Not everyone agreed that the questionnaire was the best way to review the performance of Negroes in World War II. Truman Gibson, for one, doubted the value of soliciting information from senior commanders, feeling that these officers would offer much subjective material of little real a.s.sistance. Referring to the letter to the major senior commanders, he said:

Mere injunctions of objectivity do not work in the racial field where more often than not decisions are made on a basis of emotion, prejudice or pre-existing opinion.... Much of the difficulty in the Army has arisen from improper racial att.i.tudes on both sides. Indeed, the Army"s basic policy of segregation is said to be based princ.i.p.ally on the individual att.i.tudes and desires of the soldiers.

But who knew what soldiers" att.i.tudes were? Why not, he suggested, make some scientific inquiries? Why not try to determine, for example, how far public opinion and pressure would permit the Army to go in developing policies for black troops?[5-24]

[Footnote 5-24: Memo, Gibson for ASW, 30 May 45, ASW 291.2 (NT).]

Gibson had become, perforce, an expert on public opinion. During the last several months he had suffered the slings and arrows of an outraged black press for his widely publicized a.n.a.lysis of the performance of black troops. Visiting black units and commanders in the Mediterranean and European theaters to observe, in McCloy"s words, "the performance of Negro troops, their att.i.tudes, and the att.i.tudes of their officers toward them,"[5-25] Gibson had arrived in Italy at the end of February 1945 to find theater officials concerned over the poor combat record of the 92d Infantry Division, the only black division in the theater and one of three activated by the War Department. After a series of discussions with senior commanders and a visit to the division, Gibson partic.i.p.ated in a press conference in Rome during which he spoke candidly of the problems of the division"s infantry units.[5-26] Subsequent news reports of the conference stressed Gibson"s confirmation of the division"s disappointing performance, but neglected the reasons he advanced to explain its failure. The reports earned a swift and angry retort from the black community. Many (p. 133) organizations and journals condemned Gibson"s evaluation of the 92d outright. Some seemed less concerned with the possible accuracy of his statement than with the effects it might have on the development of future military policy. The NAACP"s _Crisis_, for example, charged that Gibson had "carried the ball for the War Department," and that "probably no more unfortunate words, affecting the representatives of the entire race, were ever spoken by a Negro in a key position in such a critical hour. We seem destined to bear the burden of Mr. Gibson"s Rome adventure for many years to come."[5-27]

[Footnote 5-25: Ltr, Gibson to Gen John C. H. Lee, CG, ComZ, ETOUSA, 31 Mar 45, ASW 291.2 (NT).]

[Footnote 5-26: Memo, Truman Gibson for Maj Gen O. L.

Nelson, 12 Mar 45, sub: Report on Visit to 92d Division (Negro Troops), ASW 291.2.]

[Footnote 5-27: "Negro Soldier Betrayed," _Crisis_ 52 (April 1945):97; "Gibson Echo," ibid. (July 1945):193.]

Other black journals took a more detached view of the situation, a.s.serting that Gibson"s remarks revealed nothing new and that the problem was segregation, of which the 92d was a notable victim. Gibson took this tack in his own defense, pointing to the irony of a situation in which "some people can, on the one hand, argue that segregation is wrong, and on the other ... blindly defend the product of that segregation."[5-28]

[Footnote 5-28: Washington _Afro-American_, April 15, 1945, quoted in Lee, _Employment of Negro Troops_, p. 579. For details of the Gibson controversy, see Lee, pp. 575-79.]

Gibson had defenders in the Army whose comments might well apply to all the large black units in the war. At one extreme stood the Allied commander in Italy, General Mark W. Clark, who attributed the 92d"s shortcomings to "our handling of minority problems at home." Most of all, General Clark thought, black soldiers needed the incentive of feeling that they were fighting for home and country as equals. But his conclusion--"only the proper environment in his own country can provide such an incentive"--neatly played down Army responsibility for the division"s problems.[5-29]

[Footnote 5-29: Mark W. Clark, _A Calculated Risk_ (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950), pp. 414-15.]

