While most of the original doc.u.ments are in the Charles Fahy Papers and the Papers of the President"s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services at the Harry S.

Truman Library or in the National Archives, this study will cite the CMH collection when possible.]

Willing to cooperate, Forrestal still wanted to chart his own course.

Both he and his successor, Louis A. Johnson, made it quite clear that as a senior cabinet officer the Secretary of Defense was accountable in all matters to the President alone. The Fahy Committee might report on the department"s racial practices and suggest changes, but the development of policy was his prerogative. Both men dealt directly with the committee from time to time, but their directives to the services on the formulation of race policy were developed independently of the White House group.[14-2] Underscoring this independent att.i.tude, Marx Leva reminded the service secretaries that the members of the Personnel Policy Board were to work with the representatives of their respective staffs on racial matters. They were not expected "to a.s.sist Fahy."[14-3]

[Footnote 14-2: Ltrs, James Forrestal to Fahy, 26 Mar 49, and Louis Johnson to Fahy, 18 Apr 49; both in FC file. See also Ltr, Thomas R. Reid to R. M.

Dalfiume, 12 Feb 65, copy in CMH.]

[Footnote 14-3: Min, Cmte of Four Secretaries Mtg, 26 Oct 48, Office of OSD Historian. The Committee of the Four Secretaries was an informal body composed of the Secretary of Defense or his representative and the secretaries of the three armed services.]

At the same time Secretary of Defense Forrestal was aware that the interests of a committee enjoying White House support could not be ignored. His attempt to develop a new racial policy was probably in part an effort to forestall committee criticism and in part a wish to draw up a policy that would satisfy the committee without really doing much to change things. After all, such a departmental att.i.tude toward committees, both congressional and presidential, was fairly normal.

Faced with the conflicting racial policies of the Air Force and Army, Forrestal agreed to let the services present their separate (p. 344) programs to the Fahy Committee, but he wanted to develop a race policy applicable to all the services.[14-4] Some of his subordinates debated the wisdom of this decision, arguing that the President had a.s.signed that task to the Fahy Committee, but they were overruled. Forrestal ordered the newly created Personnel Policy Board to undertake, simultaneously with the committee, a study of the department"s racial policy. The board was to concentrate on "breaking down the problem,"

as Forrestal put it, into its component parts and trying to arrive quietly at areas of agreement on a uniform policy that could be held in readiness until the Fahy Committee made its report.[14-5]

[Footnote 14-4: Min, War Council Mtg, 12 Jan 49, Office of OSD Historian; Memo, Secy of War Council for SA et al., 13 Jan 49, sub: Significant Action of the Special Meeting of the War Council on 12 January 1949, OSD 291.2. The War Council, established by Section 210 of the National Security Act of 1947, consisted of the Secretary of Defense as chairman with power of decision, the service secretaries, and the military chiefs of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.]

[Footnote 14-5: Memo, Thomas R. Reid, Chmn, PPB, for Worthington Thompson, OSD, 15 Feb 49, sub: Meeting of Committee of Four, 10 A.M. Tuesday--15 February, FC file.]

The Personnel Policy Board, established by Forrestal to help regulate the military and civilian policies of his large department, was the logical place to prepare a departmental racial policy.[14-6] But could a group basically interservice in nature be expected to develop a forceful, independent racial policy for all the services along the lines Forrestal appeared to be following? It seemed unlikely, for at their first meeting the board members agreed that any policy developed must be "satisfactory to the three services."[14-7]

[Footnote 14-6: Forrestal signed an interim directive appointing members of the board on 22 February 1949. Composed of a civilian chairman and an under secretary or a.s.sistant secretary from each service, the board was to have a staff of personnel experts under a director, an officer of flag rank, appointed by the chairman; see NME Press Releases, 28 Dec 48, and 1 Apr 49.]

[Footnote 14-7: Min PPB Mtg, 26 Feb 49, FC file.]

