Here Euthydemus, interrupting him, said, "And indeed these G.o.ds are in this respect more favourable to you than to the rest of mankind, since, without expecting you to consult them, they give you notice of what you ought or ought not to do." "You will allow, therefore, that I told you true," said Socrates, "when I told you there were G.o.ds, and that they take great care of men; but expect not that they will appear to you, and present themselves before your eyes. Let it suffice you to behold their works, and to adore them, and be persuaded that this is the way by which they manifest themselves to men, for among all the G.o.ds that are so liberal to us there is not one who renders himself visible to confer on us his favours. And that Supreme G.o.d, who built the universe, and who supports this great work, whose every part is accomplished in beauty and goodness; He, who is the cause that none of its parts grow old with time, and that they preserve themselves always in an immortal vigour, who is the cause, besides, that they inviolably obey His laws with a readiness that surpa.s.ses our imagination; He, I say, is visible enough in the so many wondrous works of which He is author, but our eyes cannot penetrate even into His throne to behold Him in these great occupations, and in that manner it is that He is always invisible. Do but consider that the sun, who seems to be exposed to the sight of all the world, does not suffer us to gaze fixedly upon him, and whoever has the temerity to undertake it is punished with sudden blindness. Besides, whatever the G.o.ds make use of is invisible; the thunder is lanced from above, it shatters all it finds in its way, but we see it not fall, we see it not strike, we see it not return. The winds are invisible, though we see the desolations they daily make, and easily feel when they grow boisterous.
If there be anything in man that partakes of the divine nature it is his soul, which, beyond all dispute, guides and governs him, and yet we cannot see it. Let all this, therefore, teach you not to neglect or disbelieve the Deity, because He is invisible; learn to know His presence and power from the visible effects of it in the world around you; be persuaded of the universal care and providence of the all-surrounding Deity from the blessings He showers down upon all His creatures, and be sure to worship and serve this G.o.d in a becoming manner."
"I am sure," said Euthydemus, "I shall never derogate from the respect due to the G.o.ds; and I am even troubled that every man cannot sufficiently acknowledge the benefits he receives from them." "Be not afflicted at that," said Socrates, "for you know what answer the Delphian Oracle is wont to return to those who inquire what they ought to do in order to make an acceptable sacrifice. "Follow the custom of your country," says he to them. Now, it is a custom received in all places for every man to sacrifice to them according to his power; and by consequence there is no better nor more pious a way of honouring the G.o.ds than that, since they themselves ordain and approve it. It is indeed a truth that we ought not to spare anything of what we are able to offer, for that would be a manifest contempt. When, therefore, a man has done all that is in his power to do, he ought to fear nothing and hope all; for, from whence can we reasonably hope for more, than from those in whose power it is to do us the greatest good? And by what other way can we more easily obtain it, than by making ourselves acceptable to them?
And how can we better make ourselves acceptable to them, than by doing their will?"
This is what Socrates taught, and by this doctrine, which was always accompanied with an exemplary devotion, he greatly advanced his friends in piety.
CHAPTER IV. INSTANCES OF THE INVIOLABLE INTEGRITY OF SOCRATES.--HIS CONVERSATION WITH HIPPIAS CONCERNING JUSTICE.
Concerning justice, it cannot be said that Socrates concealed his opinion of it, for he plainly revealed his sentiments by his actions, as well in public as in private, making it his business to serve every man, and to obey the magistrates and the laws; insomuch, that as well in the army as in the city, his obedience and uprightness rendered him remarkable above all others. He fully discovered the integrity of his soul, when he presided in the a.s.semblies of the people; he would never pa.s.s a decree that was contrary to the laws; he alone defended the cause of justice against the efforts of the mult.i.tude, and opposed a violence which no man but himself was able to resist. Again, when the Thirty commanded him anything that was unjust, he did not obey them. Thus, when they forbid him to speak to the young men, he regarded not their inhibition, and when they gave orders to him, as well as to some other citizens, to bring before them a certain man, whom they intended to put to death, he alone would do nothing in it, because that order was unjust. In like manner when he was accused by Melitus, though in such occasions others endeavour to gain their judges by flatteries and ignominious solicitations, which often procure them their pardon, he would not put in practice any of these mean artifices that are repugnant to the laws, and yet he might very easily have got himself acquitted, if he could have prevailed with himself to comply in the least with the custom, but he chose rather to die in an exact observance of the laws, than to save his life by acting contrary to them, for he utterly abhorred all mean or indirect practices; and this was the answer he gave to several of his friends who advised him to the contrary.
