In 1887 Patikul and Lati were attacked by Governor Arolas and Datu Aliyud Din fled to Siasi and Laminusa, from there he returned, late in 1888, to Bunbun and Patikul; there he lived quietly until his death, about 1892.

The administration of Governor Arolas was the longest in duration, the most eventful, the most interesting, and the most warlike administration Sulu had under Spanish rule. The difficult situation the governor found at his arrival, his misunderstanding of the Sulu character and underestimation of Sulu public opinion, his integrity, his exalted opinion of Spanish sovereignty and honor, his disregard of treaties and precedent, his ability as a commander of troops, and his warlike policy, all combine to make a picture vivid in its colors and unique in its make-up. Governor Arolas can not be held responsible for what had transpired prior to his appointment as governor, and the policy he followed was probably dictated for him in general from Manila; but it is difficult to conceive of a man executing his duty with such vigor, earnestness, and thoroughness as General Arolas did, unless his heart and soul approved of such a policy and added enthusiasm and zest to the impetus of duty. Furthermore, there are many reasons for believing that Governor Arolas recommended the main lines of the policy he pursued. At all events he impersonates, as far as the object of this work is concerned, that combined agency of government which is responsible for the significant events of his administration of Sulu affairs. In commenting upon his policy it would therefore be proper to refer to him personally, without the least intention of fixing the blame on anybody, or indeed of finding fault at all, but with the sole intention of eliciting the facts and showing the actual condition of affairs in their proper light.

In going over the long list of expeditions and campaigns conducted by General Arolas and of the casualties on both sides, one can not help but express admiration, surprise, or blame as to the justice or advisability of the policy pursued, its motives, conduct, and effect. For, if the treaty of 1878 was still in force--and there is no reason to suppose that it was abrogated--why did Governor Arolas inst.i.tute new rules and conditions pertaining to the sultanate and render compliance with them necessary for qualification and confirmation? If by virtue of the prerogative of sovereignty it was deemed necessary to interfere with Sulu internal affairs and customs for a beneficial and good purpose, why was it not right then to oppose and check Datu Aliyud Din as soon as it became evident that the majority of the Sulus wanted Amirul Kiram as sultan and Aliyud Din had refused to honor the governor"s proposals and recommendations? Why was it not considered right for the Government to object to war between the contending parties from the beginning and to a.s.sume for itself all the powers and prerogatives of a protector or arbitrator? If the good of the Sulus was the ultimate object sought, why was not the rightful heir supported from the beginning and advantage taken of such an opportunity to enlist the sympathy of one party, at least, on the side of the Government, strengthen the weak head of the nation, and bring order and tranquillity out of chaos and anarchy?

Apparently the worthy cause of peace and Sulu welfare were completely overlooked, while the main object of a.s.serting power and gaining supremacy was pressed and prosecuted at the expense of a thousand souls and war with every strong chief throughout the whole Archipelago. Governor Arolas trampled on the treaty, a.s.sumed arbitrary and absolute authority, and treated noncompliance with his wishes as disloyalty and insurrection. This att.i.tude might have been due to his peculiar military training and ideas, but it was certainly unjust and overbearing. Nations can not be trampled under foot without bringing about resentment and retaliation and people can not be treated as privates in a company of disciplinarios or deportados. The result of such coercion is hatred, and the effect of abuse is enmity. Such methods do not tend to civilize a country or better its chances of progress. They kill ambition, harden the heart, and dull the senses. The first step toward the progress of a subordinate nation is imitation of its superior; but imitation is generally engendered by admiration and kindly influences, and cruel warlike measures are certainly disposed to kill such good agencies.

Sulu military operations ceased soon after the arrival of Governor-General Weyler in Manila, and some of the Jolo forces were withdrawn.

General Arolas left Jolo in 1893 and was succeeded by Col. Cesar Mattos, who was in turn followed by Gen. Venancio Hernandez before the end of the same year. The successors of General Arolas did not have similar motives for upholding Harun"s sultanate against overwhelming odds. They saw in him a weak and vacillating sultan who was a burden to the state. Consequently Sultan Harun was relieved in 1894, and he returned to his home in Palawan. During his inc.u.mbency Sultan Harun lived at Mubu in the vicinity of Jolo. The house he occupied was the best building ever occupied by a Sulu sultan. He was ambitious and willing to reform his people, but he never had a strong following and was very unfortunate in that he had to fight so hard and so often for a nominal allegiance and false support from his people.

