2. _Self-love_. "It is an admirable saying of a worthy divine, that though many discoveries have been made in the world of self-love, there is yet abundance of _terra incognita_ left behind." There is nothing so sincere upon earth as the love that creatures bear to themselves. "Man centres everything in himself, and neither loves nor hates, but for his own sake." Nay, more, we are naturally regardless of the effect of our conduct upon others; we have no innate love for our fellows. The highest virtue is not without reward; it has a satisfaction of its own, the pleasure of contemplating one"s own worth. But is there no genuine self-denial? Mandeville answers by a distinction: mortifying one pa.s.sion to gratify another is very common, but this not self-denial; self-inflicted pain without any recompense--where is that to be found?
"Charity is that virtue by which part of that sincere love we have for ourselves is transferred pure and unmixed to others (not friends or relatives), whom we have no obligation to, nor hope or expect anything-from." The counterfeit of true charity is _pity_ or _compa.s.sion_, which is a fellow-feeling for the sufferings of others.
Pity is as much a frailty of our nature as anger, pride, or fear. The weakest minds (_e.g._, women and children) have generally the greatest share of it. It is excited through the eye or the ear; when the suffering does not strike our senses, the feeling is weak, and hardly more than an imitation of pity. Pity, since it seeks rather our own relief from a painful sight, than the good of others, must be curbed and controlled in order to produce any benefit to society.
Mandeville draws a nice distinction between self-love, and, what he calls, _self-liking_. "To increase the care in creatures to preserve themselves, Mature has given them an instinct, by which _every individual values itself above its real worth_." The more mettlesome and spirited animals (_e.g._, horses) are endowed with this instinct.
In us, it is accompanied with an apprehension that we do overvalue ourselves; hence our susceptibility to the confirmatory good opinion of others. But if each were to display openly his own feeling of superiority, quarrels would inevitably arise. The grand discovery whereby the ill consequences of this pa.s.sion are avoided is _politeness_. "Good manners consists in flattering the pride of others, and concealing our own." The first step is to conceal our good opinion of ourselves; the next is more impudent, namely, to pretend that we value others more highly than ourselves. But it takes a long time to come to that pitch; the Romans were almost masters of the world before they learned politeness.
3. _Pride, Vanity, Honour_. Pride is of great consequence in Mandeville"s system. "The moral virtues are the political offspring which flattery begot upon pride." Man is naturally innocent, timid, and stupid; dest.i.tute of strong pa.s.sions or appet.i.tes, he would remain in his primitive barbarism were it not for pride. Yet all moralists condemn pride, as a vain notion of our own superiority. It is a subtle pa.s.sion, not easy to trace. It is often seen in the humility of the humble, and the shamelessness of the shameless. It simulates charity; "pride and vanity have built more hospitals than all the virtues together." It is the chief ingredient in the chast.i.ty of women, and in the courage of men. Less cynical moralists than Mandeville have looked with suspicion on posthumous fame; "so silly a creature is man, as that, intoxicated with the fumes of vanity, he can feast on the thought of the praises that shall be paid his memory in future ages, with so much ecstasy as to neglect his present life, nay court and covet death, if he but imagines that it will add to the glory he had acquired before." But the most notable inst.i.tution of pride is the love of honour. Honour is a "chimera," having no reality in nature, but a mere invention of moralists and politicians, to keep men close to their engagements, whatever they be. In some families it is hereditary, like the gout; but, luckily, the vulgar are dest.i.tute of it. In the time of chivalry, honour was a very troublesome affair; but in the beginning of the 17th century, it was melted over again, and brought to a new standard; "they put in the same weight of courage, half the quant.i.ty of honesty, and a very little justice, but not a sc.r.a.p of any other virtue." The worst thing about it is duelling; but there are more suicides than duels, so that at any rate men do not hate others more than themselves. After a half-satirical apology for duelling, he concludes with one insurmountable objection; duelling is wholly repugnant to religion, adding with the m.u.f.fled scepticism characteristic of the 18th century, "how to reconcile them must be left to wiser heads than mine."
4. _Private vices, public benefits_. Mandeville ventures to compare society to a bowl of punch. Avarice is the souring, and prodigality the sweetening of it. The water is the ignorance and folly of the insipid mult.i.tude, while honour and the n.o.ble qualities of man represent the brandy. To each of these ingredients we may object in turn, but experience teaches that, when judiciously mixed, they make an excellent liquor. It is not the good, but the evil qualities of men, that lead to worldly greatness. Without luxury we should have no trade. This doctrine is ill.u.s.trated at great length, and has been better remembered than anything else in the book; but it may be dismissed with two remarks. (1) It embodies an error in political economy, namely, that it is spending and not saving that gives employment to the poor. If Mandeville"s aim had been less critical, and had he been less delighted with his famous paradox, we may infer from the acuteness of his reasoning on the subject, that he would have antic.i.p.ated the true doctrine of political economy, as he saw through the fallacy of the mercantile theory. (2) He employs the term, luxury, with great lat.i.tude, as including whatever is not a bare necessary of existence.