Since I am now ill.u.s.trating the character of Socrates with regard to justice, I will, at the same time, relate a conversation I remember he had with Hippias of Elis on that subject.
It was a long while that Hippias had not been at Athens; and being arrived there, he happened to come to a place where Socrates was discoursing with some persons, and telling them that if any one had a mind to learn a trade, there wanted not masters to teach him; nay, that if one would have a horse trained up there were persons enough to undertake it; but that if one desired to learn to be a good man, or to have his son, or any of his family taught to be so, it would be difficult to know to whom to apply himself. Hippias rallying him, said:--"What!
Socrates, you are still repeating the same things I heard you say so long ago." "Nay, more," replied Socrates, "and always upon the same subject; but you, perhaps, being learned as you are, do not always say the same thing upon the same subject." "Indeed," said Hippias, "I always endeavour to say something new." "Is it possible," replied Socrates?
"Pray tell me if you were asked how many letters there are in my name, and which they are, would you answer sometimes in one manner and sometimes in another? Or if you were asked whether twice five be not ten, would you not always say the same thing?" "In subjects like those,"
said Hippias, "I should be obliged to say the same thing as well as you; but since we are upon the theme of justice, I believe I can now say some things of it, against which, neither you nor any man else can make any objection." "Good G.o.d!" cried Socrates, "what a mighty boast is here!
Upon my word, Hippias, you have made an admirable discovery! and you have reason to value yourself upon it; for, let me tell you, if you can establish one single opinion of justice, the judges will be no longer divided in their sentiments, there will be no more quarrels, no more suits at law, no more seditions among citizens, no more wars between republics. Indeed, it much troubles me to leave you before you have taught me this secret, which you say you have discovered." "I give you my word," answered Hippias, "that I will tell you nothing of it, till you have first declared your own opinion concerning justice; for it is your old way to interrogate others, and then to laugh at them by refuting what they have said; but you never make known your own opinions, that you may not be obliged to give a reason for them." "Why do you lay this to my charge," said Socrates, "since I am continually showing to all the world what are the things I believe to be just?" "How do you show it?" said Hippias. "If I explain it not by my words," answered Socrates, "my actions speak it sufficiently; and do you think that actions deserve not rather to be believed than words?" "Much rather," said Hippias, "because many may say one thing, and do another; nay, we see that, in fact, many who preach up justice to others are very unjust themselves; but this cannot be said of a man whose every action is good, and that never in his life did an unjust thing." "Have you known, then," said Socrates, "that I have accused any man out of malice, that I have sown dissension among friends, that I have raised seditions in the Republic; in short, that I have committed any other sort of injustice?" "Not in the least," said he. "Well, then," added Socrates, "do you not take him to be just who commits no manner of injustice?" "It is plain, now,"" said Hippias, "that you intend to get loose, and that you will not speak your mind freely, nor give us an exact definition of justice. For all this while you have only shown what just men do not, but not what they do." "I should have thought," said Socrates, "I had given at once a good definition, and a clear instance of justice, when I called it an aversion from doing injustice. But since you will not allow it to be so, see whether this will satisfy you: I say, then, that justice "is nothing but the observance of the laws."" "You mean," said Hippias, "that to observe the laws is to be just?" "Yes," answered Socrates. "I cannot comprehend your thought," said Hippias. "Do you not know," pursued Socrates, "what the laws in a State are?" "The laws," answered Hippias, "are what the citizens have ordained by an universal consent." "Then," inferred Socrates, "he who lives conformably to those ordinances observes the laws; and he who acts contrary to them is a transgressor of the laws."
