Until the breakdown of the Empire, Confucian texts were studied appreciatively rather than critically. One does not criticize common sense unless one is anxious for the reputation of a crank. With the blinding dawn of Western knowledge, Confucianism went into the wastebasket. Two years in New York were worth a generation of study over the ancient authorities. From time to time, under the Republic, the various governments discussed plans for educational reform, or haphazardly encouraged the dying traditionalist schools; but nothing could restore the prestige of cla.s.sicism. Strangely, the greatest impetus toward cla.s.sical learning was provided by the challengers of the cla.s.sics. Modern Chinese scholarship, using Western methods of critical study, and armed with new specializations undreamed of by the archaists, found that the traditional authorities were valuable not only for what they pretended to be--plain, direct, factual records--but also as source material for penetrating interpretations.
The Chinese have turned to this task since the opening of the various scientific agencies of the National Government at Nanking and have already produced works of importance on their own past. They have pushed back their scientifically ascertainable history almost a thousand years.
The modern Chinese students, who hated the cla.s.sics when they were mouthed by sedate old scholars ignorant of the modern world, now devote themselves to the cla.s.sics to criticize them; criticizing them, they study them; studying them, they love them. The "science of the country"
(Sinology) has recently been added to the curriculum of the modern schools; it is causing a veritable renaissance. In fact, the Chinese are constantly becoming more anxious to find precedent for political growth and development in their own past rather than in the past of the West, which they could never appreciate as much as do Westerners.
The actual Confucian movements do not warrant attention. Militarists have sponsored little Confucian coteries, or have paid for the publication of sumptuous editions of the Confucian cla.s.sics, with the expectation of acquiring a reputation for benevolence and intelligence.
Wu P"ei-fu, the most accomplished scholar among the military leaders of his period, who owed part of his prestige to his scholarship, was diligent in promoting Confucianism. With his decline (1926) his example was no longer felt to be worth following; Confucianism as a practical political expedient pa.s.sed from the scene. It gave too little sanction to the raising of local conscript armies, inflation of the currency, and the doubling of taxes. Its complete silence on such necessities could not be taken for consent.
In the j.a.panese-occupied territory in Manchuria, however, an interesting experiment in Confucianism has been made. The customs and organization of the last Chinese dynasty have been resurrected, touched up by a few cla.s.sical scholars, given a somewhat more orthodox and unrealistic air, and proclaimed as the const.i.tution of the Great Empire of Manchou (Manchoukuo). Since the effective government of the country is under strong j.a.panese influence, the venture is significant only as a political narcotic. The laws proclaimed are in Chinese; the officials"
names are Chinese; the miranda of government, whatever the fact, are consistent with the grand traditions of Chinese history. The j.a.panese might have placed a handful of dreaming reactionaries in actual power and helped the growth of an anachronistic Chinese Empire in the northeast, but they seem to have spoiled their opportunity of creating a friendly and subservient state by acting too arbitrarily and making it impossible for the Confucian experiment to work.
Confucianism in modern China owes its position not so much to its prospects as to the fact that it has provided a frame of reference, however obsolescent, for the political struggle. Hence, through the tumultuous modern period, the Chinese have been strengthened by a philosophy which emphasized the separateness and stability of each inst.i.tution in society, and which did not make them lose all with the fortunes of a single supreme organization. As a positive political force, Confucianism has done two things: It has kept the Chinese from depending too much on political control, and it has provided a rationale in the contest for power. It accomplished the first by making police a function of society as a whole, by stressing the appropriateness of behavior rather than its legality; and it has given the Chinese ethical values despite their sorry political condition. Confucianism has rationalized struggle by supplying each individual partic.i.p.ant with a code to apply if he came to power, and by giving him a good pretense for seeking power. Confucius himself lived in a time when Chinese political organization was chaotic. He noted the need for righteous men in high places and pointed out the good which could be done, apart from general reform, by the furtherance of virtue through scattered efforts.
