[Footnote 14-73: Fahy Cmte, "A Progress Report for the President," 7 Jun 49, FC file.]

To remove any unnecessary obstacle to what Fahy hoped would be fruitful sessions, the committee revised its initial recommendations to the Army. First, as Fahy had promised Johnson, it modified its position on guaranteeing qualified black soldiers already a.s.signed to units the opportunity to attend Army schools within eighteen months.

Calling the imbroglio over this issue a mere misunderstanding--the committee did not intend that preferential treatment be given Negroes nor that the Army train more people than it needed--Fahy explained to Johnson that the committee only wanted to make sure that qualified Negroes would have the same chance as qualified white men. It would be happy, Fahy said, to work with the Army on rewording the recommendation.[14-74] The committee also added the suggestion that so long as racial units existed, the Army might permit enlisted men in the four lowest grades, at their request, to remain in a unit predominantly composed of men of their own race. This provision, however, was not to extend to officers and noncommissioned officers in the top three grades, who received their promotions on a worldwide compet.i.tive basis. Finally, the committee offered a subst.i.tute for the numerical quota it wanted abolished. So that the Army would not get too many low-scoring recruits, either black or white, the committee proposed a separate quota for each category in the cla.s.sification test scores. Only so many voluntary enlistments would be accepted in categories I through III, their numbers based on the normal spread of scores that existed in both the wartime and peacetime Army. If the Army netted more high scorers than average in any period, it would induct fewer men from the next category. It would also deny reenlistment to any man scoring less than eighty (category IV).[14-75]

[Footnote 14-74: Ltr, Fahy to Johnson, 15 Jun 49, FC file.]

[Footnote 14-75: Idem to SA, 25 Jul 49, FC file.]

After meeting first with Gray and then the Chief of Staff, Fahy called the sessions "frank and cordial" and saw some prospect of accord, although their positions were still far apart.[14-76] Just how far apart had already become apparent on 5 July when Gray presented (p. 363) Fahy with an outline for yet another program for using black soldiers.

This new program was based in part on the comments of the field commanders, and the Director of Personnel and Administration warned that "beyond the steps listed in this plan, there is very little major compromise area left short of complete integration."[14-77] While the Army plan differed from the committee"s recommendations in many ways, in essence the disagreement was limited to two fundamental points.

Determined to retain segregated units, the Army opposed the rea.s.signment of school-trained Negroes to vacancies in white units; and in order to prevent an influx of Negroes in the low achievement categories, the Army was determined to retain the numerical quota.[14-78]

[Footnote 14-76: Idem to SecDef, 25 Jul 49, FC file.]

[Footnote 14-77: P&A Summary Sheet to DC/S (Adm), 24 Jun 49, sub: Utilization of Negro Manpower, CSUSA 291.2 Negroes. For comments of Army commanders, see the following Memos: Wade H. Haislip (DC/S Adm) for Army Cmdrs, 8 Jun 49, sub: Draft Recommendations of Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity; Lt Gen M. S. Eddy for CofS, 10 Jun 49, same sub; Lt Gen W. B. Smith for CofS, 10 Jun 49, same sub; Lt Gen S. J. Chamberlain, 5th Army Cmdr, for CofS, 13 Jun 49, same sub; Lt Gen John R. Hodge for CofS, 14 Jun 49, same sub; Gen Jacob Devers, 13 Jun 49, same sub; Gen Thomas T. Handy, 4th Army Cmdr, for CofS, 10 Jun 49, sub: Comments on Fahy Committee Draft Recommendations. All in CSUSA 291.2 Negroes.]

[Footnote 14-78: An Outline Plan for Utilization of Negro Manpower Submitted by the Army to the President"s Committee, 5 Jul 49, Incl to Ltr, Fahy to SecDef, 25 Jul 49, FC file. See also Ltr, Kenworthy to Fahy, 23 Jun 49, Fahy Papers, Truman Library; Fahy Cmte, "Meeting to Discuss the Proposals Made by the Army as Preliminary to the Third Response," 11 Jul 49, FC file.]