Undeterred by members" calling for more investigation and debate before the board prepared a common policy, Chairman Thomas R. Reid and his chief of staff, Army Brig. Gen. Charles T. Lanham, acted.[14-8] On 28 February they drafted a directive for the Secretary of Defense that would abolish all racial quotas and establish uniform standards of induction for service which in times of emergency would include provisions for the apportionment of enlistees both qualitatively and quant.i.tatively. Moreover, all black enlistees would be given the opportunity to serve as individuals in integrated units. The services would be completely integrated by 1 July 1950. To ease the change, Reid and Lanham would in the interim regulate the number of Negroes in integrated units, allowing not less than four men and not more than 10 percent in a company-size unit. Enlisted men could choose to serve under officers of their own race.[14-9]

[Footnote 14-8: Memo, Col J. F. Ca.s.sidy, PPB, for Dir, PPB Staff, 25 Feb 49, sub: Policies of the Three Departments With Reference to Negro Personnel, FC file.]

[Footnote 14-9: PPB, Draft (Reid and Lanham), Proposed Directive for the Armed Forces for the Period 1 July 1949 to 1 July 1950, 28 Feb 49, FC file.]

Favorably received in the secretary"s office, the proposed directive came too late for speedy enactment. On 3 March Forrestal resigned, and although Leva hoped the directive could be issued before Forrestal"s actual departure, "in view of his long-standing interest in this field," Forrestal was obviously reluctant to commit his successor (p. 345) to so drastic a course.[14-10] With a final bow to his belief in service autonomy, Forrestal asked Reid and Lanham to submit their proposal to the service secretaries for review.[14-11] The secretaries approved the idea of a unified policy in principle, but each had very definite and individual views on what that policy should contain and how it should be carried out. Denied firm direction from the ailing Forrestal, Reid and Lanham could do little against service opposition.

Their proposal was quietly tabled while the board continued its search for an acceptable unified policy.

[Footnote 14-10: Note, Leva thru Ohly to Buck Lanham, attached to Draft of Proposed Directive cited in n.

9.]

[Footnote 14-11: Memo, Chmn, PPB, for John Ohly, a.s.sistant to SecDef, 15 Mar 49; Revised Min, PPB Mtg, 18 Mar 49; both in FC file.]

Perhaps it was just as well, for the Reid-Lanham draft had serious defects. It failed to address the problems of qualitative imbalance in the peacetime services, probably in deference to Forrestal"s recent rejection of the Army"s call for a fair distribution of high-scoring enlistees. While the proposal encouraged special training for Negroes, it also limited their a.s.signment to a strict 10 percent quota in any unit. The result would have been an administrative nightmare, with trained men in excess of the 10 percent quota a.s.signed to other, nonspecialty duties. As one manpower expert later admitted, "you ran the real chance of haying black engineers and the like pushing wheelbarrows."[14-12]

[Footnote 14-12: Interv, author with Roy K. Davenport, 7 Oct 71, CMH.]

The service objections to a carefully spelled out policy were in themselves quite convincing to Lanham and Reid. Reid agreed with Eugene Zuckert, a.s.sistant Secretary of the Air Force, that "probably the most logical and soundest approach" was for each service to prepare a policy statement and explain how it was being carried out.

The board could then prepare a general policy based on these statements, and, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense, send it to the Fahy Committee in time for its report to the President.[14-13]

But if Zuckert"s scheme was logical and sound, it also managed to reduce the secretary"s status to final endors.e.m.e.nt officer. Such a role never appealed to James Forrestal, and would be even less acceptable to the politically energetic Louis Johnson, who succeeded Forrestal as Secretary of Defense on 28 March 1949.

[Footnote 14-13: Memo for Files, Clarence H. Osthagen, a.s.sistant to SecAF, 31 Mar 49, sub: Conference With Thomas Reid, FC file.]