"You say true." "Is it not likewise true," continued Socrates, "that he who obeys these ordinances does justly, and that he obeys them not does unjustly?" "Yes." "But," said Socrates, "he who acts justly is just, and he who acts unjustly is unjust?" "Without doubt." "Therefore," said Socrates, "whosoever observes the laws is just, and whosoever observes them not is unjust." "But how can it be imagined," objected Hippias, "that the laws are a good thing, and that it is good to obey them, since even they that made them mend, alter, and repeal them so often?" To this Socrates answered, "When you blame those who obey the laws, because they are subject to be abrogated, you do the same thing as if you laughed at your enemies for keeping themselves in a good posture of defence during the war, because you might tell them that the peace will one day be made: and thus you would condemn those who generously expose their lives for the service of their country. Do you know," added he, "that Lycurgus could never have rendered the Republic of Sparta more excellent than other States if he had not made it his chief care to incline the citizens most exactly to observe the laws? This, too, is what all good magistrates aim at, because a Republic that is obedient to the laws is happy in peace, and invincible in war. Moreover, you know that concord is a great happiness in a State. It is daily recommended to the people; and it is an established custom all over Greece to make the citizens swear to live in good understanding with one another, and each of them takes an oath to do so. Now, I do not believe that this unity is exacted of them, only that they might choose the same company of comedians, or of musicians, nor that they might give their approbation to the same poets, or all take delight in the same diversions, but that they may all unanimously obey the laws, because that obedience is the security and the happiness of the State. Concord, therefore, is so necessary, that without it good polity and authority cannot subsist in any State, nor good economy and order in any family.
"In our private capacity, likewise, how advantageous is it to obey the laws? By what means can we more certainly avoid punishments, and deserve rewards? What more prudent conduct can we observe, always to gain our suits at law, and never to be cast! To whom should we with greater confidence trust our estates or our children, than to him who makes a conscience of observing the laws? Who can deserve more of his country?
whom can she more safely entrust with public posts, and on whom can she more justly bestow the highest honours, than on the good and honest man?
Who will discharge himself better of his duty towards his father or his mother, towards his relations or his domestics, towards his friends, his fellow-citizens, or his guests? To whom will the enemy rather trust for the observing of a truce, or for the performance of a treaty of peace?
With whom would we rather choose to make an alliance? To whom will the allies more readily give the command of their armies, or the government of their towns? From whom can we rather hope for a grateful return of a kindness than from a man who strictly obeys the laws? and, by consequence, to whom will men be more ready to do good turns, than to him of whose grat.i.tude they are certain? With whom will men be better pleased to contract a friendship, and, consequently, against whom will men be less inclined to commit acts of hostility, than against that person who has everybody for his well-wisher and friend, and few or none for his ill-wishers or enemies? These, Hippias, are the advantages of observing the laws. And now, having shown you that the observance of the laws is the same thing with justice, if you are of another opinion, pray let me know it." "Indeed, Socrates," answered Hippias, "what you have said of justice agrees exactly with my sentiments of it." "Have you never heard," continued Socrates, "of certain laws that are not written?"
"You mean the laws," answered Hippias, "which are received all over the earth." "Do you think, then," added Socrates, "that it was all mankind that made them?" "That is impossible," said Hippias, "because all men cannot be a.s.sembled in the same place, and they speak not all of them the same language." "Who, then, do you think gave us these laws?" "The G.o.ds," answered Hippias; "for the first command to all men is to adore the G.o.ds." "And is it not likewise commanded everywhere to honour one"s father and mother?" "Yes, certainly," said Hippias. Socrates went on:--"And that fathers and mothers should not marry with their own children, is not that too a general command?" "No," answered Hippias, "this last law is not a Divine law, because I see some persons transgress it." "They observe not the others better," said Socrates; "but take notice, that no man violates with impunity a law established by the G.o.ds.
There are unavoidable punishments annexed to this crime; but we easily secure ourselves from the rigour of human laws, after we have transgressed them, either by keeping ourselves hid, or defending ourselves by open force." "And what is this punishment," said Hippias, "which it is impossible for fathers, who marry with their own children, to avoid?" "It is very great," said Socrates; "for what can be more afflicting to men, who desire to have children than to have very bad ones?" "And how do you know," pursued Hippias, "that they will have bad children? What shall hinder them, if they are virtuous themselves, from having children that are so likewise?" "It is not enough," answered Socrates, "that the father and the mother be virtuous: they must, besides, be both of them in the vigour and perfection of their age. Now, do you believe, that the seed of persons who are too young, or who are already in their declining age, is equal to that of persons who are in their full strength?" "It is not likely that it is," said Hippias. "And which is the best?" pursued Socrates. "Without doubt," said Hippias, "that of a man in his strength." "It follows, then," continued Socrates, "that the seed of persons who are not yet come to their full strength, or who are past it, is not good." "In all appearance it is not." "In those ages, then, we ought not to get children?" said Socrates. "I think so."
