-- I.
The Metaphysics of Rationalism--Materialism.
The Persian mind, having adjusted itself to the new political environment, soon rea.s.serts its innate freedom, and begins to retire from the field of objectivity, in order that it may come back to itself, and reflect upon the material achieved in its journey out of its own inwardness. With the study of Greek thought, the spirit which was almost lost in the concrete, begins to reflect and realise itself as the arbiter of truth. Subjectivity a.s.serts itself, and endeavours to supplant all outward authority. Such a period, in the intellectual history of a people, must be the epoch of rationalism, scepticism, mysticism, heresy--forms in which the human mind, swayed by the growing force of subjectivity, rejects all external standards of truth. And so we find the epoch under consideration.
The period of Umayyad dominance is taken up with the process of co-mingling and adjustment to new conditions of life; but with the rise of the "Abbasid Dynasty and the study of Greek Philosophy, the pent-up intellectual force of Persia bursts out again, and exhibits wonderful activity in all the departments of thought and action. The fresh intellectual vigour imparted by the a.s.similation of Greek Philosophy which was studied with great avidity, led immediately to a critical examination of Islamic Monotheism. Theology, enlivened by religious fervour, learned to talk the language of Philosophy earlier than cold reason began to seek a retired corner, away from the noise of controversy, in order to construct a consistent theory of things. In the first half of the 8{th} century we find Wa?il Ibn "Ata--a Persian disciple of the famous theologian ?asan of Ba?ra--starting Mu"tazilaism (Rationalism)--that most interesting movement which engaged some of the subtlest minds of Persia, and finally exhausted its force in the keen metaphysical controversies of Bag_h_dad and Ba?ra. The famous city of Ba?ra had become, owing to its commercial situation, the playground of various forces--Greek Philosophy, Scepticism, Christianity, Buddhistic ideas, Manichaeism[47:1]--which furnished ample spiritual food to the inquiring mind of the time, and formed the intellectual environment of Islamic Rationalism. What Spitta calls the Syrian period of Muhammadan History is not characterised with metaphysical subtleties. With the advent of the Persian Period, however, Muhammadan students of Greek Philosophy began properly to reflect on their religion; and the Mu"tazila thinkers[47:2], gradually drifted into metaphysics with which alone we are concerned here. It is not our object to trace the history of the Mu"tazila Kalam; for present purposes it will be sufficient if we briefly reveal the metaphysical implications of the Mu"tazila view of Islam. The conception of G.o.d, and the theory of matter, therefore, are the only aspects of Rationalism which we propose to discuss here.
[47:1] During the "Abbasid Period there were many who secretly held Manichaean opinions. See Fihrist, Leipsig 1871, p. 338; See also Al-Mu"tazila, ed. by T. W. Arnold, Leipsig 1902, p. 27, where the author speaks of a controversy between Abu "l-Hud_h_ail and ?alih, the Dualist. See also Macdonald"s Muslim Theology, p. 133.
[47:2] The Mu"tazilas belonged to various nationalities, and many of them were Persians either by descent or domicile. Wa?il Ibn "Ata--the reported founder of the sect--was a Persian (Browne, Lit. His., Vol I, p. 281). Von Kremer, however, traces their origin to the theological controversies of the Umayyad period. Mu"tazilaism was not an essentially Persian movement; but it is true, as Prof. Browne observes (Lit. His., Vol. I, p.
283) that S_h_i"ite and Qadari tenets, indeed, often went together, and the S_h_i"ite doctrine current in Persia at the present day is in many respects Mu"tazilite, while ?asan Al-As_h_"ari, the great opponent of the Mu"tazilite, is by the S_h_i"ites held in horror. It may also be added that some of the greater representatives of the Mu"tazila opinion were S_h_i"as by religion, e.g. Abu "l-Hud_h_ail (Al-Mu"tazila, ed. by T. W.
Arnold, p. 28). On the other hand many of the followers of Al-As_h_"ari were Persians (See extracts from Ibn "Asakir ed.