Reid appreciated this distinction, and while he was willing to abandon the idea of a policy directive spelling out matters of personnel administration, he was determined that there be a general policy statement on the subject and that it originate not with the services but with the Secretary of Defense, who would then review individual service plans for implementing his directive.[14-14] Reid set the board"s staff to this task, but it took several draftings, each stronger and more specific than the last, before a directive acceptable to Reid and Lanham was devised.[14-15] Approved by the full board on 5 April 1949 and signed by Secretary Johnson the next day, the directive reiterated the President"s executive order, adding that all persons would be considered on the basis of individual merit and ability and must qualify (p. 346) according to the prescribed standards for enlistment, promotion, a.s.signment, and school attendance. All persons would be accorded equal opportunity for appointment, advancement, professional improvement, and retention, and although some segregated units would be retained, "qualified" Negroes would be a.s.signed without regard to race. The secretary ordered the services to reexamine their policies and submit detailed plans for carrying out this directive.[14-16]

[Footnote 14-14: Memo, Thomas Reid for a.s.st SecNav, 1 Apr 49, sub: Statement on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity, FC file.]

[Footnote 14-15: PPB, Draft Memo, SecDef for Svc Secys (prepared by Col J. F. Ca.s.sidy for Reid), 31 Mar 49; PPB, Proposed Policy for the National Military Establishment, 4 Apr 49; both in FC file.]

[Footnote 14-16: Memo, SecDef for SA et al., 6 Apr 49, sub: Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services; Min, PPB Mtg, 5 Apr 49; both in FC file.]

Although responsible for preparing the secretary"s directive, Reid and Lanham had second thoughts about it. They were concerned lest the services treat it as an endors.e.m.e.nt of their current policies. Reid pointedly explained to their representatives on the Personnel Policy Board that the service statements due by 1 May should not merely reiterate present practices, but should represent a "sincere effort"

by the departments to move toward greater racial equality.[14-17] Service responses, he warned, would be scrutinized to determine "their adequacy in the light of the intent of the Secretary"s policy." Reid later admitted to Secretary Johnson that the directive was so broadly formed that it "permits almost any practice under it."[14-18] He, Lanham, and others agreed that since its contents were bound to reach the press anyway, the policy should be publicized in a way that played down generalizations and emphasized the responsibilities it imposed for new directions. Johnson agreed, and the announcement of his directive, emphasizing the importance of new service programs and setting a deadline for their submission, was widely circulated.[14-19]

[Footnote 14-17: Min, PPB Mtg, 8 Apr 49, FC file.]

[Footnote 14-18: Memo, Reid for SecDef, 14 Apr 49, sub: The President"s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, FC file.]

[Footnote 14-19: Min, PPB Mtg, 5 May 49; NME Press Release 3-49A, 20 Apr 49; both in FC file.]

The directive reflected Louis Johnson"s personality, ambition, and administrative strategy. If many of his a.s.sociates questioned his personal commitment to the principle of integration, or indeed even his private feeling about President Truman"s order, all recognized his political ambition and penchant for vigorous and direct action.[14-20]

The secretary would recognize the political implications of the executive order just as he would want to exercise personal control over integration, an issue fraught with political uncertainties that an independent presidential committee would only multiply. A dramatic public statement might well serve Johnson"s needs. By creating at least the illusion of forward motion in the field of race relations, a directive issued by the Secretary of Defense might neutralize the Fahy Committee as an independent force, protecting the services from outside interference while enhancing Johnson"s position in the White House and with the press. A "bl.u.s.tering bully," one of Fahy"s a.s.sistants later called Johnson, whose directive was designed, he charged, to put the Fahy Committee out of business.[14-21]

[Footnote 14-20: This conclusion is based on Interviews, author with Charles Fahy, 8 Feb 68, James C. Evans, 6 Apr 69, and Brig Gen Charles T.

Lanham, 10 Jan 71. It is also based on letters to author from John Ohly, 9 Jan 71, and Thomas Reid, 15 Jan 71. All in CMH.]

[Footnote 14-21: Memo, Kenworthy for Chief of Military History, 13 Oct 76. CMH.]

