Iraq will take any less time to deal with." So while it is likely that there will be a series of cuts in the U.S. military presence in Iraq in 2006 and 2007, it also remains likely that thousands of troops will be there for many years to come.

The a.n.a.logy here is to the American war in the Philippines at the end of the nineteenth century. That episode began badly in 1899, with a combination of poor strategic planning and presidential inattentiveness, and a media that acted as cheerleaders for war. Also like Iraq in 2003, it began as a conventional conflict and was transformed into a guerrilla war. And when U.S. troops proved poorly prepared, and some reacted with brutality, the American public was dismayed.

But by late 1900, the U.S. Army had begun to adjust. Commanders spread their troops among the people, where they were able to learn the ident.i.ties of their enemies and to seize many weapons. They trained local police units that, though troubled, eventually became an effective counterinsurgency force. Drawing on its experience in the American West, and resolved not to repeat the mistakes it had made there, the Army was "determined to preserve the Filipino by raising his standards and cultivating his friendship," said one officer quoted by Brian Linn in his history of the Philippines War. By 1902 the war was over, but U.S. forces remained in the country for decades. It was, wrote Linn, "the most successful counterinsurgency campaign in U.S. history."

Settling into such a posture of keeping a lid on the insurgents while whittling them down to irrelevancy would mean that the U.S. war in Iraq was returning to its pattern of containment-albeit this time on the ground. If that happens, it is likely that future historians will come to look at the U.S. effort from 1991 on as one long war, beginning with a short ground battle, followed by twelve years of containment done largely from the air, then another short ground fight in 2003, followed by another decade or so of containment-this time on the ground, and inside Iraq. No one expects the insurgency to disappear, but the hope would be to keep a lid on it, limiting its reach and intensity.

The doubt that hangs over even this most optimistic of scenarios is the duration of American popular support for maintaining a significant military presence for years to come. The question will become increasingly pointed with the pa.s.sage of time, because as long as American soldiers are in Iraq, some are likely to die violently. The aim would be to reduce U.S. losses from two or three a day to that number a week, and eventually to that number a month, on the calculation that the American people would stand for such a rate of casualties.

The middling scenario: France in Algeria or Israel in Lebanon It is equally possible that while the U.S. military makes improvements in its tactics and in the quality of Iraqi security forces, the political clock will run out on the effort there, either domestically or in Iraq itself, and that the U.S. will retreat before the job is done. Even if the U.S. military is able to turn most security functions over to Iraqi forces, that is unlikely to end the fighting. Because the Sunnis aren"t reconciled to being a minority in a democracy, said Bing West, the Shiite-dominated Iraqi security forces essentially are going to have to conduct their own occupation of the Sunni Triangle for years to come. Thus, any U.S. withdrawal would almost certainly lead to far more violence.

The closest a.n.a.logy to the U.S. experience in Iraq may be the French in Algeria. There are of course many differences-France was a colonial power, it had a million citizens residing in Algeria, and its military was reeling from a stinging defeat in Vietnam. Also, the French had been in Algeria for over a century and had a much better feel for its Arab and Berber cultures. The biggest difference is that a sovereign Iraqi government able to stand on its own would represent a victory for the United States, while an independent Algeria was a defeat for France. Yet there also are some striking similarities; most notably, in both wars a Western power found itself enmeshed in an Arab land fighting a primarily urban battle against a murky mix of nationalists and Islamicists.

Algeria ended badly for the French. Their military became steadily more effective, but so notably brutal, with three thousand prisoners supposedly murdered, that the French public was repulsed. Ultimately, parts of the French army, feeling betrayed by the nation"s politicians, rebelled, and even tried to a.s.sa.s.sinate President Charles de Gaulle. "They won tactically on the ground but brought down the French government by losing its moral authority-that"s not a victory," noted Gen. Mattis, a Marine commander who has long studied the Algerian conflict in the belief that it was emblematic of the wars the United States was likely to fight. That said, France recovered smartly, and in the decades since the Algerian crisis has enjoyed more political stability than it had for most of the twentieth century.

The U.S. Army isn"t going to launch a coup d"etat, no matter what happens in Iraq, but a premature U.S. withdrawal likely would have severe consequences, especially for the Mideast. "To push Iraqi forces to the fore before they are ready is not "leaving to win," it is rushing to failure," said Sepp, the insurgency expert who advised Gen. Casey in 2005. If we leave too soon, he and his colleague Col. Hix argued, we might just be setting ourselves up for another war. "It is not beyond the realm of the possible that the United States would find itself in the position of leading another invasion of Iraq ... to make right what was allowed to go wrong for the sake of expedience," they warned.

An Iraqi blogger writing under the t.i.tle The Mesopotamian laid out a scenario of what might come after a precipitous U.S. pullout. On Day 2, he wrote, al Anbar province would fall, "even before the last American soldier leaves Baghdad." That would be followed by fighting between Shiite and Sunni groups along the murky ethnic dividing line running southwest from Baghdad. In the capital, "[a]ll shops and markets are closed and start to be looted." Next, the Kurds would move to capture the key oil city of Kirkuk, on the edge of their historical territory. "Turkey cannot allow that and invades from the north." The Kurds would turn to Iran for protection, as would the Shiites, who would feel abandoned by the West and betrayed once more by the United States. In response to the Iranian intervention, he predicted, a torrent of Arabs from Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia would pour into Iraq to support their Sunni brothers. "All join an infernal orgy of death and destruction the likes of which have seldom been seen," he said, and oil prices would rocket past one hundred dollars a barrel as "fanaticism sweeps the region."

The prospect of such a catastrophe makes it more likely that the United States will remain in Iraq even if the country hovers for years on the edge of civil war. In that scenario, the U.S. strategy essentially would have to be to keep a lid on a low-level civil war for as long as possible, while also trying to keep U.S. casualties low enough that the American public doesn"t demand an unconditional withdrawal. That sort of chronic occupation raises the possibility of another historical parallel. The U.S. experience in Iraq may come to resemble that of yet another Western-style military"s attempt to pacify an Arab population: Israel"s painful eighteen-year occupation of parts of southern Lebanon.