Mehren), so that it does not seem to be quite justifiable to describe the As_h_"arite mode of thought as a purely semitic movement.
His conception of the unity of G.o.d at which the Mu"tazila eventually arrived by a subtle dialectic is one of the fundamental points in which he differs from the Orthodox Muhammadan. G.o.d"s attributes, according to his view, cannot be said to inhere in him; they form the very essence of His nature. The Mu"tazila, therefore, denies the separate reality of divine attributes, and declares their absolute ident.i.ty with the abstract divine Principle. "G.o.d", says Abu"l-Hud_h_ail, "is knowing, all-powerful, living; and his knowledge, power and life const.i.tute His very essence (d_h_at)"[49:1]. In order to explain the pure unity of G.o.d Joseph Al-Ba?ir[49:2] lays down the following five principles:--
(1). The necessary supposition of atom and accident.
(2). The necessary supposition of a creator.
(3). The necessary supposition of the conditions (A?wal) of G.o.d.
(4). The rejection of those attributes which do not befit G.o.d.
(5). The unity of G.o.d in spite of the plurality of His attributes.
[49:1] S_h_ahrastani: Cureton"s ed., p. 34.
[49:2] Dr. Frankl: Ein Mu"tazilitischer Kalam--Wien 1872, p. 13.
This conception of unity underwent further modifications; until in the hands of Mu"ammar and Abu Has_h_im it became a mere abstract possibility about which nothing could be predicated. We cannot, he says, predicate knowledge of G.o.d[50:1], for His knowledge must be of something in Himself. The first necessitates the ident.i.ty of subject and object which is absurd; the second implicates duality in the nature of G.o.d which is equally impossible. A?mad and Fa?l[50:2]--disciples of Nazzam, however, recognised this duality in holding that the original creators are two--G.o.d--the eternal principle; and the word of G.o.d--Jesus Christ--the contingent principle. But more fully to bring out the element of truth in the second alternative suggested by Mu"ammar, was reserved, as we shall see, for later ?ufi thinkers of Persia. It is, therefore, clear that some of the rationalists almost unconsciously touched the outer fringe of later pantheism for which, in a sense, they prepared the way, not only by their definition of G.o.d, but also by their common effort to internalise the rigid externality of an absolute law.
[50:1] S_h_ahrastani: Cureton"s ed., p. 48. See also Steiner--Die Mutaziliten, p. 59.
[50:2] Ibn ?azm (Cairo, ed. I) Vol. IV, p. 197. See also S_h_ahrastani: Cureton"s ed., p. 42.
But the most important contribution of the advocates of Rationalism to purely metaphysical speculation, is their explanation of matter, which their opponents--the Ash"arite--afterwards modified to fit in with their own views of the nature of G.o.d. The interest of Nazzam chiefly consisted in the exclusion of all arbitrariness from the orderly course of nature[51:1]. The same interest in naturalism led Al-Ja?i? to define Will in a purely negative manner[51:2]. Though the Rationalist thinkers did not want to abandon the idea of a Personal Will, yet they endeavoured to find a deeper ground for the independence of individual natural phenomena. And this ground they found in matter itself. Nazzam taught the infinite divisibility of matter, and obliterated the distinction between substance and accident[51:3]. Existence was regarded as a quality superimposed by G.o.d on the pre-existing material atoms which would have been incapable of perception without this quality.
Mu?ammad Ibn "Ut_h_man, one of the Mu"tazila S_h_aik_h_s, says Ibn ?azm,[51:4] maintained that the non-existent (atom in its pre-existential state) is a body in that state; only that in its pre-existential condition it is neither in motion, nor at rest, nor is it said to be created. Substance, then, is a collection of qualities--taste, odour, colour--which, in themselves, are nothing more than material potentialities. The soul, too, is a finer kind of matter; and the processes of knowledge are mere mental motions. Creation is only the actualisation of pre-existing potentialities[52:1] (?afra). The individuality of a thing which is defined as "that of which something can be predicated"[52:2] is not an essential factor in its notion. The collection of things we call the Universe, is externalised or perceptible reality which could, so to speak, exist independent of all perceptibility. The object of these metaphysical subtleties is purely theological. G.o.d, to the Rationalist, is an absolute unity which can, in no sense, admit of plurality, and could thus exist without the perceptible plurality--the Universe.