"Such, therefore, as indulge their l.u.s.t in such untimely fruition will have very weakly children?" "I grant they will." "And are not weakly children bad ones?" "They are," said Hippias.
"Tell me, further," said Socrates, "is it not an universal law to do good to those who have done good to us?" "Yes," said Hippias, "but many offend against this law." "And they are punished for it," replied Socrates, "seeing their best friends abandon them, and that they are obliged to follow those who have an aversion for them. For are not they the best friends who do kindnesses whenever they are desired? And if he who has received a favour neglect to acknowledge it, or return it ill, does he not incur their hate by his ingrat.i.tude? And yet, finding his advantage in preserving their goodwill, is it not to them that he makes his court with most a.s.siduity?" "It is evident," said Hippias, "that it is the G.o.ds who have ordered these things; for, when I consider that each law carries with it the punishment of the transgressor, I confess it to be the work of a more excellent legislator than man." "And do you think," said Socrates, "that the G.o.ds make laws that are unjust?" "On the contrary," answered Hippias, "it is very difficult for any but the G.o.ds to make laws that are just." "Therefore, Hippias," said Socrates, "according to the G.o.ds themselves "to obey the laws is to be just.""
This is what Socrates said on the subject of justice, and his actions being conformable to his words, he from day to day created a greater love of justice in the minds of those who frequented him.
CHAPTER V. OF THE MISCHIEFS OF INTEMPERANCE, AND THE ADVANTAGES OF SOBRIETY.
I will now set down the arguments that Socrates used to bring his friends to the practice of good actions, for being of opinion that temperance is a great advantage to such as desire to do anything that is excellent, he first showed them, by his way of living, that no man was more advanced than himself in the exercise of that virtue; and in his conferences he exhorted his hearers above all things to the practice of it, and his thoughts being continually employed in the means of arriving to be virtuous, he made it likewise the subject of all his discourses.
I remember that talking once with Euthydemus concerning temperance he delivered himself to this effect:--"In your opinion, Euthydemus, is liberty a very valuable thing?" "To be valued above all things,"
answered Euthydemus. "Do you believe that a man who is a slave to sensual pleasures, and finds himself incapable of doing good, enjoys his liberty?" "Not in the least." "You allow, then, that to do good is to be free, and that to be prevented from doing it, by any obstacle whatever, is not to be free?" "I think so," said Euthydemus. "You believe, then," said Socrates, "that debauched persons are not free?" "I do." "Do you believe likewise," continued Socrates, "that debauchery does not only hinder from doing good, but compels to do ill?" "I think it does." "What would you say, then, of a master who should hinder you from applying yourself to what is honest, and force you to undertake some infamous occupation?" "I would say he was a very wicked master,"
answered Euthydemus. "And which is the worst of all slaveries?" added Socrates. "To serve ill masters," said Euthydemus. "Therefore,"
inferred Socrates, "the debauched are in a miserable slavery." "No doubt of it." "Is it not debauchery, likewise," said Socrates, "that deprives men of their wisdom, the n.o.blest gift of the G.o.ds, and drives them into ignorance and stupidity, and all manner of disorders? It robs them of leisure to apply themselves to things profitable, while it drowns them in sensual pleasures; and it seizes their minds to that degree that, though they often know which is the best way, they are miserably engaged in the worst." "They are so." "Nor can we expect to find temperance nor modesty in a debauched person, since the actions of temperance and debauchery are entirely opposite." "There is no doubt of it," said Euthydemus. "I do not think neither," added Socrates, "that it is possible to imagine anything that makes men neglect their duty more than debauchery." "You say true." "Is there anything more pernicious to man," said Socrates, "than that which robs him of his judgment, makes him embrace and cherish things that are hurtful, avoid and neglect what is profitable, and lead a life contrary to that of good men?" "There is nothing," said Euthydemus. Socrates went on:--"And may we not ascribe the contrary effects to temperance?" "Without doubt." "And is it not likely to be true that the cause of the contrary effects is good?" "Most certainly." "It follows, then, my dear Euthydemus," said Socrates, "that temperance is a very good thing?" "Undoubtedly it is." "But have you reflected," pursued Socrates, "that debauchery, which pretends to lead men to pleasures, cannot conduct them thither, but deceives them, leaving them in disappointment, satiety, and disgust? and have you considered that temperance and sobriety alone give us the true taste of pleasures?