According to the fashionable doctrine of his day, all luxury was called an evil and a vice; and in this sense, doubtless, vice is essential to the existence of a great nation.
5. _The origin of society_. Mandeville"s remarks on this subject are the best he has written, and come nearest to the accredited views of the present day. He denies that we have any natural affection for one another, or any natural aversion or hatred. Each seeks his own happiness, and conflict arises from the opposition of men"s desires. To make a society out of the raw material of uncivilized men, is a work of great difficulty, requiring the concurrence of many favourable accidents, and a long period of time. For the qualities developed among civilized men no more belong to them in a savage state, than the properties of wine exist in the grape. Society begins with _families_.
In the beginning, the old savage has a great wish to rule his children, but has no capacity for government. He is inconstant and violent in his desires, and incapable of any steady conduct. What at first keeps men together is not so much reverence for the father, as the common danger from wild beasts. The traditions of antiquity are full of the prowess of heroes in killing dragons and monsters. The second step to society is the danger men are in from one another. To protect themselves, several families would be compelled to accept the leadership of the strongest. The leaders, seeing the mischiefs of dissension, would employ all their art to extirpate that evil. Thus they would forbid killing one another, stealing one another"s wives, &c. The third and last step is the invention of letters; this is essential to the growth of society, and to the corresponding, expansion of law.[22]
I.--Mandeville"s object being chiefly _negative_ and _dialectical_, he has left little of positive ethical theory. Virtue he regards as _de facto_ an arbitrary inst.i.tution of society; what it ought to be, he hardly says, but the tendency of his writings is to make the good of the whole to be preferred to private interest.
II.--He denies the existence of a moral sense and of disinterestedness.
The motive to observe moral rules is pride and vanity fomented by politicians. He does not regard virtue as an independent end, even by a.s.sociation, but considers that pride in its naked form is the ever present incentive to good conduct.
V.--The connexion of virtue with society is already fully indicated.
In France, the name of HELVETIUS (author of _De l"esprit, De l"homme_, &c., 1715-71) is identified with a serious (in contrast to Mandeville), and perfectly consistent, attempt to reduce all morality to direct Self-interest. Though he adopted this ultimate interpretation of the facts, Helvetius was by no means the "low and loose moralist" that he has been described to be; and, in particular, his own practice displayed a rare benevolence.
DAVID HUME. [1711-1776.]
The Ethical views of Hume are contained in "_An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals_."
In an Introductory Section (I.) he treats of the GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF MORALS.
After describing those that profess to deny the reality of the distinction of Right and Wrong, as disingenuous disputants, useless to reason with,--he states the great problem of Morals to be, whether the foundation is REASON or SENTIMENT; whether our knowledge of moral distinctions is attained by a chain of argument and induction, or by an immediate feeling or finer internal sense.
Specious arguments may be urged on both sides. On the side of Reason, it may be contended, that the justice and injustice of actions are often a subject of argument and controversy like the sciences; whereas if they appealed at once to a sense, they would be as unsusceptible of truth or falsehood as the harmony of verse, the tenderness of pa.s.sion, or the brilliancy of wit.
In reply, the supporters of Sentiment may urge that the character of virtue is to be _amiable_, and of vice to be _odious_, which are not intellectual distinctions. The end of moral distinctions is to influence the feelings and determine the will, which no mere a.s.sent of the understanding can do. Extinguish our _feelings_ towards virtue and vice, and morality would cease to have any influence on our lives.
The arguments on both sides have so much force in them, that we may reasonably suspect that Reason and Sentiment both concur in our moral determinations. The final sentence upon actions, whereby we p.r.o.nounce them praiseworthy or blameable, may depend on the feelings; while a process of the understanding may be requisite to make nice distinctions, examine complicated relations, and ascertain matters of fact.
It is not the author"s intention, however, to pursue the subject in the form of adjudicating between these two principles, but to follow what he deems a simpler method--to a.n.a.lyze that complication of mental qualities, called PERSONAL MERIT: to ascertain the attributes or qualities that render a man an object of esteem and affection, or of hatred and contempt. This is a question of fact, and not of abstract science; and should be determined, as similar questions are, in the modern physics, by following the experimental method, and drawing general maxims from a comparison of particular instances.
Section II. is OF BENEVOLENCE.