Another officer, who as commander of a divisional artillery unit was intimately acquainted with the division"s shortcomings, delineated an entirely different set of causes. The division was doomed to mediocrity and worse, Lt. Col. Marcus H. Ray concluded, from the moment of its activation. Undercurrents of racial antipathy as well as distrust and prejudice, he believed, infected the organization from the outset and created an unhealthy beginning. The practice of withholding promotion from deserving black officers along with preferential a.s.signments for white officers prolonged the malady. The basic misconception was that southern white officers understood Negroes; under such officers Negroes who conformed with the southern stereotype were promoted regardless of their abilities, while those who exhibited self-reliance and self-respect--necessary attributes of leadership--were humiliated and discouraged for their uppityness. "I was astounded," he said, "by the willingness of the white officers who preceded us to place their own lives in a hazardous position in order to have tractable Negroes around them."[5-30] In short, the men of the 92d who fought and died bravely should be honored, but their unit, which on balance did not perform well, should be considered a (p. 134) failure of white leadership.

[Footnote 5-30: Ltr, Ray to Gibson, 14 May 45, WDGAP 291.2. Ray later succeeded Gibson as Civilian Aide to the Secretary of War.]

[Ill.u.s.tration: COMPANY I, 370TH INFANTRY, 92D DIVISION, _advances through Cascina, Italy_.]

Lt. Gen. Lucian K. Truscott, Jr., then Fifth Army commander in Italy, disagreed. Submitting the proceedings of a board of review that had investigated the effectiveness of black officers and enlisted men in the 92d Division, he was sympathetic to the frustrations encountered by the division commander, Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond. "In justice to those splendid officers"--a reference to the white senior commanders and staff members of the division--"who have devoted themselves without stint in an endeavor to produce a combat division with Negro personnel and who have approached this problem without prejudice,"

Truscott endorsed the board"s hard view that many infantrymen in the division "would not fight."[5-31] This conclusion was in direct conflict with the widely held and respected truism that competent leadership solved all problems, from which it followed that the answer to the problem of Negroes in combat was command. Good commanders prevented friction, performed their mission effectively, and achieved success no matter what the obstacles--a view put forth in a typical report from World War II that "the efficiency of Negro units depends entirely on the leadership of officers and NCO"s."[5-32]

[Footnote 5-31: 1st Ind, Hq Fifth Army (signed L. K.

Truscott, Jr.), 30 Jul 45, to Proceedings and Board of Review, 92d Inf Div, Fifth Army files.]

[Footnote 5-32: WD file 291.2 (Negro Troop Policy), 1943-1945, is full of statements to this effect.

The quote is from 2d Ind, Hq USASTAF, 26 Jul 45, attached to AAF Summary Sheets to CofS, 17 Sep 45, sub: Partic.i.p.ation of Negro Troops in the Post-War Military Establishment, AG 291.2 (23 May 45).]

In fact, General Truscott"s a.n.a.lysis of the 92d Division"s problems seemed at variance with his a.n.a.lysis of command problems in other units, as ill.u.s.trated by his later attention to problems in the all-white 34th Infantry Division.[5-33] The habit of viewing unit problems as command problems was also demonstrated by General Jacob L.

Devers, who was deputy Allied commander in the Mediterranean when the 92d arrived in Italy. Reflecting later upon the 92d Division, General Devers agreed that its engineer and armor unit performed well, but the infantry did not "because their commanders weren"t good enough."[5-34]

[Footnote 5-33: L. K. Truscott, Jr., _Command Missions: A Personal Story_ (New York: Dutton, 1959), see pages 461-62 and 471-72 for comparison of Truscott"s critical a.n.a.lysis of problems of the 34th and 92d Infantry Divisions.]

[Footnote 5-34: Interv, author with General Jacob Devers, 30 Mar 71, CMH files.]

Years later General Almond, the division"s commander, was to claim (p. 135) that the 92d Division had done "many things well and some things poorly." It fought in extremely rugged terrain against a determined enemy over an exceptionally broad front. The division"s artillery as well as its technical and administrative units performed well. Negroes also excelled in intelligence work and in dealing with the Italian partisans. On the other hand, General Almond reported, infantry elements were unable to close with the enemy and destroy him. Rifle squads, platoons, and companies tended "to melt away" when confronted by determined opposition. Almond blamed this on "a lack of dedication to purpose, pride of accomplishment and devotion to duty and teammates by the majority of black riflemen a.s.signed to Infantry Units."[5-35]

[Footnote 5-35: Ltr, Lt Gen Edward M. Almond to Brig Gen James L. Collins, Jr., 1 Apr 72, CMH files.