A worse scenario: civil war, part.i.tion, and regional war?

Even if the United States stays, there is no guarantee that Iraq won"t slip into civil war. That threat hovers constantly, discussed quietly by American officers as a possibility and more openly by many Iraqis. Americans tend to remember the horrors of their own civil war and so a.s.sume that all parties would do their best to avoid it, a perspective that obscures the fact that there is a considerable pro-civil war lobby in Iraq. Essentially, there may be more people in the region who want to see the United States leave Iraq than want to see it stay, from Sunni Islamic extremists to their Shiite foes. The quickest way to achieve that ejection of the U.S. presence may be to start a civil war, on the calculation that the U.S. public wouldn"t stand for seeing American troops die trying to keep apart the warring factions.

Some maintained that civil conflict already had begun in 2005. "This is one of the stages of civil war we are in right now," said Ayad Allawi, who served as Iraq"s interim prime minister in late 2004 and early 2005. "What you have is killings, a.s.sa.s.sinations, militias, a stagnant economy, no services." Yet a genuine, full-blown civil war would be far worse. It likely would involve major ma.s.sacres of civiliansand a variety of foreign interventions, both covert and overt. A Shiite-dominated Iraqi government with its back to the wall might very well invite the Iranian military to join it in putting down the Sunnis, which likely would be done with such brutality that it would horrify the world.

Were Iraq to break up, it is possible that a Shiite south eventually would harness its oil money to build its military capacity, and then move southward to "liberate" its Shiite brethren who live on top of Saudi Arabia"s oil fields, warned T. X. Hammes, the Marine counterinsurgency expert who served in Iraq. Meanwhile, he predicted, there would be a multination fight for the oil fields of the north, likely including Turkey, a member of NATO. "We have lit multiple fuses" in the region, he said. "There will be multiple explosions. I"m thinking our grandkids could easily be there," carrying on the fight decades from now.

Amin Saikal, director of the Australian National University"s Center for Arab and Islamic Studies, worried that the United States, by turning over control of Iraq to its Shiites, had altered the balance of power in the region. "The traditional power equation in the Gulf is rapidly shifting in favor of Shiite Islam," he wrote. "If the present trend continues, the Iraq conflict could cause wider sectarian hostilities across the Muslim world, with a devastating impact on the region and beyond."

Indeed, in the fall of 2005 there already were small but worrisome signs of the regionalization of the Iraq war. Not only was there a steady trickle of foreign fighters into Iraq, there were indications that the insurgency might also be exporting violence. For example, the rockets fired at U.S. Navy ships anch.o.r.ed off Aqaba, Jordan, in August 2005 had been smuggled out of Iraq by three al Qaeda operatives. A month later, the Saudi foreign minister, Prince Saudi al-Faisal, traveled to Washington to warn, "All the dynamics are pulling the country apart." He could have said the same thing at home, but his choice of venue indicated that he would fault the U.S. government for this outcome. Two months later, "al Qaeda in Iraq," an insurgent group, detonated a series of bombs in three hotels in Amman, Jordan, killing fifty-seven people. "This is the first of a heavy rain," said a statement posted on the Internet, purportedly by these insurgents.

It was at this time that a thoughtful U.S. Army officer who had served in Iraq sketched out what he expected for the next ten years of his career. "In 2009, after we withdraw, and the south turns into Shiastan, and the Kurds declare independence, and Turkey invades, and Sunnistan leads to the fall of the house of Saud, and Arabia becomes the first step in the caliphate, and oil goes to two hundred dollars a barrel, then we have to invade Arabia with a broken Army, and then it"s our Algeria," he said.

438.

afterword: betting against history The nightmare scenario But that dark vision is not the worst possible outcome. Even more worrisome would be that perhaps in the wake of those regional wars, a new Iraqi leader emerged to unify his country, and then perhaps the region. This was one variant hinted at in a U.S. government intelligence study, "Mapping the Global Future," in which the National Intelligence Council presented as one future scenario the rise of a new pan-Arab caliphate. "A caliphate would not have to be entirely successful for it to present a serious challenge to the international order," the report noted. Nor would its proclamation likely lessen the incidence of terrorism. Rather, it "could fuel a new generation of terrorists intent on attacking those opposed to the caliphate, whether inside or outside the Muslim world."

A poll taken in 2005 by Oxford Research International of 1,711 Iraqis reported that 74.8 percent felt that what their country needed was a single strong leader. At first the appearance of a new Iraqi strongman might also appear to be a relief to the U.S. government and the West, especially if he weren"t a radical cleric. He might be a former Iraqi major or lieutenant colonel. He could be young, energetic, moral, modest, even austere, spurning luxury and driving an old Volkswagen. Admirers might speak of how he retreats into the desert for a week at a time to cleanse himself spiritually through solitary meditation. He might be of mixed ethnic origin, with a Kurdish father and a Sunni mother. There would be embellished tales of his spontaneous generosity, taking care of widows and children, and giving away personal goods without hesitation. But he likely also would have a harsh side, perhaps ill.u.s.trated by his summary execution with his pistol of one of his soldiers caught in the act of raping a woman.

There is a precedent for the emergence of just such a figure: Salah ed-Din Yusuf, or Saladin, as he was known in the West, came out of the fractionalized chaos of the twelfth-century Mideast and rose to power in response to the invasion of the Crusaders. He was the son of a Kurd who had been the "governor" of Tikrit. "He was a man of great ambitions, but simple and modest in his private life, careless of protocol and so good-natured as to be almost weak," wrote Zoe Oldenbourg, the French historian of the Crusades. He also unified the Arab world in responding to the Crusader invasion.

The new Saladin would emerge first as a relief from the madness of chaos and terrorism. He would be a unifier, bringing together the disparate and weary parts of Iraq. He might even extend his influence beyond Iraq"s borders, calling for the revival of the Arab world. Bolstered by Iraq"s oil revenues, he might succeed in creating a wave of new pan-Arab feeling. Riding that wave, he might confront the West as it hasn"t yet been-that is, as an Arab leader combining popular support with huge oil revenues. And he may seek also to harness that oil money to a new program to secure nuclear weapons. Such a program could threaten the existence of Israel or, by secret means of delivery, New York or Washington. Before that happened, the West would have to consider a war of preemption-but this time its soldiers might really face nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.