For it is the nature of debauchery not to endure hunger nor thirst, nor the fatigue of being long awake, nor the vehement desires of love, which, nevertheless, are the true dispositions to eat and drink with delight, and to find an exquisite pleasure in the soft approaches of sleep, and in the enjoyments of love. This is the reason that the intemperate find less satisfaction in these actions, which are necessary and frequently done. But temperance, which accustoms us to wait for the necessity, is the only thing that makes us feel an extreme pleasure in these occasions." "You are in the right," said Euthydemus. "It is this virtue, too," said Socrates, "that puts men in a condition of bringing to a state of perfection both the mind and the body, of rendering themselves capable of well governing their families, of being serviceable to their friends and their country, and of overcoming their enemies, which is not only very agreeable on account of the advantages, but very desirable likewise for the satisfaction that attends it. But the debauched know none of this, for what share can they pretend to in virtuous actions, they whose minds are wholly taken up in the pursuit of present pleasures?" "According to what you say," replied Euthydemus, "a man given to voluptuousness is unfit for any virtue." "And what difference is there," said Socrates, "between an irrational animal and a voluptuous man, who has no regard to what is best, but blindly pursues what is most delightful? It belongs to the temperate only to inquire what things are best and what not, and then, after having found out the difference by experience and reasoning, to embrace the good and avoid the bad, which renders them at once most happy, most virtuous, and most prudent."
This was the sum of this conference with Euthydemus. Now Socrates said that conferences were so called because the custom was to meet and confer together, in order to distinguish things according to their different species, and he advised the frequent holding of these conferences, because it is an exercise that improves and makes men truly great, teaches them to become excellent politicians, and ripens the judgment and understanding.
CHAPTER VI. SOCRATES" FRIENDS ATTAIN, BY FREQUENTING HIS CONVERSATION, AN EXCELLENT WAY OF REASONING.--THE METHOD HE OBSERVED IN ARGUING SHOWN IN SEVERAL INSTANCES.--OF THE DIFFERENT SORTS OF GOVERNMENT.--HOW SOCRATES DEFENDED HIS OPINIONS.
I will show, in the next place, how Socrates" friends learnt to reason so well by frequenting his conversation. He held that they who perfectly understand the nature of things can explain themselves very well concerning them, but that a man who has not that knowledge often deceives himself and others likewise. He therefore perpetually conferred with his friends without ever being weary of that exercise. It would be very difficult to relate how he defined every particular thing. I will therefore mention only what I think sufficient to show what method he observed in reasoning. And, in the first place, let us see how he argues concerning piety.
"Tell me," said he to Euthydemus, "what piety is?" "It is a very excellent thing," answered Euthydemus. "And who is a pious man?" said Socrates. "A man who serves the G.o.ds." "Is it lawful," added Socrates, "to serve the G.o.ds in what manner we please?" "By no means," said Euthydemus; "there are laws made for that purpose, which must be kept."
"He, then, who keeps these laws will know how he ought to serve the G.o.ds?" "I think so." "And is it not true," continued Socrates, "that he who knows one way of serving the G.o.ds believes there is no better a way than his?" "That is certain." "And will he not be careful how he does otherwise?" "I believe he will." "He, then, who knows the laws that ought to be observed in the service of the G.o.ds, will serve them according to the laws?" "Without doubt." "But he who serves the G.o.ds as the laws direct, serves them as he ought?" "True, he does." "And he who serves the G.o.ds as he ought is pious?" "There can be no doubt of it."
"Thus, then," said Socrates, "we have the true definition of a pious man: He who knows in what manner he ought to serve the G.o.ds?" "I think so,"
said Euthydemus.
"Tell me further," continued Socrates, "is it lawful for men to behave themselves to one another as they please?" "In nowise," answered Euthydemus; "there are also certain laws which they ought to observe among themselves." "And do they," said Socrates, "who live together according to those laws, live as they ought?" "Yes." "And do they who live as they ought live well?" "Certainly they do." "And does he who knows how to live well with men understand well how to govern his affairs?" "It is likely that he may." "Now, do you believe," said Socrates, "that some men obey the laws without knowing what the laws command?" "I do not believe it." "And when a man knows what he ought to do, do you think he believes that he ought not to do it?" "I do not think so." "And do you know any men who do otherwise than they believe they ought to do?" "None at all." "They, then, who know the laws that men ought to observe among themselves, do what those laws command?" "I believe so." "And do they who do what the laws command, do what is just?" "Most surely." "And they who do what is just are just likewise?"
