Chapter II. inquires into the origin of Ambition, and of the distinction of Ranks. Proceeding upon the principle just enounced, that mankind sympathize with joy rather than with sorrow, the author composes an exceedingly eloquent homily on the worship paid to rank and greatness.
Chapter III., in continuation of the same theme, ill.u.s.trates the corruption of our moral sentiments, arising from this worship of the great. "We frequently see the respectful attentions of the world more strongly directed towards the rich and the great, than towards the wise and the virtuous." "The external graces, the frivolous accomplishments of that impertinent and foolish thing called a man of fashion, are commonly more admired than the solid and masculine virtues of a warrior, a statesman, a philosopher, or a legislator."
PART II. is OF MERIT AND DEMERIT; OR OF THE OBJECTS OF REWARD AND PUNISHMENT. It consists of three Sections.
_Section I_. is, _Of the Sense of Merit and Demerit_.
Chapter I. maintains that whatever appears to be the proper object of grat.i.tude, appears to deserve reward; and that whatever appears to be the proper object of resentment, appears to deserve punishment. The author distinguishes between grat.i.tude and mere love or liking; and, obversely, between resentment and hatred. Love makes us pleased to see any one promoted; but grat.i.tude urges us to be ourselves the instrument of their promotion.
Chapter II. determines the proper objects of Grat.i.tude and Resentment, these being also the proper objects of Reward and Punishment respectively. "These, as well as all the other pa.s.sions of human nature, seem proper, and are approved of, _when the heart of every impartial spectator entirely sympathizes with them_, when every indifferent by-stander entirely enters into, and goes along with them."
In short, a good moral decision is obtained by the unanimous vote of all impartial persons.
This view is in accordance with the course taken by the mind in the two contrasting situations. In sympathizing with the joy of a prosperous person, we approve of his complacent and grateful sentiment towards the author of his prosperity; we make his grat.i.tude our own: in sympathizing with sorrow, we enter into, and approve of, the natural resentment towards the agent causing it.
Chapter III. remarks that where we do not approve of the conduct of the person conferring the benefit, we have little sympathy with the grat.i.tude of the receiver; we do not care to enter into the grat.i.tude of the favourites of profligate monarchs.
Chapter IV. supposes the case of our approving strongly the conduct and the motives of a benefactor, in which case we sympathize to a corresponding degree with the grat.i.tude of the receiver.
Chapter V. sums up the a.n.a.lysis of the Sense of Merit and of Demerit thus:--The sense of Merit is a compound sentiment, made up of two distinct emotions; a direct sympathy with the sentiments of the agent (const.i.tuting the propriety of the action), and an indirect sympathy with the grat.i.tude of the recipient. The sense of Demerit includes a direct antipathy to the sentiments of the agent, and an indirect sympathy with the resentment of the sufferer.
_Section II_. is _Of Justice and Beneficence_.
Chapter I. compares the two virtues. Actions of a beneficent tendency, from proper motives, seem alone to require a reward; actions of a hurtful tendency, from improper motives, seem alone to deserve punishment. It is the nature of Beneficence to be free; the mere absence of it does not expose to punishment. Of all the duties of beneficence, the one most allied to perfect obligation is grat.i.tude; but although we talk of the debt of grat.i.tude (we do not say the debt of _charity_), we do not punish ingrat.i.tude.
Resentment, the source of punishment, is given for defence against positive evil; we employ it not to extort benefits, but to repel injuries. Now, the injury is the violation of Justice. The sense of mankind goes along with the employment of violence to avenge the hurt done by injustice, to prevent the injury, and to restrain the offender.
Beneficence, then, is the subject of reward; and the want of it is not the subject of punishment. There may be cases where a beneficent act is compelled by punishment, as in obliging a father to support his family, or in punishing a man for not interfering when another is in danger; but these cases are immaterial exceptions to the broad definition. He might have added, that in cases where justice is performed under unusual difficulties, and with unusual fidelity, our disposition would be not merely to exempt from punishment, but to reward.
Chapter II. considers the sense of Justice, Remorse, and the feeling of Merit.
Every man is recommended by nature to his own care, being fitter to take care of himself than of another person. We approve, therefore, of each one seeking their own good; but then it must not be to the hurt of any other being. The primary feeling of self-preservation would not of itself, however, be shocked at causing injury to our fellows. It is when we pa.s.s out of this point of view, and enter into the mental state of the spectator of our actions, that we feel the sense of injustice and the sting of Remorse. Though it may be true that every individual in his own breast prefers himself to mankind, yet he dares not look mankind in the face, and avow that he acts on this principle. A man is approved when he outstrips his fellows in a fair race; he is condemned when he jostles or trips up a compet.i.tor unfairly. The actor takes home to himself this feeling; a feeling known as Shame, Dread of Punishment, and Remorse.
