This official thief, with his mind warped by his mode of life, is the ultimate authority in all matters of social, political, and criminal life....[24]

In 1905 Sun Yat-sen lashed out at the monarchical reformers, subjecting their motives to vigorous criticism:

Since the Boxer war many have been led to believe that the Tartar [Manchu or Ch"ing government] is beginning to see the sign of time and to reform itself for the betterment of the country, just from the occasional ... edicts ... not knowing that they are mere dead letters made for the express purpose of pacifying popular agitations. It is absolutely impossible for the Manchus to reform the country because reformation means detriment to them. By reformation they would be absorbed by the Chinese people and would lose the special rights and privileges which they are enjoying. The still darker side of the government can be seen when the ignorance and corruptness of the official cla.s.s are brought to light. These fossilized, rotten, good-for-nothing officials know only how to flatter and bribe the Manchus, whereby their position may be strengthened to carry on the trade of squeezing [graft].[25]

He also insisted that China"s difficulties could be solved only by the establishment of a republic, which he envisaged with great optimism:

A new, enlightened and progressive government must be subst.i.tuted in place of the old one; in such a case China would not only be able to support herself but would also relieve the other countries of the trouble of maintaining her independence and integrity. There are many highly educated and able men among the people who would be competent to take up the task of forming a new government, and carefully thought-out plans have long been drawn up for the transformation of this ... Tartar monarchy into a Republic of China. The ... ma.s.ses of the people are also ready to accept the new order of things and are longing for a change for better to uplift them from their ...

deplorable condition of life. China is now on the eve of a great national movement, for just a spark of light would set the whole political forest on fire to drive out the Tartar from our land. Our task is indeed great but it will not be an impossible one....[26]

Sun"s diagnosis of the situation was remarkably correct; he clearly sensed the coming Republic whose first president he was to become seven years later. The ideological revolution was already under way, and the Empire about to dissolve into the past. What neither Sun nor anyone else realized was that ahead of China there lay government problems more serious than misrule. The ideological shift had terminated the reality of the old regime, and the military conditions were favorable; but would men be ready to invest their faith durably in a new order?

NOTES

[1] See above, pp. 17 ff., 83 ff.

[2] Herrlee G. Creel, _The Birth of China_, p. 138, London, 1936.

[3] Leon Wieger, S. J., _La Chine a travers les ages: hommes et choses_, pp. 22-25, Hsien-hsien, 1920. This is among the most useful handbooks of Chinese history and bibliography. It is written on a popular level and designed for the rapid and easy information of Catholic missionaries in China. H. F. MacNair, _Modern Chinese History, Selected Readings_, Shanghai, 1923, will be found entertaining as well as highly informative.

[4] See John K. Shryock, _The Origin and Development of the State Cult of Confucius_, New York, 1932, for a description of the rise of Confucianism.

[5] For a list of the Chinese dynasties see below, p. 197.

[6] T"ang government is outlined on the basis of Baron Robert des Rotours, _Le Traite des examens_, Paris, 1932, a lucid and detailed translation of a section of the T"ang dynastic history dealing with the civil service. The book includes a valuable account of the organization of T"ang government and may well be cited as a model of Sinological achievement. The rendering _Department of Ministerial Coordination_ was suggested by the usage of Professor C. S. Gardner, Harvard-Yenching Inst.i.tute.

[7] Rotours, _op. cit._, p. 10. See also _ibid._, p. 3.

[8] Cf. Hans Wist, _Das Chinesische Zensorat_, Hamburg, 1932.

[9] For a Western parallel see Fritz Morstein Marx, _Civil Service in Germany_, in: _Civil Service Abroad_, p. 181 _n._ 31, New York and London, 1935.

[10] For further detail on local home rule see below, pp. 177 ff.

[11] Rotours, _op. cit._, pp. 26-55, "Les examens sous la dynastie des T"ang."

[12] Jean Escarra, _Le droit chinois_, p. 97, Peiping and Paris, 1936.