NOTES.This volume is not an academic study written at long remove from its subject, but an attempt to write narrative history on the heels of the events it covers. I decided against using formal footnotes, yet I also think that the curious are ent.i.tled to know the sources of much of my information. So where the source is particularly significant or deserving of notice, I have tried in the text to say what it was. When sources aren"t explained there, I have tried to list them here.

This book is based foremost on several hundred interviews and my own coverage of events in Washington, D.C., and in Iraq, and in several other places. I was surprised in reading my notes, for example, to realize that I had covered Defense Secretary Rumsfeld in Munich early in February 2003, then Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz in Detroit later that month, then the Washington end of the invasion the following month, and then was embedded with the 1st Armored Division in Baghdad not long after that. It gave me a renewed appreciation of my wife"s tolerance of my job. While writing I also relied on a steady stream of e-mails to and from soldiers in the field. It is a pleasant surprise of the modern world that I was able to send a just written paragraph from my desk near Washington, D.C., to a commander operating in al Anbar province and ask, "Does this accurately capture what happened, in your view?" I frequently would receive a response within the hour.

I also have relied extensively on a vast number of doc.u.ments. The biggest surprise to me in writing a work of nonfiction now, compared to a decade ago, was the extraordinary increase in the amount of information available, in the form of memoranda, depositions, PowerPoint summaries of military briefings and plans, and transcripts of congressional hearings and press conferences. At the end of one interview, for example, one U.S. official handed me a CD-ROM with his entire work output related to Iraq, including most of his internal brief ings and all the memos he had sent to the CPA. I estimate that in the course of writing this book I have read more than thirty-seven thousand pages of such official doc.u.ments.

This book also draws frequently on the work of my colleagues in journalism. Because of my direct involvement I have used Washington Post Washington Post stories most often to add to my own experience. But I also have referred to articles that appeared in dozens of other publications, most notably the stories most often to add to my own experience. But I also have referred to articles that appeared in dozens of other publications, most notably the New York Times, New York Times, the the Los Angeles Times, Los Angeles Times, and and USA Today, USA Today, as well as the work of journalists in the Knight-Ridder chain. as well as the work of journalists in the Knight-Ridder chain.

Epigraph vii "Know your enemy, know yourself": The quotation from Sun Tzu appears in Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province (University of California, 1972). In addition to interviews and e-mail exchanges, this chapter relies heavily on the published memoirs of American leaders of the 1991 Gulf War. These include George H. W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, (University of California, 1972). In addition to interviews and e-mail exchanges, this chapter relies heavily on the published memoirs of American leaders of the 1991 Gulf War. These include George H. W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed A World Transformed (Knopf, 1998); Colin Powell, (Knopf, 1998); Colin Powell, My American Journey My American Journey (Random House, 1995); and H. Norman Schwarzkopf, (Random House, 1995); and H. Norman Schwarzkopf, It Doesn"t Take a Hero It Doesn"t Take a Hero (Bantam, 1992). For this chapter and throughout the book I found very helpful the transcriptions of postwar interviews with Cheney and Schwarzkopf available on the Web site of (Bantam, 1992). For this chapter and throughout the book I found very helpful the transcriptions of postwar interviews with Cheney and Schwarzkopf available on the Web site of Frontline, Frontline, the Public Broadcasting System"s extraordinary doc.u.mentary series. In addition, the Pentagon"s "Final Report to Congress: Conduct of the Persian Gulf War" (Defense Department, 1992) remains a useful reference doc.u.ment. For outside views of the end of the 1991 war I consulted Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, the Public Broadcasting System"s extraordinary doc.u.mentary series. In addition, the Pentagon"s "Final Report to Congress: Conduct of the Persian Gulf War" (Defense Department, 1992) remains a useful reference doc.u.ment. For outside views of the end of the 1991 war I consulted Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, The Generals" War The Generals" War (Little, Brown, 1995) and Rick Atkinson, (Little, Brown, 1995) and Rick Atkinson, Crusade Crusade (Houghton Mifflin, 1993). (Houghton Mifflin, 1993).

Chapter 1: A 1: A Bad Ending Bad Ending.6 "I was not an enthusiast": Cheney"s comment is from a Frontline Frontline transcript. transcript.7 "With hindsight it does seem like a mistake": Wolfowitz"s comment appeared in an essay in National Interest National Interest magazine (spring 1993). My discussion of the unhappiness of the Shiites with the end of thel991war was influenced by Yitzhak Nakash, magazine (spring 1993). My discussion of the unhappiness of the Shiites with the end of thel991war was influenced by Yitzhak Nakash, The Shi"is of Iraq The Shi"is of Iraq (Princeton, 2003). For the beginnings of the subsequent U.S. containment of Iraq I also have used Kenneth Pollack"s (Princeton, 2003). For the beginnings of the subsequent U.S. containment of Iraq I also have used Kenneth Pollack"s The Threatening Storm The Threatening Storm (Random House, 2002). (Random House, 2002).7 "More than any of the other dramatis personae": This is from Andrew Bacevich, "Trigger Man," American Conservative American Conservative (June 6, 2005). For the account of Operation Provide Comfort I began with the official history by Gordon Rudd, (June 6, 2005). For the account of Operation Provide Comfort I began with the official history by Gordon Rudd, Humanitarian Intervention: a.s.sisting the Iraqi Kurds in Operation Provide Comfort, 1991 Humanitarian Intervention: a.s.sisting the Iraqi Kurds in Operation Provide Comfort, 1991 (Department of the Army, 2004). (Department of the Army, 2004).9 "We moved our ground and air forces": This quotation from Abizaid about his approach is from the March 1993 issue of the Army"s "We moved our ground and air forces": This quotation from Abizaid about his approach is from the March 1993 issue of the Army"s Military Review. Military Review.