General Almond"s views are thoroughly explored in Paul Goodman, _A Fragment of Victory_ (Army War College, 1952). For an objective and detailed treatment of the 92d Division, see Lee, _Employment of Negro Troops_, Chapter XIX, and Ernest F.

Fisher, Jr., _Ca.s.sino to the Alps_, United States Army in World War II (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977), Chapter XXIII.]

Similar judgments were expressed concerning the combat capability of the other major black unit, the 93d Infantry Division.[5-36] When elements of the 93d, the 25th Regimental Combat Team in particular, partic.i.p.ated in the Bougainville campaign in the Solomon Islands, their performance was the subject of constant scrutiny by order of the Chief of Staff.[5-37] The combat record of the 25th included enough examples of command and individual failure to reinforce the War Department"s decision in mid-1944 to use the individual units of the division in security, laboring, and training duties in quiet areas of the theater, leaving combat to more seasoned units.[5-38] During the last year of the war the 93d performed missions that were essential but not typical for combat divisions.

[Footnote 5-36: A third black division, the 2d Cavalry, never saw combat because it was disbanded upon arrival in the Mediterranean theater.]

[Footnote 5-37: Rad, Marshall to Lt Gen Millard Harmon, CG, USAFISPA, 18 Mar 44, CM-OUT 7514 (18 Mar 44).]

[Footnote 5-38: Lee, _Employment of Negro Troops_, pp. 498-517. Lee discusses here the record of the 93d Infantry Division and War Department decisions concerning its use.]

a.n.a.lyses of the division"s performance ran along familiar lines. The XIV Corps commander, under whom the division served, rated the performance of the 25th Regimental Combat Team infantry as fair and artillery as good, but found the unit, at least those parts commanded by black officers, lacking in initiative, inadequately trained, and poorly disciplined. Other reports tended to agree. All of them, along with reports on the 24th Infantry, another black unit serving in the area, were a.s.sembled in Washington for a.s.sistant Secretary McCloy.

While he admitted important limitations in the performance of the units, McCloy nevertheless remained encouraged. Not so the Secretary of War. "I do not believe," he told McCloy, "they can be turned into really effective combat troops without all officers being white."[5-39]

[Footnote 5-39: The above digested reports and quotations are from Lee, _Employment of Negro Troops_, pp. 513-17.]

Black officers of the 93d, however, entertained a different view. They generally cited command and staff inefficiencies as the major cause of the division"s discipline and morale problems. One respondent, a company commander in the 25th Infantry, singled out the "continuous (p. 136) dissension and suspicion characterizing the relations between white and colored officers of the division." All tended to stress what they considered inadequate jungle training, and, like many white observers, they all agreed the combat period was too brief to demonstrate the division"s developing ability.[5-40]

[Footnote 5-40: USAFFE Board Reports No. 185, 20 Jan 45, and 221, 25 Feb 45, sub: Information on Colored Troops. These reports were prepared at the behest of the commanding general of the Army Ground Forces during the preparation of Bell I. Wiley"s _The Training of Negro Troops_ (AGF Study No. 36, 1946).

The quotation is from Exhibit K of USAFFE Board Report No. 221.]

[Ill.u.s.tration: 92D DIVISION ENGINEERS PREPARE A FORD FOR ARNO RIVER TRAFFIC.]

Despite the performance of some individuals and units praised by all, the combat performance of the 92d and 93d Infantry Divisions was generally considered less than satisfactory by most observers. A much smaller group of commentators, mostly black journalists, never accepted the prevailing view. Pointing to the decorations and honors received by individuals in the two divisions, they charged that the adverse reports were untrue, reflections of the prejudices of white officers. Such an a.s.sertion presupposed that hundreds of officers and War Department officials were so consumed with prejudice that they falsified the record. And the argument from decorations, as one expert later pointed out, faltered once it was understood that the 92d (p. 137) and 93d Infantry Divisions combined a relatively high number of decorations with relatively few casualties.[5-41]

[Footnote 5-41: E. W. Kenworthy, "The Case Against Army Segregation," _Annals of the American Academy of Political Science_ 275 (May 1952):28-29. A low decoration to casualty ratio is traditionally used as one measure of good unit performance. However, so many different unit att.i.tudes and standards for decorations existed during World War II that any argument over ratios can only be self-defeating no matter what the approach.]