RULE OF SULTAN JAMALUL KIRAM II

Raja Muda Amirul Kiram, who fought and suffered so long for the throne of his father and brother, succeeded Sultan Harun and a.s.sumed the name of Sultan Jamalul Kiram II. He was not obliged to go to Manila in order to be vested with proper authority by the Governor-General, but it seems that he pledged himself in one way or another to pay some tribute to the Spanish Government, and consequently a decree was issued by Governor-General Blanco on March 1, 1894, directing a general census of the Moros of the Sulu Archipelago and the collection of a tax of 1 real [222] from each individual. The proceeds of this tribute, after deducting the allowances made for the interpreters and collectors, were to be devoted to the development of the inst.i.tutions of Jolo, and especially to the construction of roads. It is said that the sultan was unable and unwilling to collect the tribute so decreed, but that he paid from his own purse the sum of P10,000 or its equivalent on the basis of a population of 100,000 and at the rate of 1 real per person. The collection of this tax was abandoned in the following year and was never resumed.

The Sulus" adherence to the cause of Jamalul Kiram II was not based on any personal influence he exerted on the people, but on the influence of his mother and the people"s devotion to the house of Jamalul Kiram I. Datu Aliyud Din"s claim was theoretically strong, but for various reasons his party weakened; while Amirul Kiram, though a fugitive, gradually gained in influence and rose to power.

The administration of Governor Hernandez was the longest in duration next to that of Governor Arolas and was, on the whole, peaceful and tranquil. On one occasion in 1895 hostilities broke out with Datus Julkarnayn and Kalbi, and the Sulus of Lati and Patikul attacked the town of Jolo causing several casualties. However, peace was soon restored by Governor-General Blanco and no further hostilities occurred. Governor Hernandez built the direct road, known as the Asturias Road, which leads from the gate of the walled town to Fort Asturias. About 1897 General Hernandez was relieved by Col. (later Brig.-Gen.) Luis Huerta, the last Spanish governor of Sulu.

Spain evacuated Sulu in May, 1899, and Jolo was garrisoned by American troops on the same day. On the 20th of August Gen. J. C. Bates concluded a treaty with Sultan Jamalul Kiram II, generally known as the "Bates Agreement," and the sovereignty of Sulu pa.s.sed from Spain to the United States of America. [223]

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

POLITICAL STATUS OF SULU AT THE TIME OF SPANISH EVACUATION

The cause for which Governor Arolas shed the blood of several hundred Spanish soldiers and killed some thousands of Moros was utterly defeated. The tenacity with which the Sulus resisted Spanish domination, their obdurate opposition and bravery in battle, and their obstinate pa.s.sive resistance in peace, baffled all Spanish efforts to subvert their political organization or gain a single point of advantage without paying too dearly for it. The Sulus succeeded at last in inaugurating their candidate as Sultan of Sulu. Their laws and the administration of their internal affairs were not interfered with. Their religion, social conditions, national usages and customs were unaffected by any change whatsoever. Spanish influence and jurisdiction did not extend beyond the limits of the garrison and no material reform or progress reached the Moro community through that channel. No effort was made by Spain to educate the Sulus and no adequate measure was proposed by her governors which was applicable to the needs of the Sulus and acceptable to their ideas. The Sulus felt that there was a strong inclination on the part of the Spanish Government or some of its recognized agents to change their religion and destroy their national unity, and consequently they never had complete confidence in Spanish officers and representatives and repulsed every influence that tended to establish close relations between them and the Christians of the Spanish garrison.

No tax or tribute was collected from the Sulus, and their territory was exempted from the operation of the laws of the Philippine Islands. Sulu imports could come in Sulu craft free of duty and unhampered by any vexatious regulation. Duties could be collected by Sulus at all ports unoccupied by Spain; and if hostilities could have been brought to an end, the Sulus, in their pursuit of the peaceful vocations of life, might have felt no appreciable difficulty or inconvenience from Spanish occupation of Jolo, except the loss of the revenues of the ports of Jolo and Siasi and some control over the trade of the Chinese.