Chapter 2: 2: Containment and Its Discontents Containment and Its Discontents In addition to Pollack"s Threatening Storm, Threatening Storm, this chapter relies heavily on a variety of reports, summaries, and chronologies produced by a.n.a.lysts at Congressional Research Service, most notably Alfred Prados, "Iraq: Former and Recent Military Confrontations with the United States" (Library of Congress, 2002) and Christopher Blanchard, "Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology" (Library of Congress, 2005). My discussion of al Qaeda"s fatwas was influenced by Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, this chapter relies heavily on a variety of reports, summaries, and chronologies produced by a.n.a.lysts at Congressional Research Service, most notably Alfred Prados, "Iraq: Former and Recent Military Confrontations with the United States" (Library of Congress, 2002) and Christopher Blanchard, "Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology" (Library of Congress, 2005). My discussion of al Qaeda"s fatwas was influenced by Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror The Age of Sacred Terror (Random House, 2002). 15 "Given that no-fly zones": The quotation by Cmdr. Huber is from his essay, "Thou Shalt Not Fly," which appeared in the August 1999 issue of (Random House, 2002). 15 "Given that no-fly zones": The quotation by Cmdr. Huber is from his essay, "Thou Shalt Not Fly," which appeared in the August 1999 issue of Proceedings of the Naval Inst.i.tute. Proceedings of the Naval Inst.i.tute. 17 "demonstrating that your friends will be protected": Wolfowitz"s a.s.sertion is in his "Remembering the Future," 17 "demonstrating that your friends will be protected": Wolfowitz"s a.s.sertion is in his "Remembering the Future," National Interest National Interest (spring 2000). (spring 2000).

22 "a weakened, fragmented, chaotic Iraq": This Zinni comment is from his meeting with the Defense Writers Group on October 21,1998.23 "Toppling Saddam is the only outcome": Wolfowitz"s criticism of that comment appeared in the December 7,1998 issue of the New Republic. New Republic.24 "for the United States to try moving from containment": The criticism of Wolfowitz appeared in Daniel Byman, Kenneth Pollack, and Gideon Rose, "The Rollback Fantasy," in the January-February 1999 issue of Foreign Affairs. Foreign Affairs.24 "the Iraqi army surrendered the northern third": His letter of response, cowritten with former Rep. Stephen Solarz, was carried in the March-April 1999 issue of that magazine. Former Treasury Secretary Paul O"Neill"s views are represented in Ron Suskind"s The Price of Loyalty The Price of Loyalty (Simon & Schuster, 2004). (Simon & Schuster, 2004).28 "Powell"s influence": Keller"s article, "The World According to Powell," appeared in the New York Times Magazine, New York Times Magazine, November 25,2001. November 25,2001.28 "far from transforming containment": The quote from Lawrence Kaplan and William Kristol is from their book, The War Over Iraq The War Over Iraq (Encounter, 2003). (Encounter, 2003).

Chapter 3: 3: This Changes Everything This Changes Everything The account of Bush administration deliberations in the days after the 9/11 attacks relies on both The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (W. W. Norton, 2004; no copyright) and on Bob Woodward"s extremely useful (W. W. Norton, 2004; no copyright) and on Bob Woodward"s extremely useful Plan of Attack Plan of Attack (Simon & Schuster, 2004). (Simon & Schuster, 2004).

Chapter 4: 4: The War of Words The War of Words.Here again the transcripts of interviews posted on Frontline Frontline s Web site were very helpful-in this case, those with Greg Thielmann, Richard Perle, and Ahmed Chalabi. s Web site were very helpful-in this case, those with Greg Thielmann, Richard Perle, and Ahmed Chalabi.

46 "the administration started speaking about Iraq": This Thielmann quotation is from his Frontline Frontline interview. The biographical material on Zinni given here is based mainly on interviews with him, but also reflects the account in Dana Priest"s interview. The biographical material on Zinni given here is based mainly on interviews with him, but also reflects the account in Dana Priest"s The Mission The Mission (W. W. Norton, 2003). (W. W. Norton, 2003).

53 "Within a very short period of time": Richard Perle, in Frontline Frontline interview. interview.

56 "As they embellished": The Beers quote is from a Cable News Network (CNN) doc.u.mentary on Iraqi intelligence issues, Dead Wrong, Dead Wrong, that aired in August 2005. that aired in August 2005.56 "He told us, we told Judy Miller": Chalabi"s quote is from a Frontline Frontline transcript, as are his other comments in this section. transcript, as are his other comments in this section.57 "It was true that Chalabi": Wolfowitz"s views on Chalabi are discussed at some length in the Downing Street Memos, internal British government doc.u.ments from the spring and summer of 2002 that were leaked to the media in 2005. The British discussions also are reflected in Christopher Meyer, DC Confidential Confidential (Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2005), the weak memoirs of a former British amba.s.sador to the United States. The data on U.S. payments to Chalabi"s organization is from a Congressional Research Service study by Kenneth Katzman, "Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts and Post-Saddam Governance" (Library of Congress, 2004). (Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2005), the weak memoirs of a former British amba.s.sador to the United States. The data on U.S. payments to Chalabi"s organization is from a Congressional Research Service study by Kenneth Katzman, "Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts and Post-Saddam Governance" (Library of Congress, 2004).