The committee argued that if the Army was to train men according to their ability, hence efficiently, and in accord with the principle of equality, it must consider a.s.signing them without regard to race. It could not see how removal of the numerical quota would result in a flood of Negroes joining the Army, but it could see how retaining the quota would prevent the enlistment of blacks for long periods of time.

These two provisions--that school-trained Negroes be freely a.s.signed and that the quota be abolished--were really the heart of the committee"s plan and hope for the gradual integration of the Army. The provisions would not require the abolition of racial units "at this time," Fahy explained to President Truman, but they would gradually extend the integration already practiced in overhead installations and Army schools. The committee could not demand any less, he confessed, in light of the President"s order.[14-79]

[Footnote 14-79: Ltrs, Fahy to SecDef and SA, 25 Jul 49; idem to President, 27 Jul 49. All in FC file.]

The committee and the Army had reached a stalemate. As a staff member of the Personnel Policy Board put it, their latest proposal and counterproposals were simply extensions of what had long been put forth by both parties. He advised Chairman Reid to remain neutral until both sides presented their "total proposal."[14-80] But the press was not remaining neutral. The New York _Times_, for example, accused the Army of stalling and equivocating, engaging in a "private insurrection," and trying "to preserve a pattern of bigotry which caricatures the democratic cause in every corner of the world." There was no room for compromise, the _Times_ added, and President Truman could not retreat without abdicating as Commander in Chief.[14-81]

Secretary Gray countered with a statement that the Army was still (p. 364) under injunction from the Secretary of Defense to submit a new race program, and he was contemplating certain new proposals on the military occupational specialty issue.[14-82]

[Footnote 14-80: Memo, Col J. F. Ca.s.sidy for Reid, 23 Aug 49, sub: Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Department of the Army, FC file.]

[Footnote 14-81: New York _Times_, July 16 and 18, 1949.]

[Footnote 14-82: Interv, NBC"s "Meet the Press" with Gordon Gray, 18 Jul 49; Ltr, SecDef to Charles Fahy, 3 Aug 49, FC file.]

The Army staff did prepare another reply for the Secretary of Defense, and on 16 September Gray met with Fahy and others to discuss it.

General Wade H. Haislip, the Vice Chief of Staff, claimed privately to Gray that the new reply was almost identical with the plan presented to the committee on 5 July and that the new concessions on occupational specialties would only require the conversion of some units from white to black.[14-83] Haislip, however, had not reckoned with the concession that Gray was prepared to make to Fahy. Gray accepted in principle the committee"s argument that the a.s.signment of black graduates of specialist schools should not be limited to black units or overhead positions but could be used to fill vacancies in any unit. At the same time, he remained adamant on the quota. When the committee spoke hopefully of the advantages of an Army open to all, the Army contemplated fearfully the racial imbalance that might result. The future was to prove the committee right about the advantages, but as of September 1949 Gray and his subordinates had no intention of giving up the quota.[14-84] Gray did agree, however, to continue studying the quota issue with the committee, and Fahy optimistically reported to President Truman: "It is the Committee"s expectation that it will be able within a few weeks to make a formal report to you on a complete list of changes in Army policy and practices."[14-85]

[Footnote 14-83: Memo, VCofS for Gray, 29 Aug 49, sub: Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, CSUSA 291.2 Negroes.]

[Footnote 14-84: Interv, Nichols with Gordon Gray, 1953, in Nichols Collection, CMH; Memo, Kenworthy for Cmte, 19 Sep 49, sub: Meeting With Gray, 16 Sep 49, Fahy Papers, Truman Library.]

[Footnote 14-85: Ltrs, Fahy to President, 21 Sep and 26 Sep 49, both in FC file.]