Slavery remained an established inst.i.tution of the land and its continued practice among the Moros was neither denounced nor restricted. The pearl industry remained in the hands of the Sulus and pearl fishers and sh.e.l.l dealers paid a variable tax to the sultan and local chiefs. Piracy was completely suppressed, and the invasion of Christian communities and the capture of Christians as slaves by Sulus terminated at the conquest of Jolo in 1876.

Before the campaign of 1876 the sultan ruled with a strong hand, lived in state, was prosperous and had considerable wealth. The princ.i.p.al datus lived at Jolo, and the Sulu forces were united. Jamalul A"lam remained rich until his death, but subsequent wars and licentiousness reduced the estate of his sons. The separation and dispersion of the datus, however, weakened the Sulus more than any other cause. Each datu began to feel more or less independent of the other, their jealousies increased and became more intense and effectual; their forces were disunited, and each chief relied solely upon his own fortifications and following. United action was ignored or became impracticable. Soon the subordinate chiefs began to feel their importance, gradually a.s.serted their rights, and a.s.sumed greater dignity and power in proportion to their prosperity and the following they could command. Jamalul A"lam ruled firmly, had every chief under his control, and held the state intact. Three chiefs outside of his house were sufficient to sign the treaty he made with Spain. These were Datu Harun, Datu Raja Lawut Zaynul "Abidin (Asibi), the father of Datus Kalbi and Julkarnayn, and Datu Muluk Bandarasa Pula, the son of the famous Datu Daniel, and the father of the present Datu Pula-pula of Mubu or Tandu. No maharajas or hadjis figured prominently in those days, and the panglimas served as state messengers.

As soon as it became known that Jamalul A"lam was dying a condition bordering on anarchy arose and disorder prevailed as in the days of Badarud Din. Things grew worse during the regency of Datu Aliyud Din, and worse still during the civil strife between the latter and Raja Muda Amirul Kiram. General Arolas and Sultan Harun had to fight every chief in his turn and every island by itself. Each chief felt independent of the rest of the country and had his own ideas as to who should be appointed sultan. Each datu was defended by his own men only and each had to meet the Spanish forces by himself unaided. Even Maymbung had to face the mighty foe with forces which could be a.s.sembled from the immediate neighborhood only. Small detachments did sometimes reenforce the forts of their neighbors, but the proportion of help so extended to the actual strength of the forces that could have been united was so insignificant that no account can be taken of such cooperation.

Thus the total or combined strength of Sulu was reduced to small, insignificant and disunited ent.i.ties; the power of resistance to outside invasion was diminished, but at the same time the susceptibility of the country to foreign influence became nil. It was an easy matter for General Arolas to defeat one party or chief alone, but the necessity of fighting each chief by himself defeated his purpose and efforts in the end. Unconsciously, Spain brought on an abnormal condition of affairs in Sulu, extremely difficult to manage and for which she never found the proper remedy. The ruling sultan, though well supported by the greater ma.s.s of the people, had neither the knowledge, the tact, nor the strength necessary to correct the wrong done, and things in general tended rather to the worse than to the better. The parties created by the civil strife of 1884 existed in 1899 with very little change, and their enmity had become deeply rooted and ineradicable. The whole northern portion of the island east of Jolo and eastern Tandu represented a distinct party unfavorable to Jamalul Kiram II and at times seemed to be wholly under the leadership of the two brothers, Datus Kalbi and Julkarnayn. Similar parties existed in Tapul, Lugus, Siasi, and the Tawi-tawi Group, many settlements having two chiefs, one representing the sultan and the other the hostile party. To add evil to existing wrong, the chiefs took advantage of this condition and vacillated in their alliance from one party to another as it seemed to them more advantageous for the time being. General Arolas fought both parties, incurred the bitter enmity of all chiefs and gained for himself and the cause of prosperity no advantage whatsoever. All the Sulus hated Spain at heart and welcomed the end of her sovereignty, with the hope of having more peace and better relations with her successor.

