Book VI. is occupied with Politics and Political Economy. It discusses the Origin of Civil Government, the Duty of Submission to Government, Liberty, the Forms of Government, the British Const.i.tution, the Administration of Justice, &c.

The Ethical Theory of Paley may be briefly resumed thus:--

I.--The Ethical Standard with him is the conjoined reference to the Will of the Deity, and to Utility, or Human Happiness. He is unable to construct a scheme applicable to mankind generally, until they are first converted to a belief in Revelation.

II.--The Psychology implied in his system involves his most characteristic features.

1. He is unmistakeable in repudiating Innate Moral Distinctions, and on this point, and on this only, is he thoroughly at one with the Utilitarians of the present day.

2. On the Theory of Will he has no remarks. He has an utter distaste for anything metaphysical.

3. He does not discuss Disinterested Sentiment; by implication, he denies it. "Without the expectation of a future existence," he says, "all reasoning upon moral questions is vain." He cannot, of course, leave out all reference to generosity. Under "Pecuniary Bounty" he makes this remark--"They who rank pity amongst the original impulses of our nature, rightly contend, that when this principle prompts us to the relief of human misery, it indicates the Divine intention and our duty.

Whether it be an instinct or a habit (?), it is, in fact, a property of our nature, which G.o.d appointed, &c." This is his first argument for charity; the second is derived from the original t.i.tle of mankind, granted by the Deity, to hold the earth in common; and the third is the strong injunctions of Scripture on this head. He cannot, it seems, trust human nature with a single charitable act apart from the intervention of the Deity.

III.--He has an explicit scheme of Happiness.

IV.--The Substance of his Moral Code is distinguished from, the current opinions chiefly by his well-known views on Subscription to Articles.

He cannot conceive how, looking to the incurable diversity of human opinion on all matters short of demonstration, the legislature could expect the perpetual consent of a body of ten thousand men, not to one controverted proposition, but to many hundreds.

His inducements to the performance of duty are, as we should expect, a mixed reference to Public Utility and to Scripture.

In the Indeterminate Duties, where men are urged by moral considerations, to the exclusion of legal compulsion, he sometimes appeals directly to our generous sympathies, as well as to self-interest, but usually ends with the Scripture authority.

V.--The relation of Ethics to Politics is not a prominent feature in Paley. He makes moral rules repose finally, not upon human, but upon Divine Law. Hence (VI.) the connexion of his system with Theology is fundamental.

JEREMY BENTHAM. [1748-1832.]

The Ethical System of Jeremy Bentham is given in his work, ent.i.tled "An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation," first published in 1789. In a posthumous work, ent.i.tled Deontology, his principles were farther ill.u.s.trated, chiefly with reference to the minor morals and amiable virtues.

It is the first-named work that we shall here chiefly notice. In it, the author has princ.i.p.ally in view Legislation; but the same common basis, Utility, serves, in his judgment, for Ethics, or Morals.

The first chapter, ent.i.tled "THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY," begins thus:--"Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, _pain_ and _pleasure_. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand, the standard of right and wrong; on the other, the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think; every effort we can make to throw off our subjection will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it.

In words a man may pretend to abjure their empire, but in reality he will remain subject to it all the while. The _principle of utility_ recognizes this subjection, and a.s.sumes it for the foundation of that system, the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hand of reason and of law. Systems which attempt to question it, deal in sounds instead of sense, in caprice instead of reason, in darkness instead of light."

He defines Utility in various phrases, all coming to the same thing:--the tendency of actions to promote the happiness, and to prevent the misery, of the party under consideration, which party is usually the community where one"s lot is cast. Of this principle no proof can be offered; it is the final axiom, on which alone we can found all arguments of a moral kind. He that attempts to combat it, usually a.s.sumes it, unawares. An opponent is challenged, to say--(1) if he discards it wholly; (2) if he will act without any principle, or if there is any other that he would judge by; (3) if that other be really and distinctly separate from utility; (4) if he is inclined to set up his own approbation or disapprobation as the rule; and if so, whether he will force that upon others, or allow each person to do the same; (5) in the first case, if his principle is not despotical; (6) in the second case, whether it is not anarchical; (7) supposing him to add the plea of reflection, let him say if the basis of his reflections excludes utility; (8) if he means to compound the matter, and take utility for part; and if so, for what part; (9) why he goes so far, with Utility, and no farther; (10) on what other principle a meaning can be attached to the words "_motive_ and _right_.

In Chapter II., Bentham discusses the PRINCIPLES ADVERSE TO UTILITY. He conceives two opposing grounds. The first mode of opposition is direct and constant, as exemplified in _Asceticism_. A second mode may be only occasional, as in what he terms the principle of _Sympathy and Antipathy_ (Liking and Disliking).