Fahy made his prediction before Secretary of Defense Johnson took a course of action that, in effect, rendered the committee"s position untenable. On 30 September Johnson received from Gray a new program for the employment of black troops. Without reference to the Fahy Committee, Johnson approved the proposal and announced it to the press. Gray"s program opened all military occupational specialties to all qualified men, abolished racial quotas for the Army"s schools, and abolished racially separate promotion systems and standards. But it also specifically called for retention of the racial quota on enlistments and conspicuously failed to provide for the a.s.signment of black specialists beyond those jobs already provided by the old Gillem Board policy.[14-86] Secretary Gray had asked for Fahy"s personal approval before forwarding the plan discussed by the two men at such length, but Fahy refused; he wanted the plan submitted to his full committee. When Johnson received the plan he did not consult the committee at all, although he briefly referred it to the acting chairman of the Personnel Policy Board, who interposed no objection.[14-87]

[Footnote 14-86: Memo, SA for SecDef, 30 Sep 49, sub: Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, CSGPA 291.2; DOD, Off of Pub Info, Press Release 256-49, 30 Sep 49, FC file.]

[Footnote 14-87: Memo, Kenworthy for Cmte, 27 Sep 49, sub: Army"s Reply to Secretary Johnson, Fahy Papers, Truman Library; Note, handwritten and signed McCrea, attached to memo, SA for SecDef, 30 Sep 49; Memo, Thompson for Leva, 3 Oct 49, sub: Army Policy of Equality of Treatment and Opportunity, CD 30-1-4; both in SecDef files.]

It is not difficult to understand Johnson"s reasons for ignoring (p. 365) the President"s committee. He had been forced to endure public criticism over the protracted negotiations between the Army and the committee. Among liberal elements on Capitol Hill, his position--that his directive and the service replies made legislation to prohibit segregation in the services unnecessary--was obviously being compromised by the lack of an acceptable Army response.[14-88] In a word, the argument over civil rights in the armed forces had become a political liability for Louis Johnson, and he wanted it out of the way. Glossing over the Army"s truculence, Johnson blamed the committee and its recommendations for his problem, and when his frontal a.s.sault on the committee failed--Kenworthy reported that the secretary tried to have the committee disbanded--he had to devise another approach.[14-89] The Army"s new proposal, a more reasonable-sounding doc.u.ment than its predecessor, provided him with a convenient opportunity. Why not quickly approve the program, thereby presenting the committee with a _fait accompli_ and leaving the President with little excuse for prolonging the civil rights negotiations?

[Footnote 14-88: Ltr, SecDef to Congressman Vinson, 7 Jul 49; Memo, Lanham for Reid, 29 Mar 49; both in PPB files.]

[Footnote 14-89: Ltr, Kenworthy to Nichols, 28 Jul 53, in Nichols Collection, CMH.]

Unfortunately for Johnson the gambit failed. While Fahy admitted that the Army"s newest proposal was an improvement, for several reasons he could not accept it. The a.s.signment of black specialists to white units was a key part of the committee"s program, and despite Gray"s private a.s.surances that specialists would be integrated, Fahy was not prepared to accept the Army"s "equivocal" language on this subject.

There was also the issue of the quota, still very much alive between the committee and the Army. The committee was bound, furthermore, to resent being ignored in the approval process. Fahy and his a.s.sociates had been charged by the President with advising the services on equality of treatment and opportunity, and they were determined to be heard.[14-90] Fahy informed the White House that the committee would review the Army"s proposal in an extraordinary meeting. He asked that the President meanwhile refrain from comment.[14-91]

[Footnote 14-90: Memo, Kenworthy to Cmte, 27 Sep 49, sub: Army"s Reply to Secretary Johnson, and Ltr, Kenworthy to Joseph Evans, 30 Sep 49, both in Fahy Papers, Truman Library; Memo, Worthington Thompson for Leva, 3 Oct 49, sub: Army Policy of Equality of Treatment and Opportunity, SecDef files; Ltr, Kenworthy to Nichols, 28 Jul 53, in Nichols Collection, CMH.]