So with the obverse. He that performs a generous action can realize the sentiments of the by-stander, and applaud himself by sympathy with the approbation of the supposed impartial judge. This is the sense of Merit.
Chapter III. gives reflections upon the utility of this const.i.tution of our nature. Human beings are dependent upon one another for mutual a.s.sistance, and are exposed to mutual injuries. Society might exist without love or beneficence, but not without mutual abstinence from injury. Beneficence is the ornament that embellishes the building; Justice the main pillar that supports it. It is for the observance of Justice that we need that consciousness of ill-desert, and those terrors of mental punishment, growing out of our sympathy with the disapprobation of our fellows. Justice is necessary to the existence of society, and we often defend its dictates on that ground; but, without looking to such a remote and comprehensive end, we are plunged into remorse for its violation by the shorter process of referring to the censure of a supposed spectator [in other words, to the sanction of public opinion].
_Section III.--Of the influence of Fortune upon the sentiments of mankind, with regard to the Merit and the Demerit of actions_.
Every voluntary action consists of three parts:--(1) the Intention or motive, (2) the Mechanism, as when we lift the hand, and give a blow, and (3) the Consequences. It is, in principle, admitted by all, that only the first, the Intention, can be the subject of blame. The Mechanism is in itself indifferent. So the Consequences cannot be properly imputed to the agent, unless intended by him. On this last point, however, mankind do not always adhere to their general maxim; when they come to particular cases, they are influenced, in their estimate of merit and demerit, by the actual consequences of the action.
Chapter I. considers the causes of this influence of Fortune. Grat.i.tude requires, in the first instance, that some pleasure should have been conferred; Resentment pre-supposes pain. These pa.s.sions require farther that the object of them should itself be susceptible of pleasure and pain; they should be human beings or animals. Thirdly, It is requisite that they should have produced the effects from a design to do so. Now, the absence of the pleasurable consequences intended by a beneficent agent leaves out one of the exciting causes of grat.i.tude, although including another; the absence of the painful consequences of a maleficent act leaves out one of the exciting causes of resentment; hence less grat.i.tude seems due in the one, and less resentment in the other.
Chapter II. treats of the extent of this influence of Fortune. The effects of it are, first, to diminish, in our eyes, the merit of laudable, and the demerit of blameable, actions, when they fail of their intended effects; and, secondly, to increase the feelings of merit and of demerit beyond what is due to the motives, when the actions chance to be followed by extraordinary pleasure or pain.
Success enhances our estimate of all great enterprises; failure takes off the edge of our resentment of great crimes.
The author thinks (Chapter III.) that final causes can be a.s.signed for this irregularity of Sentiments. In the first place, it would be highly dangerous to seek out and to resent mere bad intentions. In the next place, it is desirable that beneficent wishes should be put to the proof by results. And, lastly, as regards the tendency to resent evil, although unintended, it is good to a certain extent that men should be taught intense circ.u.mspection on the point of infringing one another"s happiness.
PART III. is ent.i.tled OF THE FOUNDATION OF OUR JUDGMENTS CONCERNING OUR OWN SENTIMENTS AND CONDUCT, AND OF THE SENSE OF DUTY.
Chapter I. is "Of the Principle of Self-approbation and of Self-disapprobation." Having previously a.s.signed the origin of our judgments respecting others, the author now proceeds to trace out our judgments respecting ourselves. The explanation is still the same. We approve or disapprove of our own conduct, according as we feel that the impartial spectator would approve or disapprove of it.
To a solitary human being, moral judgments would never exist. A man would no more think of the merit and demerit of his sentiments than of the beauty or deformity of his own face. Such criticism is exercised first upon other beings; but the critic cannot help seeing that he in his turn is criticised, and he is thereby led to apply the common standard to his own actions; to divide himself as it were into two persons--the examiner or judge, and person examined into, or judged of.
He knows what conduct of his will be approved of by others, and what condemned, according to the standard he himself employs upon others; his concurrence in this approbation or disapprobation is self-approbation or self-disapprobation. The happy consciousness of virtue is the consciousness of the favourable regards of other men.
Chapter II. is "Of the love of Praise, and of Praise-worthiness; the dread of Blame, and of Blame-worthiness;" a long and important chapter.
The author endeavours to trace, according to his principle of sympathy, the desire of Praise-worthiness, as well as of Praise. We approve certain conduct in others, and are thus disposed to approve the same conduct in ourselves: what we praise as judges of our fellow-men, we deem praise-worthy, and aspire to realize in our own conduct. Some men may differ from us, and may withhold that praise; we may be pained at the circ.u.mstance, but we adhere to our love of the praise-worthy, even when it does not bring the praise. When we obtain the praise we are pleased, and strengthened in our estimate; the approbation that we receive confirms our self-approbation, but does not give birth to it.