Chapter 5: 5: The Run-up The Run-up.The quotes from Skelton are from a series of interviews with him. 60 "Well, Congressman, we really don"t need your vote": A White House spokesman said that Keniry"s recollection of the exchange was somewhat different, and that he recalled simply telling Skelton that the Iraq resolution would pa.s.s with a large bipartisan majority.64 "We have got to go in and win": The exchange between Michael O"Hanlon and Richard Perle is from the American Enterprise Inst.i.tute"s transcript of its conference t.i.tled "The Day After: Planning for a Post-Saddam Iraq" that was held on October 3, 2002. The quotations from Patrick Clawson, Alina Romanowski, and Amatzia Baram are from the Washington Inst.i.tute for Near East Policy"s transcript of its conference, "Bush Administration Middle East Policy," held October 4-6, 2002. The Army War College"s August 2002 seminar on Afghanistan was summarized in internal doc.u.ments and also is reflected in part in a monograph by Conrad Crane and Andrew Terrill t.i.tled "Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario," published by the U.S. Army War College"s Strategic Studies Inst.i.tute in February 2003. The account of the workshop meeting, "Iraq: Looking Beyond Saddam"s Role," held by the Inst.i.tute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University on November 20-21, 2002, is based largely on an internal report on the meeting.75 "a key point in the planning": The material from Maj. Gen. James Thurman and Lt. Gen. David McKiernan is from interviews conducted by Army historians and held on file at the Army"s Center of Military History, Ft. McNair, Washington, D.C.78 "the dumbest f.u.c.king guy on the planet": Franks"s description of Feith appears in both his autobiography, American Soldier American Soldier (HarperCollins, 2004) and Woodward"s (HarperCollins, 2004) and Woodward"s Plan of Attack. Plan of Attack.78 "may be the most planned operation": The quotation from Lt. Col. James Scudieri is from his paper t.i.tled "Iraq 2003-04 and Mesopotamia 1914-18: A Comparative a.n.a.lysis in Ends and Means," published by the Army War College"s Center for Strategic Leadership in August 2004.78 "Overall, this approach worked poorly": The quotation from the Rand Corporation report is from a study that hasn"t been released but was faxed by the office of James Thomson, Rand"s president and chief executive officer, to the office of DefenseSecretary Rumsfeld on February 8,2005. My discussion of Phase IV planning at Central Command and subordinate commands is based in part on my study of several cla.s.sified U.S. military PowerPoint briefings, including "Phase IV Reconstruction," "CFLCC Stability Operations," and "Annex G to CFLCC OPLAN COBRA II."

Chapter 6: The Silence of the Lambs.The editorial reviews of Powell"s UN speech were collected by Editor & Publisher Editor & Publisher magazine. 98 "Given that the requisite additional troops": This comment from Bacevich is from the same article quoted in Chapter 1. The attendees at the February 21-22, 2003, rock drill meeting at the National Defense University are listed in an internal ORHA doc.u.ment t.i.tled "Interagency Reconstruction Planning Conference." The account of that conference is based in part on a summary written by the political adviser to the commander of the Army"s V Corps. Garner"s briefings to Rumsfeld are contained in two February 2003 PowerPoint briefings, t.i.tled "Macroview of Issues: Funding, Stability Forces, Iraqi Security Forces, UN Resolutions" and "Reshaping the Iraqi Military," as well as a one-page Talking Points memo prepared by Garner"s staff. magazine. 98 "Given that the requisite additional troops": This comment from Bacevich is from the same article quoted in Chapter 1. The attendees at the February 21-22, 2003, rock drill meeting at the National Defense University are listed in an internal ORHA doc.u.ment t.i.tled "Interagency Reconstruction Planning Conference." The account of that conference is based in part on a summary written by the political adviser to the commander of the Army"s V Corps. Garner"s briefings to Rumsfeld are contained in two February 2003 PowerPoint briefings, t.i.tled "Macroview of Issues: Funding, Stability Forces, Iraqi Security Forces, UN Resolutions" and "Reshaping the Iraqi Military," as well as a one-page Talking Points memo prepared by Garner"s staff.103 "What the h.e.l.l": Powell"s angry exchange with Rumsfeld over expelling State Department officials from Garner"s staff is described in Woodward"s Plan of Attack. Plan of Attack. The discussion in the March The discussion in the March 7, 7, 2003, secure video teleconference is reported in a formal internal ORHA summary t.i.tled "Notes from the Phase IV SVTC." The full t.i.tle of the ORHA doc.u.ment quoted on the postwar challenge is "Initial Working Draft/A Unified Mission Plan for Post Hostilities Iraq," dated April 21, 2003. The paper by Maj. Isaiah Wilson presented to the Peace Studies Program at Cornell University on October 14,2004, is t.i.tled "Thinking Beyond War: Civil-Military Operational Planning in Northern Iraq." The Marine Corps history is 2003, secure video teleconference is reported in a formal internal ORHA summary t.i.tled "Notes from the Phase IV SVTC." The full t.i.tle of the ORHA doc.u.ment quoted on the postwar challenge is "Initial Working Draft/A Unified Mission Plan for Post Hostilities Iraq," dated April 21, 2003. The paper by Maj. Isaiah Wilson presented to the Peace Studies Program at Cornell University on October 14,2004, is t.i.tled "Thinking Beyond War: Civil-Military Operational Planning in Northern Iraq." The Marine Corps history is Basrah, Baghdad, and Beyond: The U.S. Marine Corps in the Second Iraq War Basrah, Baghdad, and Beyond: The U.S. Marine Corps in the Second Iraq War (Naval Inst.i.tute Press, 2005) by retired Marine Col. Nicholas Reynolds. The Army War College review of the a.s.sumptions of the war plan is summarized in a June 2003 PowerPoint briefing t.i.tled "The Stabilization and Reconstruction of Iraq: Initial Strategic Observations." The Rand Corporation report is the one cited in the previous chapter. (Naval Inst.i.tute Press, 2005) by retired Marine Col. Nicholas Reynolds. The Army War College review of the a.s.sumptions of the war plan is summarized in a June 2003 PowerPoint briefing t.i.tled "The Stabilization and Reconstruction of Iraq: Initial Strategic Observations." The Rand Corporation report is the one cited in the previous chapter.