[Footnote 14-91: Memo for Rcd, probably written by Philleo Nash, 3 Oct 49, Nash Collection, Truman Library.]

The committee"s stand received support from the black press and numerous national civil rights organizations, all of which excoriated the Army"s position.[14-92] David K. Niles, the White House adviser on racial matters, warned President Truman about the rising controversy and predicted that the committee would again reject the Army"s proposal. He advised the President to tell the press that Johnson"s news release was merely a "progress report," that it was not final, and that the committee was continuing its investigation.[14-93] The President did just that, adding: "Eventually we will reach, I (p. 366) hope, what we contemplated in the beginning. You can"t do it all at once. The progress report was a good report, and it isn"t finished yet."[14-94] And lest his purpose remain unclear, the President declared that his aim was the racial integration of the Army.

[Footnote 14-92: See Los Angeles _Star Review_, October 6, 1949; _Afro-American_, October 8, 1949; Washington _Post_, October 6, 1949; Pittsburgh _Courier_, Octobers, 1949; Norfolk _Journal and Guide_, October 15, 1949; New York _Amsterdam News_, October 15, 1949.]

[Footnote 14-93: Ltr, Niles to President, 5 Oct 49, Nash Collection, Truman Library.]

[Footnote 14-94: News Conference, 6 Oct 49, as quoted in _Public Papers of the President: Harry S.

Truman, 1949_, p. 501.]

The President"s statement signaled a victory for the committee; its extent became apparent only when the Army tried to issue a new circular, revising its Gillem Board policy along the lines of the outline plan approved by Johnson on 30 September. During the weeks of protracted negotiations that followed, the committee clearly remained in control, its power derived basically from its willingness to have the differences between the committee and the Army publicized and the reluctance of the White House to have it so. The att.i.tudes toward publicity were already noticeable when, on 11 October, Fahy suggested to Truman some possible solutions to the impa.s.se between the committee and the Army. The Secretary of Defense could issue a supplementary statement on the Army"s a.s.signment policy, the committee could release its recommendations to the press, or the Army and the committee could resume discussions.[14-95]

[Footnote 14-95: Memo, Fahy for President, 11 Oct 49, FC file.]

President Truman ordered his military aide to read the committee"s 11 October suggestion and "then take [it] up with Johnson."[14-96] As a result the Secretary of Defense retired from the controversy.

Reminding Gray through intermediaries that he had approved the Army"s plan in outline form, Johnson declared that it was "inappropriate" for him to approve the plan"s publication as an Army circular as the Army had requested.[14-97] About the same time, Niles informed the Army that any revision of Circular 124 would have to be submitted to the White House before publication, and he candidly admitted that presidential approval would depend on the views of the Fahy Committee.[14-98] Meanwhile, his a.s.sistant, Philleo Nash, predicting that the committee would win both the a.s.signment and quota arguments, persuaded Fahy to postpone any public statement until after the Army"s revised circular had been reviewed by the committee.[14-99]

[Footnote 14-96: Penciled Note, signed HST, on Memo, Niles for President, Secretary"s File (PSF), Truman Library.]

[Footnote 14-97: Memo, Maj Gen Levin C. Allen, Exec Secy, SecDef, for SA, 14 Oct 49; Memo, Vice Adm John McCrea, Dir of Staff, PPB, for Allen, 25 Oct 49; both in CD 30-1-4, SecDef files.]

[Footnote 14-98: Memo for Rcd, Karl Bendetsen, Spec Consultant to SA, 28 Nov 49, SA files; Ltr, Kenworthy to Fahy, 22 Nov 49, and Memo, Kenworthy for Fahy Cmte, 29 Oct 49, sub: Background to Proposed Letter to Gray; both in Fahy Papers, Truman Library.]

[Footnote 14-99: Ltr, Fahy to Cmte, 17 Nov 49, Fahy Papers, Truman Library.]