Confucius supplied the ambitious men of his own time with a reason for aspiring to power--by making political responsibility a duty for the man of intelligence. The Confucian scholar was no saint contemplating eternity; he was a proud, correct, self-righteous, patient individual, obliged by his training to take public office wherein his talent could gain wide influence.
In modern China, the seekers of political office have been able to avoid the appearance of abject venality by professing respectability. Even though they may have been just as corrupt as the politicians of other nations, and more efficiently so, they nevertheless had the saving grace to eschew hard realism and cloak their ambition with a pleasantly virtuous tradition. A military leader could surround himself with a few scholars and give his efforts to reach power the air of a mild and well-mannered crusade. Whenever political strife in China has had no meaning but vanity and greed it has at least worn the decent cloak of the Confucian tradition.
NOTES
[1] For a good general introduction to Far Eastern history and politics see G. Nye Steiger, _A History of the Far East_, Boston, 1936, the most complete of one-volume works; Harold M. Vinacke, _A History of the Far East in Modern Times_, New York, 1937, especially good for social, economic, and governmental developments; Rene Grousset, _Histoire de l"Extreme Orient_, Paris, 1929; and Richard Wilhelm, _Ostasien_, Potsdam and Zurich, 1928, a brilliant short outline. Diplomatic history is dealt with by H. B. Morse and H. F. MacNair, _Far Eastern International Relations_, Boston, 1931, the most detailed one-volume work; Paul H.
Clyde, A _History of the Modern and Contemporary Far East_, New York, 1937, the most recent; and Payson J. Treat, _The Far East_, New York, 1935. The most useful one-volume history of China is Kenneth Scott Latourette, _The Chinese: Their History and Culture_, New York, 1934.
All these works carry bibliographies; those of Steiger and Latourette are particularly informing.
[2] Herrlee Glessner Creel, _Studies in Early Chinese Culture, First Series_, p. 254, Baltimore, 1937. Quoted by permission of the author.
[3] H. G. Creel, _The Birth of China_, London, 1936, provides a brilliant popular account of the earliest known Chinese culture.
[4] Creel, _Studies_, pp. 50 ff. For relevant information the writer is indebted to Professor H. H. Dubs, Duke University.
[5] On Confucianism and its immediate background see Marcel Granet, _Chinese Civilization_, New York, 1930; Fung Yu-lan (Derk Bodde, translator), _A History of Chinese Philosophy: The Period of the Philosophers_, Peiping, 1937, an authoritative work; Liang Chi-chao, _A History of Chinese Political Thought_, New York, 1930; and Leonard Shihlien Hsu, _The Political Philosophy of Confucianism_, New York, 1932, brilliant but open to criticism. For a popular portrait of Confucius see Carl Crow, _Master Kung_, New York, 1938.
[6] _Confucian a.n.a.lects_, Book II, Chapter III.
[7] For its loss of political support see below, pp. 34 ff.
[8] See below, pp. 41 ff.
_Chapter_ II
THE RISE OF NATIONALISM
Of the const.i.tuent movements of modern China, the most important has focused on the personality, principles, and following of Sun Yat-sen (1867-1925). Now known primarily as the Nationalist movement, it has at various times emphasized different aspects of its program. In its simplest and most fundamental points, the movement has fallen heir to early patriotism. It has a.s.sumed different names: the Society for the Regeneration of China (1894-1905), or _Hsing Chung Hui_; the League of Common Alliance (1905-1912), or _T"ung Meng Hui_; the Nationalist Democratic Party or National People"s Party (1912-1914), or Kuomintang; the Chung Hua Ke Ming Tang (1914-1920), or Chinese Revolutionary Party; and since 1920, again the _Kuomintang_. Kuomintang is the combination of three Chinese words meaning "country" or "realm," "people," and "party."