In short, there are two principles at work within us. We are pleased with approbation, and pained by reproach: we are farther pleased if the approbation coincides with what we approve when we are ourselves acting as judges of other men. The two dispositions vary in their strength in individuals, confirming each other when in concert, thwarting each other when opposed. The author has painted a number of striking situations arising out of their conflict. He enquires why we are more pained by unmerited reproach, than lifted up by unmerited approbation; and a.s.signs as the reason that the painful state is more pungent than the corresponding pleasurable state. He shows how those men whose productions are of uncertain merit, as poets, are more the slaves of approbation, than the authors of unmistakeable discoveries in science.
In the extreme cases of unmerited reproach, he points out the appeal to the all-seeing Judge of the world, and to a future state rightly conceived; protesting, however, against the view that would reserve the celestial regions for monks and friars, and condemn to the infernal, all the heroes, statesmen, poets, and philosophers of former ages; all the inventors of the useful arts; the protectors, instructors, and benefactors of mankind; and all those to whom our natural sense of praise-worthiness forces us to ascribe the highest merit and most exalted virtue.
Chapter III. is "On the influence and authority of Conscience;" another long chapter, occupied more with moral reflections of a practical kind than with the following out of the a.n.a.lysis of our moral sentiment.
Conceding that the testimony of the supposed impartial spectator does not of itself always support a man, he yet a.s.serts its influence to be great, and that by it alone we can see what relates to ourselves in the proper shape and dimensions. It is only in this way that we can prefer the interest of many to the interest of one; the interest of others to our own. To fortify us in this hard lesson two different schemes have been proposed; one to increase our feelings for others, the other to diminish our feelings for ourselves. The first is prescribed by the whining and melancholy moralists, who will never allow us to be happy, because at every moment many of our fellow-beings are in misery. The second is the doctrine of the Stoics, who annihilate self-interest in favour of the vast commonwealth of nature; on that the author bestows a lengthened comment and correction, founded on his theory of regulating the manifestations of joy or grief by the light of the impartial judge.
He gives his own panacea for human misery, namely, the power of nature to accommodate men to their permanent situation, and to restore tranquillity, which is the one secret of happiness.
Chapter IV. handles Self-Deceit, and the Origin and Use of General Rules. The interference of our pa.s.sions is the great obstacle to our holding towards ourselves the position of an impartial spectator. Prom this notorious fact the author deduces an argument against a special moral faculty, or moral sense; he says that if we had such a faculty, it would surely judge our own pa.s.sions, which are the most clearly laid open to it, more correctly than the pa.s.sions of others.
To correct our self-partiality and self-deceit is the use of general rules. Our repeated observations on the tendency of particular acts, teach us what is fit to be done generally; and our conviction of the propriety of the general rules is a powerful motive for applying them to our own case. It is a mistake to suppose, as some have done, that rules precede experience; on the contrary, they are formed by finding from experience that all actions of a certain kind, in certain circ.u.mstances, are approved of. When established, we appeal to them as standards of judgment in right and wrong, but they are not the original judgments of mankind, nor the ultimate foundations of moral sentiment.
Chapter V. continues the subject of the authority and influence of General Rules, maintaining that they are justly regarded as laws of the Deity. The grand advantage of general rules is to give steadiness to human conduct, and to enable us to resist our temporary varieties of temper and disposition. They are thus a grand security for human duties. That the important rules of morality should be accounted laws of the Deity is a natural sentiment. Men have always ascribed to their deities their own sentiments and pa.s.sions; the deities held by them in special reverence, they have endowed with their highest ideal of excellence, the love of virtue and beneficence, and the abhorrence of vice and injustice. The researches of philosophical inquiry confirmed mankind in the supposition that the moral faculties carry the badge of authority, that they were intended as the governing principles of our nature, acting as the vicegerents of the Deity. This inference is confirmed by the view that the happiness of men, and of other rational creatures, is the original design of the Author of nature, the only purpose reconcilable with the perfections we ascribe to him.
Chapter VI. is on the cases where the Sense of Duty should be the sole motive of conduct; and on those where it ought to join with other motives. Allowing the importance of religion among human motives, he does not concur with the view that would make religious considerations the sole laudable motives of action. The sense of duty is not the only principle of our conduct; it is the ruling or governing one. It may be a question, however, on what occasions we are to proceed strictly by the sense of duty, and on what occasions give way to some other sentiment or affection. The author answers that in the actions prompted by benevolent affections, we are to follow out our sentiments as much as our sense of duty; and the contrary with the malevolent pa.s.sions. As to the selfish pa.s.sions, we are to follow duty in small matters, and self-interest in great. But the rules of duty predominate most in cases where they are determined with exactness, that is, in the virtue of Justice.