The principle of Asceticism means the approval of an action according to its tendency to diminish happiness, or obversely. Any one reprobating in any shape, pleasure as such, is a partisan of this principle. Asceticism has been adopted, on the one hand, by certain moralists, from the spur of philosophic pride; and on the other hand, by certain religionists, under the impulse of fear. It has been much less admitted into Legislation than into Morals. It may have originated, in the first instance, with hasty speculators, looking at the pains attending certain pleasures in the long run, and pushing the abstinence from such pleasures (justified to a certain length on prudential grounds) so far as to fall in love with pain.

The other principle, Sympathy and Antipathy, means the unreasoning approbation or disapprobation of the individual mind, where fancy, caprice, accidental liking or disliking, may mix with a regard to human happiness. This is properly the negation of a principle. What we expect to find in a principle is some _external_ consideration, warranting and guiding our sentiments of approbation and disapprobation; a basis that all are agreed upon.

It is under this head that Bentham rapidly surveys and dismisses all the current theories of Right and Wrong. They consist all of them, he says, in so many contrivances for avoiding an appeal to any external standard, and for requiring us to accept the author"s sentiment or opinion as a reason for itself. The dictates of this principle, however, will often unintentionally coincide with utility; for what more natural ground of hatred to a practice can there be than its mischievous tendency? The things that men suffer by, they will be disposed to hate. Still, it is not constant in its operation; for people may ascribe the suffering to the wrong cause. The principle is most liable to err on the side of severity; differences of taste and of opinion are sufficient grounds for quarrel and resentment. It will err on the side of lenity, when a mischief is remote and imperceptible.

The author reserves a distinct handling for the Theological principle; alleging that it falls under one or other of the three foregoing. The Will of G.o.d must mean his will as revealed in the sacred writings, which, as the labours of divines testify, themselves stand in need of interpretation. What is meant, in fact, is the _presumptive_ will of G.o.d; that is, what is presumed to be his will on account of its conformity with another principle. We are pretty sure that what is right is conformable to his will, but then this requires us first to know what is right. The usual mode of knowing G.o.d"s pleasure (he remarks) is to observe what is our own pleasure, and p.r.o.nounce that to be his.

Chapter III.--ON FOUR SANCTIONS OR SOURCES OF PAIN AND PLEASURE whereby men are stimulated to act right; they are termed, _physical, political, moral_, and _religious_. These are the Sanctions of Right.

The _physical_ sanction includes the pleasures and pains arising in the ordinary course of nature, unmodified by the will of any human being, or of any supernatural being.

The _political_ sanction is what emanates from the sovereign or supreme ruling power of the state. The punishments of the Law come under this head.

The _moral_ or _popular_ sanction results from the action of the community, or of the individuals that each person comes in contact with, acting without any settled or concerted rule. It corresponds to public opinion, and extends in its operation beyond the sphere of the law.

The _religious_ sanction proceeds from the immediate hand of a superior invisible being, either in the present, or in a future life.

The name Punishment is applicable only to the three last. The suffering that befalls a man in the course of nature is termed a _calamity_; if it happen through imprudence on his part, it may be styled a punishment issuing from the physical sanction.

Chapter IV. is the VALUE OF A LOT OF PLEASURE OR PAIN, HOW TO BE MEASURED. A pleasure or a pain is determined to be greater or less according to (1) its _intensity_, (2) its _duration_, (3) its _certainty_ or _uncertainty_, (4) its _propinquity_ or _remoteness_; all which are obvious distinctions. To these are to be added (5) its _fecundity_, or the chance it has of being followed by other sensations of its own kind; that is pleasures if it be pleasure, pains if it be pain. Finally (6) its _purity_, or the chance of its being unmixed with the opposite kind; a pure pleasure has no mixture of pain. All the six properties apply to the case of an individual person; where a plurality are concerned, a new item is present, (7) the _extent_, or the number of persons affected. These properties exhaust the meaning of the terms expressing good and evil; on the one side, happiness, convenience, advantage, benefit, emolument, profit, &c.; and, on the other, unhappiness, inconvenience, disadvantage, loss, mischief, and the like.

Next follows, in Chapter V., a cla.s.sified enumeration of PLEASURES AND PAINS. In a system undertaking to base all Moral and Political action on the production of happiness, such a cla.s.sification is obviously required. The author professes to have grounded it on an a.n.a.lysis of human nature, which a.n.a.lysis itself, however, as being too metaphysical, he withholds.

The simple pleasures are:--1. The pleasures of sense. 2. The pleasures of wealth. 3. The pleasures of skill. 4. The pleasures of amity. 5. The pleasures of a good name. 6. The pleasures of power. 7. The pleasures of piety. 8. The pleasures of benevolence. 9. The pleasures of malevolence. 10. The pleasures of memory. 11. The pleasures of imagination. 12. The pleasures of expectation. 13. The pleasures dependent on a.s.sociation. 14. The pleasures of relief.

The simple pains are:--1. The pains of privation. 2. The pains of the senses. 3. The pains of awkwardness. 4. The pains of enmity. 5. The pains of an ill name. 6. The pains of piety. 7. The pains of benevolence. 8. The pains of malevolence. 9. The pains of the memory.