SPANISH POLICY

ATt.i.tUDE OF THE MOROS

The vivid picture presented by the history of Sulu thrills the reader with scenes of horror, cruelty, and misdirected energies. On one page we read of how a rich and mighty sovereign stretched his hand across the border of his domain into the territory of his weak neighbor and coveted his jewels and treasure, and, being refused, struck terror, desolation, and destruction in the home of the latter. On another page we read how, as if possessed by a mighty demon, that weak and petty king-neighbor summoned the powers of the wind and sea to his aid, marched upon his strong enemy in the night, a.s.sailed him while unaware, robbed his house, and carried his people away to work for his homely sustenance. The mighty sovereign wakens in the morning, and in his rage curses his wretched neighbor and swears vengeance upon him and his wicked fellow nomads of the sea, but the rich and mighty lord of the north has enemies and rivals in the west and far south and does not dare leave his home unguarded. Part of his available warriors he thought would be sufficient, and their valor and patriotism were counted on as an additional a.s.set and a sure guaranty of victory. The sails of a gigantic fleet were unfurled and chariots and steeds were provided for the triumphal march into the enemy"s pearl land. But the mighty sea rolled and the furious winds blew and the giant did not prove a match for the weak, for man can not go against nature, and valor is a poor aid against overwhelming odds. Yet some men"s hearts are made of stone and one or two experiences do not teach them enough; so we see the same scene repeated time and time again, until an opportune moment arrived and a new chapter was opened in which we find the rich sovereign richer and mightier. This time nature takes sides with might and turns the scales against the weak and petty king of the south and leaves him wrecked and stranded on his coral reefs.

The Sulu is a Malayan of prominent type, reared in his infancy by a Brahman priest and brought up to maturity under the care of a Mohammedan instructor. He rejected his idols as early as 1450 and had been for more than a century prior to the arrival of Legaspi at Cebu, a faithful and devoted worshipper of "Allahu Ta"ala," the Almighty and only G.o.d, according to the teaching of the prophet Mohammed and the holy Quran. He had laws, an established government, an organized state, an alphabet, and a system of education. By trade he was a planter and fisher, and both land and sea yielded him plenty. He turned the timber of his rich forests into boats and utilized the currents of the sea and the movements of the wind. Navigation came natural to him, and he sailed to distant lands and traded his pearls for silks and spices. He had a wide range of experience, and his knowledge of the world was by no means restricted to one island or to one limited group of islands.

The dominion of the Sultan of Sulu was complete and his power was well respected throughout the Archipelago. Between Mindanao and Borneo 150,000 people--Yakans, Samals, and Sulus--lived and obeyed one man. True, the Sulus had no standing army or navy, but they had innumerable boats, forts, and firearms, and every able-bodied man was a soldier and a sailor, always armed, and always ready for a call to arms. His immediate neighbors were pagans, or "infidels," who paid him homage and tribute. He was the master of the land and the lord of the southern seas. He was chivalrous in his manners and received his friends with liberal hospitality; but he wasted no sympathy or kindness on his enemy. The enemy of the state was also an enemy to "Allahu Ta"ala," and no life was deemed too dear to sacrifice for the cause of home and G.o.d. It was the idea of his home that started the blood rushing through his veins, and religion fittingly fanned the flame and heated his blood to the boiling point. There is honor even among thieves, and a nation made up of fierce pirates need not go begging for dignity, gallantry, and self-pride. Let the Sulu be idolatrous or a fire worshiper and he will "go juramentado" on the strength of his faith in wooden or fire G.o.ds before he yields to a master or serves as a slave. He will die before he surrenders. Such metal is what makes the Sulus brave, independent, and unyielding.

The Sulus watched the progress of Legaspi at Cebu, Panay, and Luzon, saw how the pagan chiefs were subjugated, and witnessed the expulsion of their brother Mohammedans from Manila. They had played this role themselves, and when the enemy reached their sh.o.r.es they needed no word of explanation or stimulus to resist, except that which they had in their breeding and general make-up. Spain instigated hostilities and coveted their domain; it was not their part to yield, but it was Spain"s clear duty to reestablish peace before the evils resulting from war outweighed the good obtained. This she failed to do, and the Sulus were invaded repeatedly and hara.s.sed constantly. Bitter animosity filled the hearts of the Sulus, and a desire for revenge prompted them to retaliate; and what can be expected from people of their race and civilization except cruelty and barbarity in war! We know that "war is h.e.l.l" among highly civilized nations and why should we expect of the Sulus a moral conduct out of proportion to their intellectual development and the influences of their civilization and religion? The life of an "infidel" was not a matter of religious concern to them at all. The Prophet himself led his people against nonconformists and promised them reward instead of pardon or intercession before G.o.d. The Quran taught them that patriotism is a part of their religion, and love of home and family left no place for cowardice and no patience with humiliation. They therefore fought well and fought cruelly. They raided the enemy"s country, robbed him, and carried away many slaves. Slavery was also sanctioned by their religion and formed an established custom or method of punishment which took the place of imprisonment and saved the expense of jails and guards.