PART IV. OF THE EFFECT OF UTILITY UPON THE SENTIMENT OF APPROBATION.
Chapter I. is on the Beauty arising out of Utility. It is here that the author sets forth the dismal career of "the poor man"s son, whom heaven in the hour of her anger has curst with ambition," and enforces his favourite moral lesson of contentment and tranquillity.
Chapter II. is the connexion of Utility with Moral Approbation. There are many actions possessing the kind of beauty or charm arising from utility; and hence, it may be maintained (as was done by Hume) that our whole approbation of virtue may be explained on this principle. And it may be granted that there is a coincidence between our sentiments of approbation or disapprobation, and the useful or hurtful qualities of actions. Still, the author holds that this utility or hurtfulness is not the foremost or princ.i.p.al source of our approbation. In the first place, he thinks it incongruous that we should have no other reason, for praising a man than for praising a chest of drawers. In the next place, he contends at length that the usefulness of a disposition of mind is seldom the first ground of our approbation. Take, for example, the qualities useful to ourselves--reason and self-command; we approve the first as just and accurate, before we are aware of its being useful; and as to self-command, we approve it quite as much for its propriety as for its utility; it is the coincidence of our opinion with the opinion of the spectator, and not an estimate of the comparative utility, that affects us. Regarding the qualities useful to others--humanity, generosity, public spirit and justice--he merely repeats his own theory that they are approved by our entering into the view of the impartial spectator. The examples cited only show that these virtues are not approved from self-interest; as when the soldier throws away his life to gain something for his sovereign. He also puts the case of a solitary human being, who might see fitness in actions, but could not feel moral approbation.
PART V. THE INFLUENCE OF CUSTOM ON THE MORAL SENTIMENTS.
The first chapter is a pleasing essay on the influence of custom and fashion on manners, dress, and in Fine Art generally. The second chapter makes the application to our moral sentiments. Although custom will never reconcile us to the conduct of a Nero or a Claudius, it will heighten or blunt the delicacy of our sentiments on right and wrong.
The fashion of the times of Charles II. made dissoluteness reputable, and discountenanced regularity of conduct. There is a customary behaviour that we expect in the old and in the young, in the clergyman and in the military man. The situations of different ages and countries develop characteristic qualities--endurance in the savage, humanity and softness in the civilized community. But these are not the extreme instances of the principle. We find particular usages, where custom has rendered lawful and blameless actions, that shock the plainest principles of right and wrong; the most notorious and universal is infanticide.
PART VI. THE CHARACTER OF VIRTUE.
_Section I_. is on _Prudence_, and is an elegant essay on the _beau ideal_ of the prudential character. _Section II_. considers _character as affecting other people_. Chapter I. is a disquisition on the comparative priority of the objects of our regard. After self, which must ever have the first place, the members of our own family are recommended to our consideration. Remoter connexions of blood are more or less regarded according to the customs of the country; in pastoral countries clanship is manifested; in commercial countries distant relationship becomes indifferent. Official and business connexions, and the a.s.sociation of neighbourhood, determine friendships. Special estimation is a still preferable tie. Favours received determine and require favours in return. The distinction of ranks is so far founded in nature as to deserve our respect. Lastly, the miserable are recommended to our compa.s.sion. Next, as regards societies (Chap. II.), since our own country stands first in our regard, the author dilates on the virtues of a good citizen. Finally, although our effectual good offices may not extend beyond our country, our good-will may embrace the whole universe. This universal benevolence, however, the author thinks must repose on the belief in a benevolent and all-wise governor of the world, as realized, for example, in the meditations of Marcus Antoninus.
_Section III. Of Self-command_. On this topic the author produces a splendid moral essay, in which he describes the various modes of our self-estimation, and draws a contrast between pride and vanity. In so far as concerns his Ethical theory, he has still the same criterion of the virtue, the degree and mode commended by the impartial spectator.
PART VII. OF SYSTEMS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
On this we need only to remark that it is an interesting and valuable contribution to the history and the criticism of the Ethical systems.[23]
The Ethical theory of Adam Smith may be thus summed up:--
I.--The Ethical Standard is the judgment of an impartial spectator or critic; and our own judgments are derived by reference to what this spectator would approve or disapprove.
Probably to no one has this ever appeared a sufficient account of Right and Wrong. It provides against one defect, the self-partiality of the agent; but gives no account whatever of the grounds of the critic"s own judgment, and makes no provision against his fallibility. It may be very well on points where men"s moral sentiments are tolerably unanimous, but it is valueless in all questions where there are fundamental differences of view.
II.--In the Psychology of Ethics, Smith would consider the moral Faculty as identical with the power of Sympathy, which he treats as the foundation of Benevolence. A man is a moral being in proportion as he can enter into, and realize, the feelings, sentiments, and opinions of others.