"None but they are so." "We may, therefore, well conclude," said Socrates, "that the just are they who know the laws that men ought to observe among themselves?" "I grant it," said Euthydemus.
"And as for wisdom," pursued Socrates, "what shall we say it is? Tell me whether are men said to be wise in regard to the things they know, or in regard to those they do not know?" "There can be no doubt," answered Euthydemus, "but that it is in consideration of what they know; for how can a man be wise in things he knows not?" "Then," said Socrates, "men are wise on account of their knowledge?" "It cannot be otherwise." "Is wisdom anything but what renders us wise?" "No." "Wisdom therefore is only knowledge?" "I think so." "And do you believe," said Socrates, "that it is in the power of a man to know everything?" "Not so much as even the hundredth part." "It is, then, impossible," said Socrates, "to find a man who is wise in all things?" "Indeed it is," said Euthydemus.
"It follows, then," said Socrates, "that every man is wise in what he knows?" "I believe so."
"But can we, by this same way of comparison, judge of the nature of good?" "As how?" said Euthydemus. "Do you think," said Socrates, "that the same thing is profitable to all men?" "By no means." "Do you believe that the same thing may be profitable to one and hurtful to another?" "I think it may." "Then is it not the good that is profitable?" "Yes, certainly." "Therefore, "what is profitable is a good to him to whom it is profitable."" "That is true."
"Is it not the same with what is beautiful? For, can you say that a body or a vessel is beautiful and proper for all the world?" "By no means."
"You will say, then, that it is beautiful in regard to the thing for which it is proper?" "Yes." "But tell me whether what is reputed beautiful for one thing has the same relation to another as to that to which it is proper?" "No." "Then "whatever is of any use is reputed beautiful in regard to the thing to which that use relates?"" "I think so."
"And what say you of courage?" added Socrates. "Is it an excellent thing?" "Very excellent," answered Euthydemus. "But do you believe it to be of use in occasions of little moment?" "Yes; but it is necessary in great affairs." "Do you think it of great advantage in dangers,"
continued Socrates, "not to perceive the peril we are in?" "I am not of that opinion." "At that rate," said Socrates, "they who are not frightened because they see not the danger are in nowise valiant." "There is no doubt of it," said Euthydemus, "for otherwise there would be some fools, and even cowards, who must be accounted brave." "And what are they who fear what is not to be feared?" "They are less brave than the others," answered Euthydemus. "They therefore," said Socrates, "who show themselves valiant in dangerous occasions, are they whom you call brave; and they who behave themselves in them unworthily, are they whom you call cowards?" "Very right." "Do you think," added Socrates, "that any men are valiant in such occasions except they who know how to behave themselves in them?" "I do not think there are." "And are not they, who behave themselves unworthily, the same as they who know not how to behave themselves?" "I believe they are." "And does not every man behave himself as he believes he ought to do?" "Without doubt." "Shall we say, then, that they who behave themselves ill know how they ought to behave themselves?" "By no means." "They, therefore, who know how to behave themselves, are they who behave themselves well?" "They and no others."
"Let us conclude, then," said Socrates, "that they who know how to behave themselves well in dangers and difficult occasions are the brave, and that they who know not how to do so are the cowards." "That is my opinion," said Euthydemus.
Socrates was wont to say, that a kingly government and a tyrannical government were indeed two sorts of monarchy, and that there was this difference between them; that, under a kingly government, the subjects obeyed willingly, and that everything was done according to the laws of the State; but that, under a tyrannical government, the people obeyed by force, and that all the laws were reduced to the sole will of the sovereign.
Concerning the other sorts of government, he said: That when the offices of a Republic are given to the good citizens, this sort of State was called aristocracy, or government of good men; when, on the contrary, the magistrates were chosen according to their revenues, it was called a plutocracy, or government of the rich; and when all the people are admitted, without distinction, to bear employments, it is a democracy, or popular government.