Chapter 7: Winning a Battle.This chapter relies throughout on the Army"s official history of the spring 2003 invasion, On Point On Point (Combat Studies Inst.i.tute Press, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2004) by retired Army Col. Gregory Fontenot, Lt. Col. E. J. Degen, and Lt. Col. David Tohn. This section also was informed by a briefing by the Army War College"s Conrad Crane t.i.tled "Too Much Phase IV Planning: Coordinating Theater Plans for Iraq," delivered at a conference cosponsored by the War College and Johns Hopkins University"s School of Advanced International Studies in November 2005. My discussion of the flaws of the war plan also was influenced by two very different early a.s.sessments of the war and the occupation: Thomas Donnelly, (Combat Studies Inst.i.tute Press, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2004) by retired Army Col. Gregory Fontenot, Lt. Col. E. J. Degen, and Lt. Col. David Tohn. This section also was informed by a briefing by the Army War College"s Conrad Crane t.i.tled "Too Much Phase IV Planning: Coordinating Theater Plans for Iraq," delivered at a conference cosponsored by the War College and Johns Hopkins University"s School of Advanced International Studies in November 2005. My discussion of the flaws of the war plan also was influenced by two very different early a.s.sessments of the war and the occupation: Thomas Donnelly, Operation Iraqi Freedom: A Strategic a.s.sessment Operation Iraqi Freedom: A Strategic a.s.sessment (AEI Press, 2004) and Jeffrey Record, (AEI Press, 2004) and Jeffrey Record, Dark Victory: America"s Second War Against Iraq Dark Victory: America"s Second War Against Iraq (Naval Inst.i.tute Press, 2004). In some ways this chapter is a dialogue with those two thoughtful a.n.a.lyses. The quotation from the war plan is from a doc.u.ment t.i.tled "Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) OPLAN COBRA II," dated January 13,2003. (Naval Inst.i.tute Press, 2004). In some ways this chapter is a dialogue with those two thoughtful a.n.a.lyses. The quotation from the war plan is from a doc.u.ment t.i.tled "Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) OPLAN COBRA II," dated January 13,2003.

116 "If the intent of operations": The quotations from retired British Maj. Gen. Bailey are from his monograph ""Over By Christmas": Campaigning, Delusions and Force Requirements," published by the Inst.i.tute of Land Warfare at the a.s.sociation of the United States Army in September 2005.122 "You know, there was probably a moment": Col. Benson"s comments are in a transcript contained in an Army study edited by Lt. Col. Brian De Toy, Turning Victory into Success: Military Operations After the Campaign Turning Victory into Success: Military Operations After the Campaign (Combat Studies Inst.i.tute Press, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, no date), which also contains a reproduction of "Phase IV-Troop to Task a.n.a.lysis," the study done by the U.S. Army in Iraq in the late spring of 2003 that concluded that about 250,000 to 300,000 troops were needed to carry out the postwar mission. (Combat Studies Inst.i.tute Press, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, no date), which also contains a reproduction of "Phase IV-Troop to Task a.n.a.lysis," the study done by the U.S. Army in Iraq in the late spring of 2003 that concluded that about 250,000 to 300,000 troops were needed to carry out the postwar mission.122 "It"s turning out right now": The Thurman and McKiernan comments are from the Army oral histories cited in Chapter 5.124 "These are Iraqi citizens who want to fight for a free Iraq": Pace"s comment was made on ABC"s This Week This Week (April 6, 2003). The history by the Special Operations Command was excerpted in an article by A. Dwayne Aaron and Cherilyn Walley t.i.tled "ODA 542: Working with the Free Iraqi Fighters" that was carried in the winter 2005 issue of their official publication, (April 6, 2003). The history by the Special Operations Command was excerpted in an article by A. Dwayne Aaron and Cherilyn Walley t.i.tled "ODA 542: Working with the Free Iraqi Fighters" that was carried in the winter 2005 issue of their official publication, Veritas: Journal of Special Operations History. Veritas: Journal of Special Operations History.124 "a waste of time and energy for us": This and subsequent comments by DeLong are from his memoir, Inside Centcom: The Unvarnished Truth about the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq Inside Centcom: The Unvarnished Truth about the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (Regnery, 2004 ). (Regnery, 2004 ).125 "They were hiding": The series of quotations is from an article by the Washington Post"s Washington Post"s William Branigin, "A Brief, Bitter War for Iraq"s Military Officers" (April 27, 2003). The account of the captured Iraqi general who had no idea that U.S. troops were near the capital is in "Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report," an extremely thorough doc.u.ment. The observation about Baghdad Bob believing what he said is from the official Army interview with Col. Boltz, which like the others is on file at the Army"s Center of Military History. William Branigin, "A Brief, Bitter War for Iraq"s Military Officers" (April 27, 2003). The account of the captured Iraqi general who had no idea that U.S. troops were near the capital is in "Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report," an extremely thorough doc.u.ment. The observation about Baghdad Bob believing what he said is from the official Army interview with Col. Boltz, which like the others is on file at the Army"s Center of Military History.131 "an intense interest in the reform of tactics": Romjue"s discussion of the post-Vietnam changes in Army thinking is found in his From Active Defense to Airland Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine, 1973-1982 From Active Defense to Airland Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine, 1973-1982 (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia, 1984). (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia, 1984).133 "Its underlying concepts": Echeverria"s a.n.a.lysis is Toward an American Way of War Toward an American Way of War (Strategic Studies Inst.i.tute, Army War College, March 2004). (Strategic Studies Inst.i.tute, Army War College, March 2004).134 "as good as it got": The Atkinson comment about the high point is from his memoir, In the Company of Soldiers In the Company of Soldiers (Henry Holt, 2004). (Henry Holt, 2004).136 "A finite supply of goodwill": Lt. Fick"s observation is from his memoir, One Bullet Away One Bullet Away (Houghton Mifflin, 2005). (Houghton Mifflin, 2005).136 "Some senior officials": Fred Ikle"s criticisms of the Bush administration"s handling of the early days of the occupation are contained in the preface to the second revised edition of Every War Must End Every War Must End (Columbia, 2005). (Columbia, 2005).138 "Continued armed opposition to coalition forces": The Central Command a.s.sessment that there wouldn"t be an insurgency is contained in a PowerPoint briefing t.i.tled "Phase IV"Rule of Law"/Logical Line of Operation/Operational Planning Team" (March 2003).138 "a cruel, hard, desolate land": The comment by Field Marshal Sir William Slim about the hardness of Iraq is from his memoir, Unofficial History Unofficial History (Corgi, 1970). (Corgi, 1970).139 "We came in to show presence": Bray is quoted in the Human Rights Watch report on the events of April 2003 in Fallujah, t.i.tled "Violent Response: The U.S. Army in al-Falluja"(June 2003).