This is the outstanding work on Chinese law, by a French scholar long in the service of Chinese governments. The exhaustive bibliography of Escarra may be supplemented by Cyrus H. Peake, "Recent Studies in Chinese Law," _Political Science Quarterly_, vol. 52, pp. 117-138, 1937.

[13] P. C. Hsieh, _The Chinese Government_, 1644-1911, Baltimore, 1925; William F. Mayers, _The Chinese Government_, Shanghai, 1897.

[14] T. F. Wade, "The Army of the Chinese Empire," _The Chinese Repository_ (Canton), vol. 20, p. 300 n., 1851.

[15] The following discussion has been taken from the author"s _The Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen_, pp. 38-43, Baltimore, 1937.

[16] D. H. Kulp, _Family Life in South China_, p. xxiv, New York, 1925.

[17] See H. G. Creel, _Sinism_, Chicago, 1929.

[18] See Arthur H. Smith, _Village Life in China_, p. 228, New York, 1899.

[19] See J. S. Burgess, _The Guilds of Peking_, New York, 1928. The present cla.s.sification is a modification of that of Burgess.

[20] Translation by the present author.

[21] See Hsieh, _op. cit_., in note 13; Meribeth E. Cameron, _The Reform Movement in China_, 1898-1912, Stanford, 1931; Harold M. Vinacke, _Modern Const.i.tutional Development in China_, Princeton, 1920.

[22] Reginald Johnston, _Twilight in the Forbidden City_, London, 1934, presents an interesting narrative of court life before and after the revolution of 1911-1912.

[23] Lyon Sharman, _Sun Yat-sen: His Life and Its Meaning_, pp. 30-32, New York, 1934.

[24] Sun Yat-sen, _Kidnapped in London_, pp. 13-15, Bristol and London, 1897. This is a most engrossing work, whether considered as a political revelation, a personal narrative, or a story of adventure.

[25] Sun Yat-sen (Hu Han-min, editor), _Tsung-li Ch"uan-chi (The Complete Works of the Leader)_, vol. IV, p. 357, Shanghai, 1930; from "The True Solution to the Chinese Question," pp. 347-368, an article written by Sun himself in English.

[26] _Ibid._, p. 366.

_Chapter_ VII

THE REVOLUTION

On October 9, 1911, a follower of Sun Yat-sen, one of the heroic and desperate "Dare-to-dies" who had hara.s.sed the imperial government for years, was working over a bomb in the Russian concession in the upriver port of Hankow. The bomb exploded accidentally; the secret storage of munitions was discovered; the next day, in the ensuing turmoil, the Republic of China was born. Double Ten Day (October 10, 1911) has since been celebrated as the Chinese Fourth of July. When the imperial officials sought to suppress the insurrection, they uncovered a conspiracy in the ranks of their own troops; in self-protection the troops revolted. In the next two months the Manchu Empire crumbled away.

Sun Yat-sen, who was in Chicago at the time of the outbreak,[1] could trust his organization. Sure that destiny was working with him, he took his leisure in returning to China and stopped in London to forestall financial aid to the collapsing Empire.

_The Presidency of Sun Yat-sen and the Republican Revolution_

The fall of the Empire was not the result of a great ma.s.s movement agitating the whole population; it developed from the revolutionary nucleus which Sun and his followers had built up to secure power. They had hammered away at the imperial regime by instigating mutiny and terror for many years, since they realized that the incompetence of the government was matched only by its impotence. The revolution itself was a chain of rebellions, occurring province by province under the leadership of revolutionaries or officials joining the revolution.