Humanity called for different action on both sides; but it evidently made no impression on the Sulus. Not satisfied with just measures of war and direct retaliation, they developed an abnormal propensity for piracy, invaded the Spanish domain frequently for the procurement of slaves and for other wicked purposes, and committed unspeakable horrors and atrocities. But to treat evil with evil adds no virtue to the credit of the other side. We rarely read of wounded Moros after an engagement, and, strange to say, all wounds of Moros were invariably immediately fatal. If few Moros were ever kindly treated after battle, certainly many more were promptly dispatched in a manner that terminated suffering and life at the same time.

MISTAKES AND DIFFICULTIES OF SPANISH RULE

Had Spain exerted more effort to increase the Jolo garrison in 1646 and trusted the charge of this garrison to an able and upright administrator, the fruits of the brilliant conquest of General Corcuera would not have been lost, and in all probability the trouble with Sulu would have been ended before the termination of the seventeenth century. However, instead of this course, weak characters were charged with the management of affairs, and in place of permanent and strong occupation of the land an insignificant treaty was made with the Sulus with no intention on the part of Spain of keeping it permanently and with no hope that it would be kept by the Sulus. Similar mistakes were frequently repeated and a cruel inhuman strife marked with an astounding profuseness of bloodshed and terrible loss of life and evil of all sorts, was prolonged for the s.p.a.ce of three hundred and twenty years without any advantage that is worth considering.

In consequence of all this, the Sulu has been pictured to the outside world as a black devil incarnate, borne in mischief and conceived in iniquity; without a human characteristic, barbarous and savage as his second cousin the orang-utan of Borneo. The Sulu had no means or chance of pleading his cause before an international court, and his cry could not be heard or registered by a foreign hand or press. He was not met except with a predetermination to fight him. He was not approached except with the intention of sharing his treasure. He was not invited except to surrender his right of government and no alternative was offered him except tribute or death. It is out of reason to expect such people to abandon their customs, traditions, government, and religion without a struggle. It is out of reason to expect them to yield to threats and be daunted by a bombsh.e.l.l shot from a distance. The jungle is thick and extensive, their boats and sails are ready and light; they know the routes of the sea and can follow the currents of the ocean in the dark as well as in the light. The coasts of Borneo and the Celebes are not too far from them, and living there is as cheap and easy as at home. It is beyond reason to expect that all sultans, datus, and panglimas will resign their offices, give up their rank and privileges, and be content to plant corn on the hillside or catch fish along the beach. The laws of nature are not ambiguous, and man is man whether his skin is white or brown.

The chief difficulties Spain had to contend with in the south arose out of the natural weakness of her system of administration. Her Governors-General changed frequently. The Moro question received a secondary attention, and no definite policy or settled course of action was ever systematically worked out and followed. What Corcuera planned was not carried out by his successors, and measures which were approved by General Terrero were disapproved by General Weyler and ignored by General Blanco. Had Governor-General Urbiztondo preceded Governor-General Claveria, Jolo might have been attacked and conquered before 1851, and had Governor-General Malcampo preceded Governor-General Urbiztondo, the garrison of Jolo might have been established twenty-five years earlier.