10. The pains of the imagination. 11. The pains of expectation. 12. The pains dependent on a.s.sociation.

We need not quote his detailed subdivision and ill.u.s.tration of these.

At the close, he marks the important difference between _self-regarding_ and _extra-regarding_; the last being those of benevolence and of malevolence.

In a long chapter (VI.), he dwells on CIRc.u.mSTANCES INFLUENCING SENSIBILITY. They are such as the following:--1. Health. 2. Strength.

3. Hardiness. 4. Bodily imperfection. 5. Quant.i.ty and Quality of knowledge. 6. Strength of intellectual powers. 7. Firmness of mind. 8.

Steadiness of mind. 9. Bent of inclination. 10. Moral sensibility. 11.

Moral biases. 12. Religious Sensibility. 13. Religious biases. 14.

Sympathetic Sensibility. 15. Sympathetic biases. 16. Antipathetic sensibility. 17. Antipathetic biases. 18. Insanity. 19. Habitual occupations. 20. Pecuniary circ.u.mstances. 21. Connexions in the way of sympathy. 22. Connexions in the way of antipathy. 23. Radical frame of body. 24. Radical frame of mind. 25. s.e.x. 26. Age. 27. Rank. 28.

Education. 29. Climate. 30. Lineage. 31. Government. 32. Religious profession.

Chapter VII. proceeds to consider HUMAN ACTIONS IN GENERAL. Right and wrong, good and evil, merit and demerit belong to actions. These have to be divided and cla.s.sified with a view to the ends of the moralist and the legislator. Throughout this, and two other long chapters, he discusses, as necessary in apportioning punishment, the _act_ itself, the _circ.u.mstances_, the _intention_, and the _consciousness_--or the knowledge of the tendencies of the act. He introduces many subdivisions under each head, and makes a number of remarks of importance as regards penal legislation.

In Chapter X., he regards pleasures and pains in the aspect of MOTIVES.

Since every pleasure and every pain, as a part of their nature, induce actions, they are often designated with reference to that circ.u.mstance.

Hunger, thirst, l.u.s.t, avarice, curiosity, ambition, &c., are names of this cla.s.s. There is not a complete set of such designations; hence the use of the circ.u.mlocutions, _appet.i.te for, love of, desire of_--sweet odours, sounds, sights, ease, reputation, &c.

Of great importance is the _Order of pre-eminence among motives_. Of all the varieties of motives, Good-will, or Benevolence, taken in a general view, is that whose dictates are surest to coincide with Utility. In this, however, it is taken for granted that the benevolence is not so confined in its sphere, as to be contradicted by a more extensive, or enlarged, benevolence.

After good-will, the motive that has the best chance of coinciding with Utility is Love of Reputation. The coincidence would be perfect, if men"s likings and dislikings were governed exclusively by the principle of Utility, and not, as they often are, by the hostile principles of Asceticism, and of Sympathy and Antipathy. Love of reputation is inferior as a motive to Good-will, in not governing the secret actions.

These last are affected, only as they have a chance of becoming public, or as men contract a habit of looking to public approbation in all they do.

The desire of Amity, or of close personal affections, is placed next in order, as a motive. According as we extend the number of persons whose amity we desire, this prompting approximates to the love of reputation.

After these three motives, Bentham places the Dictates of Religion, which, however, are so various in their suggestions, that he can hardly speak of them in common. Were the Being, who is the object of religion, universally supposed to be as benevolent as he is supposed to be wise and powerful, and were the notions of his benevolence as correct as the notions of his wisdom and power, the dictates of religion would correspond, in all cases, with Utility. But while men call him benevolent in words, they seldom mean that he is so in reality. They do not mean that he is benevolent as man is conceived to be benevolent; they do not mean that he is benevolent in the only sense that benevolence has a meaning. The dictates of religion are in all countries intermixed, more or less, with dictates unconformable to utility, deduced from texts, well or ill interpreted, of the writings held for sacred by each sect. These dictates, however, gradually approach nearer to utility, because the dictates of the moral sanction do so.

Such are the four Social or Tutelary Motives, the antagonists of the Dissocial and Self-regarding motives, which include the remainder of the catalogue.

Chapter XI. is on DISPOSITIONS. A man is said to be of a mischievous disposition, when he is presumed to be apt to engage rather in actions of an _apparently_ pernicious tendency, than in such as are apparently beneficial. The author lays down certain Rules for indicating Disposition. Thus, "The strength of the temptation being given, the mischievousness of the disposition manifested by the enterprise, is as the apparent mischievousness of the act," and others to a like effect.

Chapter XII.--OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF A MISCHIEVOUS ACT, is meant as the concluding link of the whole previous chain of causes and effects. He defines the shapes that bad consequences may a.s.sume. The mischief may be _primary_, as when sustained by a definite number of individuals; or _secondary_, by extending over a mult.i.tude of una.s.signable individuals.

The evil in this last case may be either actual pain, or danger, which is the chance of pain. Thus, a successful robbery affects, primarily, a number of a.s.signable persons, and secondarily, all persons in a like situation of risk.