[51:1] Steiner: Die Mu"taziliten; Leipzig, 1865, p. 57.
[51:2] Steiner: Die Mu"taziliten; Leipzig, 1865, p. 59.
[51:3] S_h_ahrastani: Cureton"s ed., p. 38.
[51:4] Ibn ?azm (ed. Cairo): Vol. V, p. 42.
[52:1] S_h_ahrastani: Cureton"s ed, p. 38.
[52:2] Steiner: Die Mu"taziliten, p. 80.
The activity of G.o.d, then, consists only in making the atom perceptible.
The properties of the atom flow from its own nature. A stone thrown up falls down on account of its own indwelling property[53:1]. G.o.d, says Al-"A??ar of Ba?ra and Bis_h_r ibn al Mu"tamir, did not create colour, length, breadth, taste or smell--all these are activities of bodies themselves[53:2]. Even the number of things in the Universe is not known to G.o.d[53:3]. Bishr ibn al-Mu"tamir further explained the properties of bodies by what he called "Tawallud"--interaction of bodies[53:4]. Thus it is clear that the Rationalists were philosophically materialists, and theologically deists.
[53:1] S_h_ahrastani: Cureton"s ed., p. 38.
[53:2] Ibn ?azm (ed. Cairo): Vol. IV, pp. 194, 197.
[53:3] Ibn ?azm (ed. Cairo): Vol. IV, p. 194.
[53:4] S_h_ahrastani: Cureton"s ed., p. 44.
To them substance and atom are identical, and they define substance as a s.p.a.ce-filling atom which, besides the quality of filling s.p.a.ce, has a certain direction, force and existence forming its very essence as an actuality. In shape it is squarelike; for if it is supposed to be circular, combination of different atoms would not be possible[53:5].
There is, however, great difference of opinion among the exponents of atomism in regard to the nature of the atom. Some hold that atoms are all similar to each other; while Abu"l-Qasim of Balk_h_ regards them as similar as well as dissimilar. When we say that two things are similar to each other, we do not necessarily mean that they are similar in all their attributes. Abu"l-Qasim further differs from Nazzam in advocating the indestructibility of the atom. He holds that the atom had a beginning in time; but that it cannot be completely annihilated. The attribute of "Baqa" (continued existence), he says, does not give to its subject a new attribute other than existence; and the continuity of existence is not an additional attribute at all. The divine activity created the atom as well as its continued existence. Abu"l-Qasim, however, admits that some atoms may not have been created for continued existence. He denies also the existence of any intervening s.p.a.ce between different atoms, and holds, unlike other representatives of the school, that the essence or atom (Mahiyyat) could not remain essence in a state of non-existence. To advocate the opposite is a contradiction in terms.
To say that the essence (which is essence because of the attribute of existence) could remain essence in a state of non-existence, is to say that the existent could remain existent in a state of non-existence. It is obvious that Abu"l-Qasim here approaches the As_h_"arite theory of knowledge which dealt a serious blow to the Rationalist theory of matter.
[53:5] In my treatment of the atomism of Islamic Rationalists, I am indebted to Arthur Biram"s publication: "Kitabul Masa"il fil k_h_ilaf beyn al-Ba?riyyin wal Bag_h_dadiyyin".
-- II.
Contemporary Movements of Thought.