His first remark on Benevolence is, that it is identified in all countries with the highest merits that human nature is capable of attaining to.
This prepares the way for the farther observation, that in setting forth the praises of a humane, beneficent man, the one circ.u.mstance that never fails to be insisted on is the happiness to society arising through his good offices. Like the sun, an inferior minister of providence, he cheers, invigorates, and sustains the surrounding world.
May we not therefore conclude that the UTILITY resulting from social virtues, forms, at least, a _part_ of their merit, and is one source of the approbation paid to them. He ill.u.s.trates this by a number of interesting examples, and defers the enquiry--_how large_ a part of the social virtues depend on utility, and for what reason we are so much affected by it.
Section III. is on JUSTICE. That Justice is useful to society, and thence derives _part_ of its merit, would be superfluous to prove. That public utility is the _sole_ origin of Justice, and that the beneficial consequences are the _sole_ foundation of its merit, may seem more questionable, but can in the author"s opinion be maintained.
He puts the supposition, that the human race were provided with such abundance of all external things, that without industry, care, or anxiety, every person found every want fully satisfied; and remarks, that while every other social virtue (the affections, &c.) might flourish, yet, as property would be absent, mine and thine unknown, Justice would be useless, an idle ceremonial, and could never come into the catalogue of the virtues. In point of fact, where any agent, as air, water, or land, is so abundant as to supply everybody, questions of justice do not arise on that particular subject.
Suppose again that in our present necessitous condition, the mind of every man were so enlarged and so replete with generosity that each should feel as much for his fellows as for himself--the _beau ideal_ of communism--in this case Justice would be in abeyance, and its ends answered by Benevolence. This state is actually realized in well-cultivated families; and communism has been attempted and maintained for a time in the ardour of new enthusiasms.
Reverse the above suppositions, and imagine a society in such want that the utmost care is unable to prevent the greater number from perishing, and all from the extremes of misery, as in a shipwreck of a siege; in such circ.u.mstances, justice is suspended in favour of self-preservation; the possibility of good order is at an end, and Justice, the means, is discarded as useless. Or, again, suppose a virtuous man to fall into a society of ruffians on the road to swift destruction; his sense of justice would be of no avail, and consequently he would arm himself with the first weapon he could seize, consulting self-preservation alone. The ordinary punishment of criminals is, as regards them, a suspension of justice for the benefit of society. A state of war is the remission of justice between the parties as of no use or application. A civilized nation at war with barbarians must discard even the small relics of justice retained in war with other civilized nations. Thus the rules of equity and justice depend on the condition that men are placed in, and are limited by their UTILITY in each separate state of things. The common state of society is a medium between the extreme suppositions now made: we have our self-partialities, but have learnt the value of equity; we have few enjoyments by nature, but a considerable number by industry. Hence we have the ideas of Property; to these Justice is essential, and it thus derives its moral obligation.
The poetic fictions of the Golden Age, and the philosophic fictions of a State of Nature, equally adopt the same fundamental a.s.sumption; in the one, justice was unnecessary, in the other, it was inadmissible.
So, if there were a race of creatures so completely servile as never to contest any privilege with us, nor resent any infliction, which is very much our position with the lower animals, justice would have no place in our dealings with them. Or, suppose once more, that each person possessed within himself every faculty for existence, and were isolated from every other; so solitary a being would be as incapable of justice as of speech. The sphere of this duty begins with society; and extends as society extends, and as it contributes to the well-being of the individual members of society.
The author next examines the _particular laws_ embodying justice and determining property. He supposes a creature, having reason, but unskilled in human nature, to deliberate with himself how to distribute property. His most obvious thought would be to give the largest possessions to the most virtuous, so as to give the power of doing good where there was the most inclination. But so unpracticable is this design, that although sometimes conceived, it is never executed; the civil magistrate knows that it would be utterly destructive of human society; sublime as may be the ideal justice that it supposes, he sets it aside on the calculation of its bad consequences.
Seeing also that, with nature"s liberality, were all her gifts equally distributed, every one would have so good a share that no one would have a t.i.tle to complain; and seeing, farther, that this is the only type of perfect equality or ideal justice--there is no good ground for falling short of it but the knowledge that the attempt would be pernicious to society. The writers on the Law of Nature, whatever principles they begin with, must a.s.sign as the ultimate reason of law the necessities and convenience of mankind. Uninstructed nature could never make the distinction between _mine_ and _yours_; it is a purely artificial product of society. Even when this distinction is established, and justice requires it to be adhered to, yet we do not scruple in extraordinary cases to violate justice in an individual case for the safety of the people at large.
When the interests of society require a rule of justice, but do not indicate any rule in particular, the resort is to some _a.n.a.logy_ with a rule already established on grounds of the general interest.