If any one opposed the opinion of Socrates, on any affair whatever, without giving a convincing reason, his custom was to bring back the discourse to the first proposition, and to begin by that to search for the truth. For example: if Socrates had commended any particular person, and any stander-by had named another, and pretended that he was more valiant, or more experienced in affairs, he would have defended his opinion in the following manner:--
"You pretend," would he have said, "that he of whom you speak is a better citizen than the person whom I was praising. Let us consider what is the duty of a good citizen, and what man is most esteemed in a Republic. Will you not grant me, that in relation to the management of the public revenue, he is in the highest esteem who, while he has that office, saves the Republic most money? In regard to the war, it is he who gains most victories over the enemies. If we are to enter into a treaty with other States, it is he who can dexterously win over to the party of the Republic those who before opposed its interests. If we are to have regard to what pa.s.ses in the a.s.semblies of the people, it is he who breaks the cabals, who appeases the seditious, who maintains concord and unity among the citizens." This being granted him, he applied these general rules to the dispute in question, and made the truth plainly appear, even to the eyes of those who contradicted him. As for himself, when he undertook to discourse of anything, he always began by the most common and universally received propositions, and was wont to say, that the strength of the argumentation consisted in so doing. And, indeed, of all the men I have ever seen, I know none who could so easily bring others to own the truth of what he had a mind to prove to them. And he said that Homer, speaking of Ulysses, called him "the certain or never- failing orator," because he had the art of supporting his arguments upon principles that were acknowledged by all men.
CHAPTER VII. METHOD TO BE OBSERVED IN STUDY.--ARTS AND SCIENCES NO FURTHER USEFUL, THAN THEY CONTRIBUTE TO RENDER MEN WISER, BETTER, OR HAPPIER.--VAIN AND UNPROFITABLE KNOWLEDGE TO BE REJECTED.
I presume now, that what I have said has been a sufficient evidence of the frankness and sincerity with which Socrates conversed with his friends, and made known his opinions to them. It remains now that I should say something of the extreme care Socrates showed for the advancement of his friends, and how much he had at heart that they might not be ignorant of anything that could be useful to them, to the end they might not want the a.s.sistance of others in their own affairs. For this reason, he applied himself to examine in what each of them was knowing; then, if he thought it in his power to teach them anything that an honest and worthy man ought to know, he taught them such things with incredible readiness and affection; if not, he carried them himself to masters who were able to instruct them. But he resolved within himself how far a person who was well-educated in his studies ought to learn everything.
Thus for geometry he said, that we ought to know enough of it not to be imposed upon in measure when we buy or sell land, when we divide an inheritance into shares, or measure out the work of a labourer, and that it was so easy to know this, that if a man applied himself ever so little to the practice of such things, he would soon learn even the extent and circ.u.mference of the whole earth, and how to measure it; but he did not approve that a man should dive into the very bottom of this science, and puzzle his brains with I know not what figures, though he himself was expert in it, for he said he could not see what all those niceties and inventions were good for, which take up the whole life of a man, and distract him from other more necessary studies.
In like manner he was of opinion that a man should employ some time in astronomy, that he might know by the stars the hour of the night, what day of the month it is, and what season of the year we are in, in order that we might know when to relieve a sentinel in the night, and when it is best to venture out to sea, or undertake a journey, and, in short, that we might know how to do everything in its proper season. He said that all this was easily learnt by conversing with seamen, or with such as go a-hunting by night, or others who profess to know these things; but he dissuaded very much from penetrating farther into this science, as even to know what planets are not in the same declination, to explain all their different motions, to know how far distant they are from the earth, in how long time they make their revolutions, and what are their several influences, for he thought these sciences wholly useless, not that he was ignorant of them himself, but because they take up all our time, and divert us from better employments. In fine, he could not allow of a too curious inquiry into the wonderful workmanship of the Deity in the disposition of the universe, that being a secret which the mind cannot comprehend, and because it is not an action acceptable to G.o.d to endeavour to discover what He would hide from us. He held, likewise, that it was dangerous to perplex the mind with these sublime speculations, as Anaxagoras had done, who pretended to be very knowing in them, for in teaching that the sun was the same thing as fire, he does not consider that fire does not dazzle the eyes, but that it is impossible to support the splendour of the sun. He did not reflect, neither, that the sun blackens the sky, which fire does not; nor lastly, that the heat of the sun is necessary to the earth, in order to the production of trees and fruits, but that the heat of fire burns and kills them. When he said, too, that the sun was only a stone set on fire, he did not consider that a stone glitters not in the fire, and cannot last long in it without consuming, whereas the sun lasts always, and is an inexhaustible source of light.
Socrates advised, likewise, to learn arithmetic, but not to amuse ourselves with the vain curiosities of that science, having established this rule in all his studies and in all his conferences, never to go beyond what is useful.