If such was his motive, the secretary was taking a chance. (p. 347) Announcing his directive to the press transformed what could have been an innocuous, private reaffirmation of the department"s pledge of equal treatment and opportunity into a public exercise in military policymaking. The Secretary of Defense in effect committed himself to a public review of the services" racial practices. In this sense the responses he elicited from the Army and Navy were a disappointment.

Both services contented themselves with an outline of their current policies and ignored the secretary"s request for future plans. The Army offered statistics to prove that its present program guaranteed equal opportunity, while the Navy concluded that its practices and procedures revealed "no inconsistencies" with the policy prescribed by the Secretary of Defense.[14-22] Summing up his reaction to these responses for the Personnel Policy Board, Reid said that the Army had a poor policy satisfactorily administered, while the Navy had an acceptable policy poorly administered. Neither service complied "with the spirit or letter of the request."[14-23]

[Footnote 14-22: Memo, Actg SecNav for Chmn, PPB, 2 May 49, sub: Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Navy and Marine Corps; Memo, SA for SecDef, 21 Apr 49, sub: Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services; both in FC file.]

[Footnote 14-23: Min, PPB Mtg, 5 May 49, FC file.]

[Ill.u.s.tration: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JOHNSON.]

Not all the board members agreed. In the wake of the Army and Navy replies, some saw the possible need for separate service policies rather than a common policy; considering the many advances enumerated in the replies, one member even suggested that Johnson might achieve more by getting the services to prosecute their current policies vigorously. Although Chairman Reid promised that these suggestions would all be taken into consideration, he still hoped to use the Air Force response to pry further concessions out of the Army and Navy.[14-24]

[Footnote 14-24: Ibid.; see also Ltr, Thomas Reid to Richard Dalfiume, 1 Apr 65, Incl to Ltr, Reid to author, 15 Jan 71. All in CMH.]

The Air Force plan had been in existence for some time, its implementation delayed because Symington had agreed with Royall in January that a joint Army-Air Force plan might be developed and because he and Zuckert needed the time to sell the new plan to some of their senior military a.s.sistants.[14-25] But greater familiarity with the plan quickly convinced Royall that the Army and Air Force (p. 348) positions could never be reconciled, and the Air Force plan was independently presented to the Fahy Committee and later, with some revision that further liberalized its provisions, to Johnson as the Air Force reply to his directive.[14-26] The Personnel Policy Board approved the Air Force"s proposal for the integration of a large group of its black personnel, and after discussing it with Fahy and the other services, Reid recommended to the Secretary of Defense that he approve it also.[14-27]

[Footnote 14-25: Min, War Council Mtg, 11 Jan 49, FC file; see also Interv, author with W. Stuart Symington, 1974, CMH.]

[Footnote 14-26: Memo, SecAF for Chmn, PPB, OSD, 30 Apr 49; Memo, a.s.st SecAF for SecAF, 20 Apr 49, sub: Department of Air Force Implementation of Department of Defense Policy on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services; both in SecAF files.]

[Footnote 14-27: Min, PPB Mtg, 5 May 49; Memo, Reid for SecDef, 10 May 49, sub: Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Forces, FC file.]

To achieve maximum benefit from the Air Force plan, Reid and his a.s.sociates had to link it publicly with the inadequate replies from the other services. Disregarding the views of some board members, he suggested that Johnson reject the Army and Navy answers and, without indicating the form he thought their answers should take, order them to prepare new proposals.[14-28] Johnson would also have to ignore a warning from Secretary of the Army Royall, who had recently reminded him that Forrestal had a.s.sured Congress during the selective service hearings that the administration would not issue a preemptory order completely abolishing segregation. "I have no reason to believe that the President had changed his mind," Royall continued, "but I think you should be advised of these circ.u.mstances because if any action were later taken by you or other authority to abolish segregation in the Army I am confident that these Southern senators would remember this incident."[14-29]

[Footnote 14-28: Ibid.]

[Footnote 14-29: Memo, SA for SecDef, 22 Apr 49, OSA 291.2.]