Side by side with the development of Mu"tazilaism we see, as is natural in a period of great intellectual activity, many other tendencies of thought manifesting themselves in the philosophical and religious circles of Islam. Let us notice them briefly:--
1. Scepticism. The tendency towards scepticism was the natural consequence of the purely dialectic method of Rationalism. Men such as Ibn As_h_ras and Al-Jahiz who apparently belonged to the Rationalist camp, were really sceptics. The standpoint of Al-Jahiz who inclined to deistic naturalism[55:1], is that of a cultured man of the time, and not of a professional theologian. In him is noticeable also a reaction against the metaphysical hairsplitting of his predecessors, and a desire to widen the pale of theology for the sake of the illiterate who are incapable of reflecting on articles of faith.
[55:1] Macdonald"s Muslim Theology, p. 161.
2. ?ufiism--an appeal to a higher source of knowledge which was first systematised by D_h_u"l-Nun, and became more and more deepened and antischolastic in contrast to the dry intellectualism of the As_h_"arite. We shall consider this interesting movement in the following chapter.
3. The revival of authority--Isma"ilianism--a movement characteristically Persian which, instead of repudiating freethought, endeavours to come to an understanding with it. Though this movement seems to have no connection with the theological controversies of the time, yet its connection with freethought is fundamental. The similarity between the methods practised by the Isma"ilian missionaries and those of the partisans of the a.s.sociation called Ik_h_wan al-Safa--Brethren of Purity--suggests some sort of secret relation between the two inst.i.tutions. Whatever may be the motive of those who started this movement, its significance as an intellectual phenomenon should not be lost sight of. The multiplicity of philosophical and religious views--a necessary consequence of speculative activity--is apt to invoke forces which operate against this, religiously speaking, dangerous multiplicity. In the 18th century history of European thought we see Fichte, starting with a sceptical inquiry concerning the nature of matter, and finding its last word in Pantheism. Schleiermacher appeals to Faith as opposed to Reason, Jacobi points to a source of knowledge higher than reason, while Comte abandons all metaphysical inquiry, and limits all knowledge to sensuous perception. De Maistre and Schlegel, on the other hand, find a resting place in the authority of an absolutely infallible Pope. The advocates of the doctrine of Imamat think in the same strain as De Maistre; but it is curious that the Isma"ilians, while making this doctrine the basis of their Church, permitted free play to all sorts of thinking.
The Isma"ilia movement then is one aspect of the persistent battle[57:1] which the intellectually independent Persian waged against the religious and political ideals of Islam. Originally a branch of the Shi"ite religion, the Isma"ilia sect a.s.sumed quite a cosmopolitan character with "Abdulla ibn Maimun--the probable progenitor of the Fatimid Caliphs of Egypt--who died about the same time when Al-As_h_"ari, the great opponent of Freethought, was born. This curious man imagined a vast scheme in which he weaved together innumerable threads of various hues, resulting in a cleverly constructed equivocation, charming to the Persian mind for its mysterious character and misty Pythagorean Philosophy. Like the a.s.sociation of the Brethren of Purity, he made an attempt, under the pious cloak of the doctrine of Imamat (Authority), to synthesise all the dominating ideas of the time.
Greek Philosophy, Christianity, Rationalism, Sufiism, Manichaeism, Persian heresies, and above all the idea of reincarnation, all came forward to contribute their respective shares to the boldly conceived Isma"ilian whole, the various aspects of which were to be gradually revealed to the initiated, by the "Leader"--the ever Incarnating Universal Reason--according to the intellectual development of the age in which he incarnated himself. In the Isma"ilian movement, Freethought, apprehending the collapse of its ever widening structure, seeks to rest upon a stable basis, and, by a strange irony of fate, is led to find it in the very idea which is revolting to its whole being. Barren authority, though still apt to rea.s.sert herself at times, adopts this unclaimed child, and thus permits herself to a.s.similate all knowledge past, present and future.
[57:1] Ibn ?azm in his Kitab al-Milal, looks upon the heretical sects of Persia as a continuous struggle against the Arab power which the cunning Persian attempted to shake off by these peaceful means. See Von Kremer"s Geschichte der herrschenden Ideen des Islams, pp. 10, 11, where this learned Arab historian of Cordova is quoted at length.