The name of the party can be translated in innumerable ways: nationalist democratic, nationalist popular, national people"s party, etc. The commonest rendering is "Nationalist," but it is to be remembered that the word "people" figures in the name. Furthermore, the Chinese version of patriotism has more cosmopolitan and fewer restrictive connotations than patriotism ever had in the West.
_Nationalism: Patriotic Anti-Manchu Phase_
Even in a world society that knew neither state nor nation the Chinese felt attached to their homes and their native land, which led them to repel invaders. They never personified this loyalty or tried to express it in specific inst.i.tutions; nor did they admit outsiders to equality and concede that there was more of the civilized world outside, thus admitting the existence of nations. Their att.i.tude rested on sentiment rather than theory. There was no elaborate bolstering of Chinese racial superiority, for--by and large--all the peoples in China, conquerors or conquered, seemed racially alike, fused under the pressure of great social h.o.m.ogeneity.
At the time of the Manchu conquest (about 1644) the Chinese developed a pa.s.sionate hatred for the invaders from the northeast. In entrenching themselves the Manchus committed a fateful blunder which was to bring momentary strength but ultimate ruin: they enforced racial segregation in the political, social, and economic sphere. Legend has it that a Chinese statesman, forced into Manchu service, suggested this plan and thus laid the cornerstone for the eventual Chinese liberation. The Manchus prohibited miscegenation; they established Manchu garrisons throughout the Empire, keeping their troops from work (which might have led to intermingling with the Chinese) and thus ruining them by sloth. A fixed quota of Manchus was introduced into the government service, irrespective of the operation of the examination system. In time the Chinese scholars submitted willingly enough to the alien rule; two of the Manchu emperors were the most enlightened patrons which Chinese letters and arts had had in centuries, and the intellectual opposition dwindled away to a minimum.
Among the populace there was no such general reconciliation. Deprived for the first time of scholarly leadership, the common people, peasants and artisans, organized numerous secret societies. The societies flourished, coming to supersede the government in whole areas and marking many decades with insurrection and riot. Scholars fought the secret societies because of their uncouth rituals, their heterodoxy of ideas, their opposition to the existing system. The societies answered by building up political agencies which were able to act on the lower and more generally understood levels of ideology.
These groups kept patriotism afire. The greatest of their uprisings, the T"ai-p"ing rebellion of 1849-1865, was put down with the a.s.sistance of the Western Christian states, but it left a permanent mark on Chinese society. The rebels had shown that it was possible to wrest the greater part of China from Manchu rule. They were the first to welcome the invasion of Christianity, adopting a fantastically modified Christian faith. They awakened the Chinese to the immediate possibility of a war of liberation against the outsiders who held the throne of the Chinese world.
The T"ai-p"ing rebellion showed its strength as a patriotic movement. It was successful in shaking the established ideology with a rival compounded of the more vulgar parts of the old, combined with Christianity. And it indicated the weakest point of the dynasty--governmental inadequacy in dealing with the agrarian problem.
The years of formal stability gave China a much increased population; the same years were years of political decline which raised the cost of government. A house-cleaning was in order. The T"ai-p"ing demonstrated the need for it; the Manchu dynasty refused to yield to the demand.
Sun Yat-sen was born in 1866 or 1867. An uncle of his had been one of the rebels. At Sun"s parental home the countryside had known of the T"ai-p"ing rebellion; many in his native village had partic.i.p.ated in it.
He was as patriotic as any Chinese could be in the far south, where the Manchu conquest had penetrated least deeply, but his patriotism did not differ from the patriotism of his neighbors until he came to know life outside China. From the patriotism of the old Chinese realm to the nationalism required of China in the new Westernized world--this was a step to be traversed only by rich personal experience.
Sun took this step as a boy, when he went to Honolulu. He soon was converted to Christianity, learned English, and became acquainted with Western life. He was able to see the world in terms of nations, and he saw that from the Western point of view China was a large but weak nation. Already committed from childhood to the revolutionary cause, he was led by his knowledge of the West to change patriotism into nationalism. When he returned to China, after studying medicine in Hongkong, he arrived with the notion of transforming the old world community into an effective modern nation-state.