144 "We slowly drove past 4th Infantry": Williams"s recollection is in her memoir Love My Rifle More Than You Love My Rifle More Than You (W. W. Norton, 2005). (W. W. Norton, 2005).145 "more than a million metric tons": Christopher Hileman"s estimate of the amount of munitions in Iraq was in a letter published in the May 2005 issue of Proceedings Proceedings magazine. magazine.146 "In Iraq, there was not only a failure to plan": The quotation from Schlesinger and Brown is from their "Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations" (August 2004).147 "the minimalist force structure": Some of Mines"s comments about the thinness of the U.S. military on the ground are in "On Fighting a 16-Division War With a 10-Division Force," posted on the Web site of the Foreign Policy Research Inst.i.tute on March 8, 2005.

Chapter 8: How 8: How to Create an Insurgency to Create an Insurgency (I) (I) This chapter was influenced by retired Marine Col. Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st 21st Century Century (Zenith, 2004), and by several unpublished essays by Maj. Isaiah Wilson. (Zenith, 2004), and by several unpublished essays by Maj. Isaiah Wilson.

150 "3RD ID transitioned into Phase IV SASO": The 3rd ID report is the same one cited in Chapter 7. Brig. Gen. Fastabend"s anecdote about the general who watched sofas go by in Baghdad is from the transcript of a conference held at the American Enterprise Inst.i.tute, "The Future of the United States Army," April 11,2005. Maj. Gavrilis"s essay, "The Mayor of Ar Rutbah: A Special Forces Account of Post-Conflict Iraq," was provided directly to me by the author; a slightly different version was later published in the November-December 2005 issue of Foreign Policy Foreign Policy magazine. magazine.154 "The problem with Garner": Chalabi"s comments are from the transcript of his interview with Frontline, Frontline, as are Bremer"s comments later in this chapter beginning, "I found a city that was on fire." The pamphlet on Gen. Shinseki"s career is by Richard Halloran, "My Name Is Shinseki and I Am a Soldier" (Hawaii Army Museum Society, 2004). The comments by David Nummy and Lloyd Sammons in this chapter are from interviews conducted by the United States Inst.i.tute of Peace as part of its oral history project, and are available on the inst.i.tute"s Web site. MPRI"s plan for the Iraqi military is described in an undated company doc.u.ment t.i.tled "MPRI Phase II Execution Plan: Iraqi Armed Forces Reconstruction Support Program." 161 "it would have gone easier for us": Gen. Dempsey"s a.s.sessment of de-Baathification was made at a seminar at the annual meeting of the a.s.sociation of the U.S. Army in October 2004. as are Bremer"s comments later in this chapter beginning, "I found a city that was on fire." The pamphlet on Gen. Shinseki"s career is by Richard Halloran, "My Name Is Shinseki and I Am a Soldier" (Hawaii Army Museum Society, 2004). The comments by David Nummy and Lloyd Sammons in this chapter are from interviews conducted by the United States Inst.i.tute of Peace as part of its oral history project, and are available on the inst.i.tute"s Web site. MPRI"s plan for the Iraqi military is described in an undated company doc.u.ment t.i.tled "MPRI Phase II Execution Plan: Iraqi Armed Forces Reconstruction Support Program." 161 "it would have gone easier for us": Gen. Dempsey"s a.s.sessment of de-Baathification was made at a seminar at the annual meeting of the a.s.sociation of the U.S. Army in October 2004.161 "Cannot immediately demobilize": Garner"s plans for the preservation of the Iraqi military are contained in a briefing slide t.i.tled "Iraqi Security Forces: Post-War Use of Regular Army," part of a PowerPoint briefing prepared by his office t.i.tled "Presentation for the National Security Advisor," and dated February 19, 2003. Those plans also are discussed in a memorandum for record, which was written the same day after that meeting, that summarizes the views of meeting partic.i.p.ants.163 "We expected to be able to recall": Col. Benson"s discussion of the impact of the dissolution of the Iraqi military is in Turning Victory into Success, Turning Victory into Success, cited in the previous chapter, as is the comment from Maj. Madison later in this chapter, "This is going to be a problem." The joint report by the inspectors general of the Defense and State Departments on the training of Iraqi police apparently has no formal t.i.tle, and was released in July 2005. cited in the previous chapter, as is the comment from Maj. Madison later in this chapter, "This is going to be a problem." The joint report by the inspectors general of the Defense and State Departments on the training of Iraqi police apparently has no formal t.i.tle, and was released in July 2005.

166 "Taking revenge is a Neanderthal strategy": Ikle"s criticism is in his book, Every War Every War Must End, that is cited in Chapter 7. 166 If America was a liberator: Maj. Varhola"s account of the stormy meeting between that is cited in Chapter 7. 166 If America was a liberator: Maj. Varhola"s account of the stormy meeting between sheikhs and Amb. Horan is, in part, in his essay "American Challenges in Post-ConflictIraq," which was posted by the Foreign Policy Research Inst.i.tute on its Web site onMay 27,2004.168 "There is absolutely no doubt": Pace"s a.s.sertion was made at a special briefing for the Arab and Muslim press corps at the State Department"s Foreign Press Center, April 11,2003.169 "The fact that pre-war planning a.s.sumptions": Rathmell"s discussion of the inability of the CPA and its overseers in Washington to adjust when a.s.sumptions were proven wrong is in his article "Planning Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Iraq: What Can We Learn?" which appeared in 2005 in International Affairs International Affairs magazine (vol. 81, no. 5). magazine (vol. 81, no. 5).175 "pretty introverted": Lt. Gen. Metz"s description of Lt. Gen. Sanchez is in a legal interview related to the Abu Ghraib case given by video teleconference to military lawyers in Mannheim, Germany, on August 25,2004.177 "despicable": This comment and others made by Iraqis in this section were made to my Washington Post Washington Post colleague Anthony Shadid, with whom I collaborated on an article headlined colleague Anthony Shadid, with whom I collaborated on an article headlined a tale of two baghdads a tale of two baghdads that appeared in the that appeared in the Post Post on June 1,2003. on June 1,2003.179 "No explicit, unambiguous and authoritative statement": The Congressional Research Service study of the legal status of the CPA by Elaine Halchin is called The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA): Origin, Characteristics and Inst.i.tutional Authorities The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA): Origin, Characteristics and Inst.i.tutional Authorities (2005). (2005).180 "It was quite a spat": The account of the stormy meeting of generals with senior CPA officials on November 4, 2003, is based on extensive notes taken by one CPA partic.i.p.ant, as well as on interviews with some of the officers and other CPA officials who attended.181 "bowing out of the political process": Rumsfeld"s comment is in L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq My Year in Iraq (Simon & Schuster, 2006). (Simon & Schuster, 2006).185 "The dog got louder": The material on the death of Lt. Nott is from a series of internal 4th Infantry Division doc.u.ments t.i.tled "Informal Investigation of Incident on 22 Jul 03."