The unfortunate connection, however, of this movement with the politics of the time, has misled many a scholar. They see in it (Macdonald, for instance) nothing more than a powerful conspiracy to uproot the political power of the Arab from Persia. They have denounced the Isma"ilian Church which counted among its followers some of the best heads and sincerest hearts, as a mere clique of dark murderers who were ever watching for a possible victim. We must always remember, while estimating the character of these people, the most barbarous persecutions which drove them to pay red-handed fanaticism in the same coin. a.s.sa.s.sinations for religious purposes were considered un.o.bjectionable, and even perhaps lawful, among the whole Semite race.
As late as the latter half of the 16th century, the Pope of Rome could approve such a dreadful slaughter as the ma.s.sacre of St. Bartholomew.
That a.s.sa.s.sination, even though actuated by religious zeal, is still a crime, is a purely modern idea; and justice demands that we should not judge older generations with our own standards of right and wrong. A great religious movement which shook to its very foundations the structure of a vast empire, and, having successfully pa.s.sed through the varied ordeals of moral reproach, calumny and persecution, stood up for centuries as a champion of Science and Philosophy, could not have entirely rested on the frail basis of a political conspiracy of a mere local and temporary character. Isma"ilianism, in spite of its almost entire loss of original vitality, still dominates the ethical ideal of not an insignificant number in India, Persia, Central Asia, Syria and Africa; while the last expression of Persian thought--Babism--is essentially Isma"ilian in its character.
To return, however, to the Philosophy of the sect. From the later Rationalists they borrowed their conception of Divinity. G.o.d, or the ultimate principle of existence, they teach, has no attribute. His nature admits of no predication. When we predicate the attribute of power to him, we only mean that He is the giver of power; when we predicate eternity, we indicate the eternity of what the Qur"an calls "Amr" (word of G.o.d) as distinguished from the "K_h_alq" (creation of G.o.d) which is contingent. In His nature all contradictions melt away, and from Him flow all opposites. Thus they considered themselves to have solved the problem which had troubled the mind of Zoroaster and his followers.
In order to find an answer to the question, "What is plurality?" the Isma"ilia refer to what they consider a metaphysical axiom--"that from one only one can proceed". But the one which proceeds, is not something completely different from which it proceeds. It is really the Primal one transformed. The Primal Unity, therefore, transformed itself into the First Intellect (Universal Reason); and then, by means of this transformation of itself, created the Universal soul which, impelled by its nature to perfectly identify itself with the original source, felt the necessity of motion, and consequently of a body possessing the power of motion. In order to achieve its end, the soul created the heavens moving in circular motion according to its direction. It also created the elements which mixed together, and formed the visible Universe--the scene of plurality through which it endeavours to pa.s.s with a view to come back to the original source. The individual soul is an epitome of the whole Universe which exists only for its progressive education. The Universal Reason incarnates itself from time to time, in the personality of the "Leader" who illuminates the soul in proportion to its experience and understanding, and gradually guides it through the scene of plurality to the world of eternal unity. When the Universal soul reaches its goal, or rather returns to its own deep being, the process of disintegration ensues. "Particles const.i.tuting the Universe fall off from each other--those of goodness go to truth (G.o.d) which symbolises unity; those of evil go to untruth (Devil) which symbolises diversity"[63:1]. This is but briefly the Isma"ilian Philosophy--a mixture, as S_h_arastani remarks, of Philosophical and Manichaean ideas--which, by gradually arousing the slumbering spirit of scepticism, they administered, as it were, in doses to the initiated, and finally brought them to that stage of spiritual emanc.i.p.ation where solemn ritual drops off, and dogmatic religion appears to be nothing more than a systematic arrangement of useful falsehoods.
[63:1] S_h_arastani: Cureton"s ed: p. 149.