The policy of Governor Parrado was not followed by Governor Arolas, and the plans and pledges of the latter were not fully respected by his successors. Treaties were made to be broken rather than to be obeyed, and at the end of three hundred and twenty years of protracted relations with Sulu, no satisfactory policy can be said to have been decided upon at either Madrid or Manila. The treaty of 1878 was a temporary expedient. It was not intended to express a policy nor did Spain intend to restrict her influence to the provisions of a treaty nor to tie her hands so fast for any length of time. Spain was intent on the complete conquest of Sulu, the a.s.similation of all the Moro tribes, and the unification of government, religion, and civilization throughout the Philippine Archipelago. This ideal was the hope of all governors of Sulu and formed a concealed motive that prompted their actions and guided their administration. The governors of Sulu differed only in their ideas as to the length of time which should pa.s.s before the Sulus should be denied their autonomy, and the methods by which the change could be best brought around. There were opportune and inopportune times to interfere, which were left for the Governor-General to decide, and in the majority of cases his decision was controlled not by the immediate needs of the occasion, but by interests pertaining to the general administration of the Archipelago, which left partial attention and inadequate means available for the solution of the vexatious difficulties in the south. Generals who were anxious to distinguish themselves, took the first opportunity that offered itself, but satisfied themselves with the immediate results of victory or the simple correction of the wrong calling for military action, without bearing in mind the general situation and the requirements of the next step that should be undertaken as part of a course planned for the carrying out of a settled general policy. Thus bound to observe the general provisions of the treaty of 1878, and limited in the authority granted them from Manila and in the strength of the garrison a.s.signed to Jolo, the governors of Sulu felt their hands completely tied, and consequently they could not accomplish much and left matters to drift with the current of events.

During the governorship of General Terrero, Governor Arolas was given a free hand and sufficient troops to carry out his plan; but Arolas was not much more than a fighting man and an excellent post commander, and the evils of his strenuous measures outweighed the good he accomplished; and when the Jolo garrison was subsequently reduced by Governor-General Weyler his policy could not be continued and was necessarily doomed to utter failure.

However, n.o.body was quicker to note such mistakes and to observe the needs of the situation than the Spanish officers themselves, especially inspectors-general who were commissioned to investigate matters and conditions in Sulu, and historians who made a study of Sulu affairs.

REPORT OF BALTASAR GIRAUDIER

Of works of this nature we give brief accounts of the estimable report of Baltasar Giraudier, Director of the "Diario de Manila,"

which was presented to the Governor-General, Domingo Moriones, in 1880, and the noteworthy remarks and recommendations of the author of "Apuntes sobre Jolo," Miguel A. Espina, colonel of infantry.

Baltasar Giraudier accompanied General Malcampo to Jolo in 1876 and made special inquiry into the situation in the south. He clearly stated that the terms of the treaty of 1851 could not be carried out (to advantage). Failure to observe this treaty provoked the sultan and Sulus to impatience, resistance, and a rebellious att.i.tude. Referring to the Jolo campaign of 1876 he estimated the strength of the attacking army at approximately 11,000 troops, and described Jolo as an actual churchyard, held in a constant state of siege, and a great cost to the nation in men and money. Naked facts, he a.s.serted, did not justify former expeditions, and hostilities were often provoked for ulterior motives. Considerable harm resulted from such misdirected measures, while much good to both nations could have been derived from a policy of attraction, frank, loyal, and disinterested. He called the attention of the authorities to the necessity of a faithful observance of the terms of treaties, in order to expect and demand with right and respect a reciprocal observance of such treaties by the Moros; to the advisability of honoring and strengthening the authority of the sultan in order to secure his good will and cooperation in maintaining peace and harmony and in repressing the evil tendencies of rebellious datus and subchiefs; to the great advantages that may arise from reestablishing the salary of the sultan and promoting those friendly relations which tend to strengthen the Sulu alliance and render this state a stronghold and a protecting wall against invasion from foreign countries. He condemned the treaty of 1878 as limiting the government"s freedom of action and checking the progress and success of the nation"s policy.

He reiterated that there is great need and necessity of defining the policy of the nation relative to Sulu and the Moro country in general. Such a grave question should be settled on a firm basis and should not be subject to the caprice of an individual governor or commander of a war vessel. No opportunity should be allowed for ignorance, malice, false pretexts, and ulterior motives that defame the national honor, weaken the policy of the government, or work to the detriment of the people and the country. He pointed to several incidents of wrong conduct or imprudence on the part of officials which provoked trouble and war and left on the Moros an impression that the Spaniards were acting deceitfully and in bad faith. The general policy he outlined for the information of the government and for the uniform conduct of all officials was submitted in the form of recommendations, the most important of which are briefly noted as follows:

1. The sultan and datus should be treated with respect and consideration.

2. Immediate justice and impartiality should be strictly administered and practiced in all cases and under all conditions, especially when crime or outrage is committed against the Moros; for such action would demonstrate in an impressive manner an upright conduct which would command the fullest respect of the Moros and obedience to law and order.

3. It is of the utmost importance that the belief, temples, and cemeteries of the people be respected.