Chapter 9: How 9: How to Create an Insurgency to Create an Insurgency (II) (II) 189 "From the beginning of July": This and subsequent quotations from British Lt. Gen. Haldane are from his memoir, The Insurrection in Mesopotamia, 1920 The Insurrection in Mesopotamia, 1920 (William Blackwood, 1922). (William Blackwood, 1922).192 "then the presence of troops... becomes counterproductive": The quotation from Holshek is from his essay, "Integrated Civil-Military and Information Operations," as prepared for delivery at George Mason University, August 25,2004.193 "did not understand the targeting process": This and subsequent quotations are from the report by the Center for Army Lessons Learned t.i.tled "Operation Outreach" that was posted on its Web site in October 2003, but unfortunately that Web site is no longer available to the public.194 "Actionable intelligence is the key": Gen. Abizaid"s recollection of recognizing the need for intelligence is from a legal interview conducted by Army lawyers in Mannheim, Germany, via video teleconference on August 26, 2004.

194 "Everybody likes to fight the war": The comment by Bernard Fall was made in a lecture, "The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency," delivered at the Naval War College on December 10,1964.195 "very few men occupy themselves": The quotation from Saxe is as carried in Lucien Poirier, ed., The Art of War in World History The Art of War in World History (University of California, 1994). (University of California, 1994).195 "grabbing whole villages": The official finding that large sweep operations clogged the U.S. military interrogation system in Iraq is in an undated 2004 memorandum for the chief of the Army inspector general"s inspections division t.i.tled "4th Infantry Division Detainee Operations a.s.sessment Trip Report (CONUS Team)," which summarizes interviews and discussions with sixty-seven members of the 4th ID conducted between April 5 and April 8,2004.197 "In three towns that summer": Shadid"s memory of the summer of 2003 is in Night Draws Near Night Draws Near (Henry Holt, 2005), his marvelous account of the occupation as seen by Iraqis. (Henry Holt, 2005), his marvelous account of the occupation as seen by Iraqis.197 "The gloves are coming off": Capt. Ponce"s e-mail and the responses to it were attached to a reply to the formal reprimand of another soldier issued by Lt. Col. Conrad Christman, the commander of the 104th Military Intelligence Battalion, on November 6, 2003. Col. Boltz didn"t respond to e-mails seeking his views on the "gloves" e-mail exchange.198 "They"re prisoners, Janis": The quotations from Karpinski in this chapter are mainly from my interview with her, but also from a sworn statement given by her to Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba in Kuwait on February 15, 2004, and from her interview with Frontline, Frontline, as transcribed on its Web site. as transcribed on its Web site.199 "to rapidly exploit internees": Gen. Miller"s comment is in his once-cla.s.sified report t.i.tled "a.s.sessment of DoD Counterterrorism and Detention Operations in Iraq," which is undated but which discusses his work in Iraq from August 31 to September 9, 2003. Miller"s credibility on how he recommended that detainees be handled was called into question later by an official Army investigation of FBI allegations of detainee abuse at Guantanamo, which pointedly reported that Miller"s testimony was inconsistent with an earlier letter he had sent to his commander. The FBI"s criticism is mentioned in the Schmidt-Furlow report, formally t.i.tled "Army Regulation 15-6: Final Report/Investigation into FBI Allegations of Detainee Abuse at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Detention Facility," as amended June 9,2005.200 "It was 120 degrees out": Lt. O"Hern discussed his depression after his platoon suffered casualties in a posting on www.companycommand.com on September 1,2003.202 "When I got to Washington": The Bremer statement is from the interview posted on Frontline Web site. Web site.

Chapter 10: 10: The The CPA: " CPA: "Can"t Produce Anything"

In writing this chapter I relied heavily on more than thirty oral histories posted on the Web site of the U.S. Inst.i.tute of Peace. The quotations in this chapter from Kraham, Raphel, Sam-mons, Coyne, Bachar, Dehgan, and Crandall are from that valuable collection.

203 "my time as an ice cream truck driver": This quotation appeared in Naomi Klein, "Baghdad Year Zero," Harper"s Harper"s (September 2004). (September 2004).204 "The tour length for most civilians": This comment by Synnott is in his article "State-Building in Southern Iraq," Survival Survival (summer 2005). (summer 2005).207 "Time off for me": Diamond"s recollection is from his Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq (Times Books, 2005). (Times Books, 2005).209 "What this means is that for the first nine months": Krohn"s memory of his time with the CPA was in his article "The Role of Propaganda in Fighting Terrorism," Army Army (December 2004). The finding of a problematic relationship between the CPA and the Army is also discussed in "Operation Iraqi Freedom: Strategic a.s.sessment," a briefing by the War College"s Strategic Studies Inst.i.tute (November 2004). (December 2004). The finding of a problematic relationship between the CPA and the Army is also discussed in "Operation Iraqi Freedom: Strategic a.s.sessment," a briefing by the War College"s Strategic Studies Inst.i.tute (November 2004).210 "The military was there to win the conflict": This and subsequent quotations are from Rea