He did not seem at first to realize how necessary it was to dispose of the monarchy. For a while he pet.i.tioned the authorities, trusting that immediate reforms might be effected within the existing framework, pending an ultimate revolution of patriots. His success must be measured in terms of what he and his few fellow workers learned, rather than of what they accomplished. His technique of revolution was based upon the established traditions of Chinese history--the formation of a small nucleus, the gathering of affiliated groups, the permeation of a regional bureaucracy when possible, and the launching of terroristic attacks to shake the apparent stability of the government.
At the beginning of his work he came into contact with the secret groups. When he started organizing in earnest, the first major development was the admittance en bloc of a small secret society. In an unpublished autobiography Sun wrote: "After my graduation I practised medicine in Canton and Macao as a pretext for spreading my revolutionary ideas."[1]
_Nationalism: Revolutionary Modernist Phase_
The Sino-j.a.panese War of 1894-1895 was the cause of much disturbance in China and the first major event to shake the belief of the ma.s.ses in their own ideology. Fantastic barbarians with deadly contrivances might harry the coasts and even allow themselves impertinences with the dynasty, but the situation became different when a small, inoffensive, ineffectual neighbor nation took over these same weapons and spoiled the internal arrangements of the Far Eastern universe. The peripheral countries could perhaps even demolish the central suzerainty; this was the _mene-tekel_ of the Empire.
The revolutionary organization of Sun Yat-sen had by now become definitely modernist, nationalist, and antimonarchical, instead of merely patriotic and antidynastic. Under the name of _Hsing Chung Hui_ there was established a confederacy of secret societies. After a short while the member societies were liquidated, and a modern revolutionary organization emerged, advocating overthrow of the Manchus. The intellectual elite of this group had no part in the ideological control which gripped the rest of China, in the form of the traditional mandarinate. As a new elite, with a new ideology, it broke the monopoly of leadership, the monopoly of thought. The consequences cannot be exaggerated. It was symptomatic that Sun"s own family became estranged in part and that many members of the society had to die a civil death before working in the organization. They left their property to heirs and changed their names, lest--under the principle of group responsibility--terrible punishments be visited upon their native villages and their families. Furthermore, an important bloc of partic.i.p.ants consisted of Chinese from overseas.
The Chinese overseas were for the most part men who had been kidnaped and sold in the coolie trade or who had stealthily deserted their native regions for adventure and wealth. With the increased foreign commerce it was possible for many Chinese to become wealthier outside their own country than within. But in leaving they left their custom and tradition and met peoples--especially Europeans and Americans--whose way of life, though utterly different, was effective in the practical, tangible terms of wealth and security. Chinese in increasing numbers bettered their condition outside. They did not ama.s.s wealth through family effort, nor did they broaden their learning through the cla.s.sics. What they won, they won themselves; and they learned something for which the Confucian ideology had no place. When they returned home, they were greeted with contempt, though also with covert admiration. Those among them who had gathered knowledge of the West, of modern methods of business, of European languages, found that in the eyes of the traditional literati and officials they were lower than the lowest illiterates.
Such men came in great numbers to the revolutionary party. Among overseas Chinese merchants, workers, and students, there developed a group--possessing power in the form of money and family connections--which was determined to overthrow the existing order and bring China in line with the outside world. Their effort was idealistic, because the Chinese overseas felt that the economic and cultural advantages of the West should be secured for their countrymen at home; it was also realistic, since they were fighting in the only way they knew for a respectable, honorable return to their homes. They could not throw their lives away and admit that their ventures and dangers were of no profit. They felt that they had acquired something, and they wanted it recognized. It was Sun Yat-sen who showed them how they could do it.