Except for the ma.s.sacre of Manchus in some of the cities, it was a nearly bloodless revolution. However, the various groups pushed in different directions, and different men tried to seize power. The const.i.tutional monarchists compelled the throne to issue a very liberal const.i.tution, which might be accepted by the populace in place of the Republican programs. Military men began to come to the fore, as the army units alone were in a position of unchallengeable power. Men who had no thought of revolution might join it in time to become leaders of the revolutionary-military juntas. Li Yuan-hung, an officer of the Empire, hid under his bed when revolutionary soldiers sought him out; given the choice between death and adherence to the revolutionaries, he sided with the new powers, and in a short while became the commanding officer of the revolutionary forces in the Wu-han cities. Similar instances were not uncommon.

The revolutionaries managed to call together representatives of their party and of the troops to a National Convention at Nanking. They were seriously handicapped by the absence of Sun Yat-sen, who now hastened back to China from London. Few of the members of the revolutionary group--heretofore forced to operate as a secret society--were well enough known to have the prestige needed to form a new government. Huang Hsing, Sun"s chief military follower, sought to manage in the interim, but not until the arrival of Sun Yat-sen in Shanghai on December 24, 1911, was there a prospect of consolidation. Five days later the National Convention elected him president of the Provisional Government of the United Provinces. On January 1, 1912, he took office; with the adoption of the Gregorian calendar now in use, this date became the first day of the Year I of the Chinese Republic. With the presidency there was created a cabinet, whose ministers did not yet hold any specific portfolios. The portions of the country under revolutionary control were ruled for the time being by a temporary system which combined the military and civilian governments in each province.

Meanwhile, the Empire was still the internationally recognized government of China and continued to function in Peking. Thoroughly frightened, the imperial court saw no alternative to calling into its service the one man who could be expected to master the situation--Yuan Shih-k"ai, who had ruthlessly terminated the experiment of the Hundred Days in 1898 and whipped up the first effective modern army of the Empire. Yuan, who had fallen into disfavor as a result of court machinations a few years before, waited his time, receiving offers from both sides. Finally he went to Peking, on October 27, 1911.

The negotiations which ensued over the establishment of a new government and the pacification of the country brought into the spotlight two of the outstanding personalities of modern China--men whose characters were to mold the inst.i.tutions in a highly plastic society and whose influences were to last beyond their deaths. Sun Yat-sen, a Cantonese with many overseas connections, stood outside the old-style elite--a const.i.tutionalist and an idealist. Yuan was a soldier and diplomat from the North, narrow in outlook, altogether a tradition-bound official despite his up-to-date military ideas--an opportunist and a realist in politics. Rarely have two leaders represented such opposite extremes.

In the conclusion of the negotiations Yuan played a part which would have filled Machiavelli with admiration. The imperial family was cajoled into taking the baby Emperor off the throne but was at the same time wheedled into refusing outright abdication. The edicts of February 12, 1912, are among the most curious state papers of modern times. They turned over "the power of government" to Yuan, admitted the faults of the dynasty, and ordered him to negotiate with the revolutionists and establish a Republic of China. Nothing was said about any eventual resumption of power by the dynasty, although provision was to be made for the comfort and dignity of the court. The Manchu house was to retain the Forbidden City (imperial palace) in Peking, where the monarch could continue to exercise his functions, freed from the cares of government.

Sun Yat-sen indignantly repudiated any idea that the Republic derived from a formal authorization extended by the hated Manchus--the Republic for which he and his revolutionists had struggled for decades. But he held his peace, unwilling to upset the chances of national unification on a point of form. Yuan was recognized as an able man, although he lacked trustworthiness and intellectual ability; it seemed possible to make use of him and simultaneously to satisfy him by giving him a position within the Republican framework. After the edicts of abdication, the issue became one of ultra-idealist const.i.tutionalism versus brutal military realism.

It was agreed that Sun should keep the provisional presidency until Yuan could be inaugurated as president. Under the circ.u.mstances it was the only possible course. Yuan possessed decisive military power, and there could have been no hope of bending him. Furthermore, Sun actually did not wish the office of president. He realized that his own strength was that of ideologue and leader and felt that by enforcing his principle of _min sheng_[2] he could serve China best.

Yuan, it was arranged, was to come south to the new capital at Nanking.