Actually, there was little doubt that the performance of the black divisions in World War II was generally unacceptable. Beyond that common conclusion, opinions diverged widely. Commanders tended to blame undisciplined troops and lack of initiative and control by black officers and noncommissioned officers as the primary cause of the difficulty. Others, particularly black observers, cited the white officers and their lack of racial sensitivity. In fact, as Ulysses Lee points out with careful doc.u.mentation, all these factors were involved, but the underlying problem usually overlooked by observers was segregation. Large, all-black combat units submerged able soldiers in a sea of men with low apt.i.tude and inadequate training. Segregation also created special psychological problems for junior black officers.

Carefully a.s.signed so that they never commanded white officers or men, they were often derided by white officers whose att.i.tudes were quickly sensed by the men to the detriment of good discipline. Segregation was also a factor in the rapid transfer of men in and out of the divisions, thus negating the possible benefits of lengthy training.

Furthermore, the divisions were natural repositories for many dissatisfied or inadequate white officers, who introduced a host of other problems.

Truman Gibson was quick to point out how segregation had intensified the problem of turning civilians into soldiers and groups into units.

The "dissimilarity in the learning profiles" between black and white soldiers as reflected in their AGCT scores was, he explained to McCloy, primarily a result of inferior black schooling, yet its practical effect on the Army was to burden it with several large units of inferior combat ability (_Table 2_). In addition to the fact that large black units had a preponderance of slow learners, Gibson emphasized that nearly all black soldiers were trained near "exceedingly hostile" communities. This hostile atmosphere, he believed, had played a decisive role in their adjustment to Army life and adversely affected individual motivation. Gibson also charged the Army with promoting some black officers who lacked leadership qualifications and whose performance, consequently, was under par. He recommended a single measure of performance for officers and a single system for promotion, even if this system reduced promotions for black officers. Promotions on any basis other than merit, he concluded, deprived the Army of the best leadership and inflicted weak commanders on black units.

Table 2--AGCT Percentages in Selected World War II Divisions

Unit I II III IV V Total (130 +) (110-120) (90-109) (60-89) (0-59)

11th Armored Division....... 3.0 23.8 33.8 33.1 6.3 100 35th Infantry Division....... 3.3 27.0 34.2 28.0 7.5 100 92d Infantry Division (Negro) 0.4 5.2 11.8 43.5 39.1 100 93d Infantry Division (Negro) 0.1 3.5 13.0 38.4 45.0 100 100th Infantry Division........ 3.6 27.1 34.1 29.1 6.1 100

_Source_: Tables submitted by The Adjutant General to the Gillem Board, 1945.

Gibson was not trying to magnify the efficiency of segregated (p. 138) units. He made a special effort to compare the performance of the 92d Division with that of the integrated black platoons in Germany because such a comparison would demonstrate, he believed, that the Army"s segregation policy was in need of critical reexamination. He cited "many officers" who believed that the problems connected with large segregated combat units justified their abolition in favor of the integration of black platoons into larger white units. Although such unit integration would not abolish segregation completely, Gibson concluded, it would permit the Army to use men and small units on the basis of ability alone.[5-42]

[Footnote 5-42: Memo, Gibson for ASW, 23 Apr 45, sub: Report of Visit to MTO and ETO, ASW 291.2 (NT); see also Interv, Bell I. Wiley with Truman K. Gibson, Civilian Aide to Secretary of War, 30 May 45, CMH files.]

The flexibility Gibson detected among many Army officers was not apparent in the answers to the McCloy questionnaire that flowed into the War Department during the summer and fall of 1945. With few exceptions, the senior officers queried expressed uniform reactions.

They reiterated a story of frustration and difficulty in training and employing black units, characterized black soldiers as unreliable and inefficient, and criticized the performance of black officers and noncommissioned officers. They were particularly concerned with racial disturbances, which, they believed, were not only the work of racial agitators but also the result of poor morale and a sense of discrimination among black troops. Yet they wanted to retain segregation, albeit in units of smaller size, and they wanted to depend, for the most part, on white officers to command these black units. Concerned with performance, pragmatic rather than reflective in their habits, the commanders showed little interest in or understanding of the factors responsible for the conditions of which they complained. Many believed that segregation actually enhanced black pride.[5-43]