In a sense, this feature of the Nationalist movement might be taken as the pivot of modern Chinese government and politics. Controlling men through controlling their minds and through making sure that every possible leader would lead from within the hierarchy--these devices of the past had failed. There were now Chinese to whom the Confucian rules were pleasant and homelike but not the real material of modern life.
These Chinese possessed intellectually trained leaders who had nothing in common with the dominant elite--who were more interested in building railroads, improving water supplies, defending China"s frontiers, and modernizing the country than in augmenting the virtue of mankind.
_Nationalism: Republican Phase_
Every year brought the Nationalists increased strength. The Manchu court yielded a series of const.i.tutional reforms which by their promises disturbed the minds of those still content with the old order and by their nonfulfillment raised fresh storms of resentment against the Manchu rule. The court did not really seek to master the drift in the thought of the people; it tried to defeat change rather than direct it.[2] In a few short years before and after 1900 the Dragon Throne declined from the supreme office of mankind to an obsolete and picturesque ornament of a government so weak and disorganized as to render ornament artificial. While the Empire lost prestige, the Nationalists came to emphasize the republican part of their program more and more. As Nationalists, they differed little from the generations of patriots who had fought the alien rulers of China. As republicans, they were the Chinese vanguard of modernization. Some people accepted republican ideas as good in themselves; far more thought them better than the Manchu rule, especially since there was no Chinese pretender in sight--the heir of the Mings, the last native dynasty, was a pensioner in Peking. A large number probably thought little about the abstract issue one way or another but trusted the revolutionary leaders because they seemed to have a competence consonant with the times.
As the Nationalists advanced, they reorganized their party mechanism, and formed the T"ung Meng Hui in 1905. At this time the principles which were later to become the _San Min Chu I_[3] were given public formulation. The Nationalists began to feel the necessity of an ideology with which to replace that of the Confucian monarchy. It had been possible to leave doubt unsettled so long as they were a small, conspiratorial group. As soon as they began to secure adherents among the ma.s.ses it became necessary to provide their followers with a common set of ideas. In seeking agreement on fundamentals, they found disagreements within the party. Sun Yat-sen"s role began to change from conspiracy to statesmanship. The future was to show that even a statesman was not enough--that a lawgiver, a state founder, was needed.
The T"ung Meng Hui was one of the most effective revolutionary organizations which the modern world has seen, so far as achievement of immediate aims was concerned. In a series of activities which would rouse a mystery-story addict to startled incredulity, the revolutionaries tried to awaken the populace by spectacular revolts.
They capitalized on the impotence of a government alien to China, one so ineffectual that it could not protect the Chinese from the other, newer aliens who had appeared. They realized that it was hopeless to attack the monarchy along its entire front, since the old ideological guidance, although waning, still held the broad ma.s.ses in inertia. The revolutionaries accordingly attacked the Empire at its top level, its most obvious and conspicuous points of strength--the military and political headquarters of the viceroyalties and other significant positions. Knowing that they themselves could not monopolize the government of China, they looked forward to attaining a position of leadership among the various groups in the Chinese society and to keeping that leadership through parliamentary methods to be established under the Republic. Instead of regarding the Empire as a set of inst.i.tutions, they considered it the mere decoration of the country.
They had no reason to suppose, nor any way of telling, that in destroying the old regime they destroyed government and all possibility of government for a long time to come. They consequently tried to set in motion a s...o...b..ll revolution--an initial conspiracy of terror which would intimidate the Manchus and cause the whole house of cards to collapse. It was their task only to start the movement, which could be counted upon to avalanche itself into history.
To the revolutionary group a republican scheme seemed possible. They felt that in the twentieth century men would disagree but amicably, and they regarded democracy as a form of government so excellent that its mere inauguration would guarantee success. Furthermore, republicanism and democracy were closely a.s.sociated with nationalism; how could a nation be free unless it governed itself in the most direct manner--through the votes of its broad majorities?