For determining what is a man"s property, there may be many statutes, customs, precedents, a.n.a.logies, some constant and inflexible, some variable and arbitrary, but all professedly terminating in the interests of human society. But for this, the laws of property would be undistinguishable from the wildest superst.i.tions.
Such a reference, instead of weakening the obligations of justice, strengthens them. What stronger foundations can there be for any duty than that, without it, human nature could not subsist; and that, according as it is observed, the degrees of human happiness go on increasing?
Either Justice is evidently founded on Utility, or our regard for it is a simple instinct like hunger, resentment, or self-preservation. But on this last supposition, property, the subject-matter, must be also discerned by an instinct; no such instinct, however, can be affirmed.
Indeed, no single instinct would suffice for the number of considerations entering into a fact so complex. To define Inheritance and Contract, a hundred volumes of laws are not enough; how then can nature embrace such complications in the simplicity of an instinct. For it is not laws alone that we must have, but authorized interpreters.
Have we original ideas of praetors, and chancellors, and juries?
Instincts are uniform in their operation; birds of a species build their nests alike. The laws of states are uniform to about the same extent as houses, which must have a roof and walls, windows and chimneys, because the end in view demands certain essentials; but beyond these, there is every conceivable diversity.
It is true that, by education and custom, we blame injustice without thinking of its ultimate consequences. So universal are the rules of justice, from the universality of its end, that we approve of it mechanically. Still, we have often to recur to the final end, and to ask, What must become of the world if such practices prevail? How could society subsist under such disorders?
Thus, then, Hume considers that, by an inductive determination, on the strict Newtonian basis, he has proved that the SOLE foundation of our regard to justice is the support and welfare of society: and since no moral excellence is more esteemed, we must have some strong disposition in favour of general usefulness. Such a disposition must be a part of the humane virtues, as it is the SOLE source of the moral approbation of fidelity, justice, veracity, and integrity.
Section IV. relates to POLITICAL SOCIETY, and is intended to show that Government, Allegiance, and the Laws of each State, are justified solely by Utility.
If men had _sagacity_ to perceive, and _strength of mind_ to follow out, distant and general interests, there had been no such thing as government. In other words, if government were totally useless, it would not be. The duty of Allegiance would be no duty, but for the advantage of it, in preserving peace and order among mankind.
[Hume is here supposing that men enter into society on equal terms; he makes no allowance for the exercise of the right of the stronger in making compulsory social unions. This, however, does not affect his reasoning as to the source of our approbation of social duty, which is not usually extended to tyranny.]
When political societies hold intercourse with one another, certain regulations are made, termed Laws of Nations, which have no other end than the advantage of those concerned.
The virtue of Chast.i.ty is subservient to the utility of rearing the young, which requires the combination of both parents; and that combination reposes on marital fidelity. Without such a utility, the virtue would never have been thought of. The reason why chast.i.ty is extended to cases where child-bearing does not enter, is that _general rules_ are often carried beyond their original occasion, especially in matters of taste and sentiment.
The prohibition of marriage between near relations, and the turpitude of incest, have in view the preserving of purity of manners among persons much together.
The laws of good manners are a kind of lesser morality, for the better securing of our pleasures in society.
Even robbers and pirates must have their laws. Immoral gallantries, where authorized, are governed by a set of rules. Societies for play have laws for the conduct of the game. War has its laws as well as peace. The fights of boxers, wrestlers, and such like, are subject to rules. For all such cases, the common interest and utility begets a standard of right and wrong in those concerned.
Section V. proceeds to argue WHY UTILITY PLEASES. However powerful education may be in forming men"s sentiments, there must, in such a matter as morality, be some deep natural distinction to work upon. Now, there are only two natural sentiments that Utility can appeal to: (1) Self-Interest, and (2) Generosity, or the interests of others.
The deduction of morals from Self-Love is obvious, and no doubt explains much. An appeal to experience, however, shows its defects. We praise virtuous actions in remote ages and countries, where our own interests are out of the question. Even when we have a private interest in some virtuous action, our praise avoids that part of it, and prefers to fasten on what we are not interested in. When we hear of the details of a generous action, we are moved by it, before we know when or where it took place. Nor will the force of imagination account for the feeling in those cases; if we have an eye solely to our own _real_ interest, it is not conceivable how we can be moved by a mere imaginary interest.
But another view may be taken. Some have maintained that the public interest is our own interest, and is therefore promoted by our self-love. The reply is that the two are often opposed to each other, and still we approve of the preference of the public interest. We are, therefore, driven to adopt a more public affection, and to admit that the interests of society, _on their own, account_, are not indifferent to us.