Chairman Fahy was fully aware of the leverage these actions gave his committee, although he and his a.s.sociates now had few illusions about the speedy end to the contest. "I know from the best authority within P&A," Kenworthy warned the committee, that the obstructionists in Army Personnel hoped to see the committee submit final recommendations--"what its recommendations are they don"t much care"--and then disband. Until the committee disbanded, its opponents would try to block any real change in Army policy.[14-100] Kenworthy offered in evidence the current controversy over the Army"s instructions to its field commanders. These instructions, a copy of the outline plan (p. 367) approved by Secretary Johnson, had been sent to the commanders by The Adjutant General on 1 October as "additional policies" pending a revision of Circular 124.[14-101] Included in the message, of course, was Gray"s order to open all military occupational specialties to Negroes; but when some commanders, on the basis of their interpretation of the message, began integrating black specialists in white units, officials in the Personnel and Administration and the Organization and Training Divisions dispatched a second message on 27 October specifically forbidding such action "except on Department of Army orders."[14-102] Negroes would continue to be authorized for a.s.signment to black units, the message explained, and to "Negro s.p.a.ces in T/D [overhead] units." In effect, the Army staff was ordering commanders to interpret the secretary"s plan in its narrowest sense, blocking any possibility of broadening the range of black a.s.signments.

[Footnote 14-100: Memo, Kenworthy for Cmte, 29 Oct 49, sub: Background to Proposed Letter to Gray, Fahy Papers, Truman Library.]

[Footnote 14-101: Msg, TAG to Chief, AFF, et al., WCL 45586, 011900Z Oct 49, copy in AG 220.3.]

[Footnote 14-102: Memo, D/PA for TAG, 25 Oct 49, sub: a.s.signment of Negro Enlisted Personnel, with attached Memo for Rcd, Col John H. Riepe, Chief, Manpower Control Gp, D/PA; Memo, Deputy Dir, PA, for Gen Brooks (Dir of PA), 3 Nov 49, same sub; Msg, TAG to Chief, AFF, et al., WCL 20682, 27 Oct 49. All in CSGPA 291.2 (25 Oct 49).]

Kenworthy was able to turn this incident to the committee"s advantage.

He made a practice of never locking his Pentagon office door nor his desk drawer. He knew that Negroes, both civilian and military, worked in the message centers, and he suspected that if any hanky-panky was afoot they would discover it and he would be anonymously apprised of it. A few days after the dispatch of the second message, Kenworthy opened his desk drawer to find a copy. For the first and only time, he later explained, he broke his self-imposed rule of relying on negotiations between the military and the committee and its staff _in camera_. He laid both messages before a long-time friend of his, the editor of the Washington _Post_"s editorial page.[14-103] Thus delivered to the press, the second message brought on another round of accusations, corrections, and headlines to the effect that "The Bra.s.s Gives Gray the Run-Around." Kenworthy was able to denounce the incident as a "step backward" that even violated the Gillem Board policy by allocating "Negro s.p.a.ces" in overhead units. The Army staff"s second message nullified the committee"s recommendations since they depended ultimately on the unlimited a.s.signment of black specialists. The message demonstrated very well, Kenworthy told the committee, that careful supervision of the Army"s racial policy would be necessary.[14-104] Some newspapers were less charitable. The Pittsburgh _Courier_ charged that the colonel blamed for the release of the second message had been made the "goat" in a case that involved far more senior officials, and the Washington _Post_ claimed that the message "vitiates" even the limited improvements outlined in the Army"s plan as approved by Secretary Johnson. The paper called on Secretary Gray to a.s.sert himself in the case.[14-105]

[Footnote 14-103: Memo, Kenworthy for Chief of Military History, 13 Oct 76, CMH.]

[Footnote 14-104: Idem for Cmte, 29 Oct 49, sub: Instructions to Commanding Generals on New Army Policy, Fahy Papers, Truman Library.]